

The Case of the Schizophrenic *Musterknabe*: Comparing the Hungarian and the European Security Strategy

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I. Background: the road to the adoption of the Hungarian National Security Strategy

The first attempt to create a conceptual national security document after the change of regime started in 1990. In the beginning of 1991 the Foreign Ministry elaborated a security policy concept parallel to the efforts of the Ministry of Defence to present a concept of national defence. The two documents were presented to parliament in June 1991 but they were never made public and eventually were not adopted. The rapid change of Hungary's environment rendered the whole concept obsolete and new documents were being elaborated. The first official Hungarian security policy concept was finalised at the beginning of 1993 and the parliament adopted it in the form of two separate documents: the "*Basic Principles of the Security Policy of the Republic of Hungary*" and "*Basic Principles of National Defence of the Republic of Hungary*".

The further ongoing changes in Hungary's security environment and the invitation of the country to begin accession talks with NATO in 1997 made it inevitable to review the security documents. Finally in December 1998 the parliament adopted a resolution on „*The Basic Principles of the Security and Defence Policy*” of Hungary. The significance of this new document can be summarised as follows:

It unified, in one document, the basic principles of security policy and defence policy;

The emphasis shifted from EU to NATO: with regard to security guarantees by membership in international organisations;

The emphasis on the problems of transition in the region shifted toward global problems¹;

Finally, the “floating” position on the issue of borders – originally present in the first document – disappeared from the later version.²

The *Basic Principles* of 1998 occupies a very special place in the hierarchy of internationally established standard national security documents. It is a kind of Hungaricum – it is one level above the classic National Security Strategies in terms of abstractness. At this time Hungary did not possess any National Security Strategy or further strategies, such as a National Military Strategy.

1 The typical security concern of early nineties had to do – as the document put it – “with the ongoing changes in the neighbouring countries” that is it was a very much region-specific security perception. In addition, the typical problems of the surrounding region were the problems of transition from the previous regime to the new one, such as economic backwardness, difficulties of the transition to market economy, conflicts between nations, and the unsolved problems of ethnic minorities. The 1998 document represents a change: it considers the problems of transition basically solved and it focuses more on global security problems.

2 “We reject the change of borders by force” repeated the document the that time Hungarian position on the issue that implicitly allowed for the peaceful change of borders – that was so bitterly opposed by most of our neighbours.

Hierarchy of security documents

“Standard”	Hungarian
	Basic Principles
NSS	NSS
	sectoral strategies

The currently valid NSS was adopted by the government on 31 March 2004. The document was formulated on the basis of the parliamentary resolution of December 1998. This document substituted the first NSS adopted by the previous government on 6 May 2002.

There are some critical remarks to be made at this point with regard to some circumstances of the adoption the NSSs of 2002 and 2004. The first thing to be noted is that after having waited for 3,5 years (since December 1998), the NSS was adopted not at parliamentary level but as a government decree. Further, the 2002 strategy can be qualified as a kind of “election document” as it was adopted during the parliamentary elections between two voting rounds, whereby after the first round it was clear that the government parties were going to lose their majority in the parliament. These two things led to a considerably lower level of legitimacy.

The new government that entered office in 2002 immediately withdrew the freshly adopted security strategy and began the elaboration of a modified one. This work ended in the adoption of a government decree on 31 March 2004. Once again it was a step that did not favour increased legitimacy: there was no pressing need for the renewal of the previous document, it was done primarily for the reason of the change of governments.

The comparison of the two NSSs shows the following picture:

Both have a similar structure I. Values and interests, II. Security environment and challenges, III. Objectives and tasks;

The only structural difference is that the new one contains a chapter on the “Instruments to implement” the objectives;

The current one foresees the elaboration of 10 so-called sectoral security strategies;³

Terrorism came to the fore in the challenges chapter (as opposed to proliferation of WMD in the previous): the elaboration of a separate sectoral security strategy is foreseen by the document;

A new category of security challenges appeared in the new version’s chapter on “Internal challenges”: political and religious extremism.

II. Comparing national strategies and union level security documents

II. 1. The comparability of the two documents

When attempting to compare the security strategy of the European Union and that of the Republic of Hungary, there are several differences and similarities we can expect to find even before starting a textual comparison of the two documents. As to the similarities, we can

3 These are: military, secret service, law enforcement, economic-financial, human resource, social policy, information technology, disaster relief, environment protection, and finally terrorism

count on essential overlaps (even in wording) between the respective documents. First of all, Hungary has been involved in CFSP processes not only since its accession to the EU but also as a candidate country, and took part in the debate about shaping the new Europe by sending members to the convention that assumed the work of creating a constitution for the Union. Apart from the obvious “community of interests” with the EU (deriving from the country’s geographical position, political establishment, economic and social conditions), and the co-operation in CFSP affairs in the pre-accession period, an important point could be that the current Hungarian Security Strategy was issued only a few months after the ESS, on 31st March 2004 and by this, it could rely on the European counterpart, also by incorporating its statements and approaches. As the introduction puts it, “The National Security Strategy... is in line with NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept and the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Union in 2003.”⁴ Possible differences could be derived from the unlike “history” of the documents. The Union, created by the Maastricht Treaty, established a CFSP (“including the eventual framing of a common defence policy”) as an intergovernmental wing of a supranational community. Later found adequate tasks for this policy in the Amsterdam Treaty by taking over the Petersberg tasks from the WEU, on the initiative of the former neutral countries Finland and Sweden. Then started rapidly building its institutions, and what is more, its military and civilian capabilities for its CFSP/ESDP (starting from the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in 1999), later to assume certain tasks under the heading “fight against terrorism”, and to arrive, at last, at the document, the ESS, that determines its main security interests and provides the guideline for the future use of its capabilities. This process (policy → tasks → capabilities) is quite different in the case of a sovereign nation state.

Further differences arise from the “quality” of the entities to which these documents belong. A national security strategy has a different scope in respect of geography (areas of interest) or threats, including a different perception of role. There is to be expected a divergence in instruments listed as available or needed, in players and principles. Also the tradition of national defence and historical experiences adds special foci and features to the NSS.

To sum it up, a NSS is more and less than the ESS. More, as it includes additional areas in a vertical sense. Then, the foreign and security policy of the EU is not a substitute to the foreign and security policies of the respective member states, but (only) a co-ordination mechanism for them, aiming to create added value from, and to make use of, the Union’s potential in promoting pan-European interests. I.e. taking in view the different levels of integration (“community” and “intergovernmental” instruments) in certain policy areas and the division of power between the Union and its member states, a NSS does, of course, cover more areas and disposes over more instruments than the ESS.

A NSS is, at the same time and in a horizontal sense, less than the ESS. The ESS is tailored for an entity of a greater volume, as to its size, scope, capabilities and role to play. Also, there could be policy areas in which – due to the very nature of “integration” – national interests can only be formulated in the framework of a community approach, i.e. where an exclusively national solution is not possible anymore (e.g. questions of economic security). The question that is to be examined is whether (or, to what extent) the HSS is a – nationally orchestrated, proportionally smaller – pendant or implementation of the ESS.

4 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, Government Resolution No. 2073/2004 (III. 31.). We quote the English version of the strategy, http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/archivum/Kulugyminiszterium/EN/Ministry/Departments/NATO/National_Security_Strategy.htm

II. 2. The European integration in the HSS. The EU's CFSP as a means of Hungarian foreign policy

On the one hand, the authors of the HSS kept the ESS in view when formulating the Hungarian document, as it was adopted a few months after its European pendant had been passed by the European Council. This could be regarded as an immediate influence on the HSS. On the other hand, the HSS, as the summary of Hungarian security policy, takes account of the European integration as a factor determining national interests and influencing the means of security policy, thereby displaying an indirect effect of the European Union. The introduction of the HSS states that “the basic guarantee of its [Hungary's] security is the co-operation taking place in the framework of NATO and EU.” One of the reasons why a new security strategy was passed is that (the coming) accession to the European Union brings new tasks that have to be reflected in the new document. The HSS sees the membership in NATO and EU, the co-operation with partners and allies as a primary framework for security policy and reminds to make use of the advantages brought by integration. As the HSS states, globalisation, interdependence and integration processes changed the substance and forms of national interests, “with a significant part of the particular national interests of the individual countries now embedded in the framework of common interests. Hungarian national interests can and need to be asserted in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic integration...”

The HSS emphasises the importance of the EU's CFSP in shaping Hungarian foreign policy and sees an opportunity for Hungary to exert a greater influence on global processes as an EU member. Also the account of *the country's position as a small member state* is already present in the document, as it underlines – besides that Hungary is interested in having an effective and strong EU – that the equality of rights and solidarity between the member states be respected. As to the HSS, Hungary should aim at deepening its economic and political integration and actively participate in shaping the EU's policies. Though Hungarian interests should be asserted as widely as possible in the framework of the EU's external relations, the ultimate dissolution of the Hungarian foreign policy in the ever deepening CFSP should be avoided too. As the most important questions of Hungarian interests are central problems in the EU's external actions as well, CFSP/ESDP can be regarded as an important means of Hungarian foreign and security policy. The HSS gives an overview of issues that are of particular interest for Hungarian foreign policy in the European framework. As to the HSS, these issues of common interest are: close transatlantic co-operation, developing the partnership with the US, the EU's neighbourhood policy with an emphasis on its Eastern direction, engagement in the Balkans (with the perspective of EU membership for the countries concerned), and the implementation of minority rights. These are the fields where Hungary expects mutual reinforcement between its own policies and those of the Union.

III. Comparing the structure

By and large, the chapters of the HSS correspond with the main parts of the ESS. These are:

ESS	HSS
Introduction	[Introduction]
–	I. Values and Interests
I. The Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats	II. Security Environment – Threats, Risks, Challenges
II. Strategic Objectives	III. Objectives and Tasks
III. Policy Implications for Europe	IV. Instruments to Implement the National Security Strategy
–	V. Sectoral Strategies
Conclusion	–

III. 1. Introduction

In this (short) part, the ESS exposes the necessity on behalf of the EU of getting actively involved internationally, especially in tackling global problems, whereas the HSS describes the basic features of Hungary’s security (NATO and EU; no military threats; new challenges) and gives an overview of preceding strategic documents.

III. 2. Values and Interests

In this (in the ESS entirely missing) chapter, the “fundamental values” on which the national security interests of Hungary are based, are outlined. They are derived from a comprehensive definition of security and comprise peace, security, stability, sovereignty, democracy, the rule of law, freedom of enterprise and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the security, prosperity and advancement of the citizens and the preservation of the cultural heritage and identity of the Hungarian people. Also the integration process is taken into consideration when the national security interests are formulated: as the HSS states, “Hungarian national interests can and need to be asserted in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic integration, which extends to policy and economy, as well as foreign and security policy and defence.” The national security interests are then listed as belonging to ten main groups: 1. Interests relating to sovereignty, democracy, rule of law; 2. Economic, social and cultural development; 3. International peace and security, international law; 4. Progress of the integration process in the framework of the European Union; 5. Preservation of NATO’s central role; 6. Spread of democratic values; 7. Stability and integration of the CEEC and SEEC, including the implementation of the rights of Hungarians living in these countries; 8. Stability in Ukraine and Russia and their rapprochement to the institutions of Euro-Atlantic integration; 9. Stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and countering the threats to it, as terrorism or proliferation of WMD; 10. Multilateralism in international relations.

The values and interests on which the EU’s external action is based, on the other hand, are formulated in documents other than the ESS. The first attempt to summarise these can be found in the Maastricht Treaty establishing both the European Union and its CFSP. As to the fundamental rights and freedoms, the proclamation of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union by the presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in December 2000 was an important step. However, the charter did not become a part of the *acquis* at that time. The incorporation of the Charter into the constitutional treaty however, will make it legally binding – only after, of course, the ratification of the

constitution by all member states. From our point of view, Title V of the MT (later amended by the AT) giving a common security and foreign policy to the Union, is more interesting, as it (besides to stating that the Union has to assert its identity on the international scene) lists those values and interests that the CFSP has to promote. These are: common values, fundamental interests and the independence of the Union; the security of the Union and its member states; peace and international security; promotion of international co-operation; democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁵

III. 3. Challenges and Threats

The ESS divides the problems the EU is facing into two groups: “global challenges” and “key threats”. The former do not have an immediate effect on the Union itself, but through the interdependence (the vulnerability) created by the process of globalisation, that links external and internal aspects of security. These challenges are: wars, diseases, poverty, conflicts, competition for natural resources, global warming, energy dependence. Key threats, on the other hand, are imminent dangers to the Union. These are: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. These threats are also linked, i.e. one leads to another (e.g. regional conflict could lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure).

The HSS emphasises the parallel existence of traditional security risks and new challenges. The HSS categorises them in a state-centred way with a geographical approach, in concentric circles as 1. Global challenges (terrorism; proliferation of WMD; unstable regions, failed states; illegal migration; economic instability; challenges of the information society; global, natural, man-made and medical sources of danger); 2. Regional challenges (CE; SEE; CIS; Mediterranean, Near East, Middle East⁶); 3. Internal challenges (organised crime; illegal economy and corruption; spreading of drugs; political and religious extremism; demographic challenges). The difference between the ESS’s and the HSS’s approach is that on the one hand, the ESS differentiates between challenges by their immediacy (imminent key threats and globally present challenges), on the other hand, the HSS categorises them with a view of the target of their effect and the means to be used for tackling them – that is why the division seems somewhat blurred (the heading “internal challenges” containing organised crime and spreading of drugs that are by nature transnational threats).

III. 4. Objectives and Tasks

This is the most important chapter in both documents. The ESS identifies three strategic objectives: 1. Addressing the threats. The ESS emphasises that the Union has already done a lot in this area, esp. fighting terrorism, proliferation and regional conflicts. In the case of the new threats, “the first line of defence will often be abroad” and defence (so that it fits the complex nature of the threat itself) will require a mixture of instruments. In this respect, “the European Union is particularly well equipped”. 2. Building security in our neighbourhood. Next to the immediate neighbourhood, the ESS lists the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the Middle East (esp. the Arab-Israeli conflict), the Mediterranean and, with a broader view, the Arab world as areas of particular interest. 3. International order based on effective multilateralism. Here, the most important organisations of global, transatlantic and regional importance and the policies (confidence building, arms control regimes, spreading of good governance, trade and development policies) that can be promoted by them, are listed. This chapter of the ESS mixes tasks and the means to achieve them.

5 Title V, Art. J.1 (2) of the Treaty on the European Union, OJ C191, 29 July 1992

6 NB The HSS, somewhat confusing the terminology, uses the term „Near East” for Middle East and „Middle East” for referring to Central Asia.

The HSS, too, seems to have made a similar mix-up, though sticking to the categories of the Challenges and Tasks chapter. Here, the main objectives and tasks are: 1. Goals and tasks related to international organisations (NATO; the European Union; transatlantic co-operation; United Nations; OSCE; economic diplomacy); 2. Relations with the countries of the region (bilateral and regional level; Hungarians living in neighbouring countries; CIS countries); 3. Action against global threats and challenges (terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflict management, state-building, humanitarian assistance; Schengen co-operation, border management, migration; development co-operation; challenges to open societies; protection of information systems; protection of the natural and human environment). 4. Action against internal challenges (organised crime; illegal economy and corruption; spreading of drugs; political and religious extremism; demographical challenges). (If, again, the main aspect of categorisation is the forum where the given challenge could be addressed, it is hardly comprehensible why the third group, action against global challenges, could not be distributed between the others.)

III. 5. Means and Instruments

The ESS exposes this section under the title “Policy Implications for Europe”. As a matter of fact, the ESS does not contain any chapter in the traditional sense devoted to list the instruments applicable to the implementation of its tasks and objectives. The document refers at some places to the fact that the EU does have a range of instruments indeed and is well equipped to tackle multi-faceted challenges. The chapter currently under scrutiny qualifies future actions of the EU in the following way: 1. More active in pursuing the Union’s objective (active policies in the “full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention... including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development policies”; the ability of sustaining several operations simultaneously; preventive engagement); 2. More capable (better use and pooling of resources; a wider spectrum of missions); 3. More coherent (among EU instruments, external activities of the member states; coherent policies regionally); 4. Working with partners (multilateral co-operation and strategic partnerships with key actors).

The HSS first lists 1. The “strategic” sources of an effective security policy: stability, solid economical and civilizational fundamentals, and national identity. Improvement of economic performance is further emphasised; 2. Political means (diplomatic, economic and cultural co-operation); 3. Military and other means to participate in collective defence and crisis management activities; 4. National security services; 5. Closer co-operation between the institutions of law enforcement (police, border guards, disaster-relief).

III. 6. Sectoral strategies

The final chapter of the HSS sets out the creation of sectoral strategies implementing the HSS, in a co-ordinated manner. The sectors in which such strategies have to be created are listed in the introduction: military, national security, law enforcement, economics and finance, human resource development, information systems and protection, disaster relief, environmental security and the fight against terrorism. As to the ESS, the inclusion of the community-type external policies into the foreign policy of the Union under the new constitutional treaty may lead to a better co-ordination of instruments and policies, implementing the ESS also in a sectoral approach.

III. 7. Conclusion

In a short conclusion, the ESS emphasises the Union’s potential for making a major contribution on a global scale, and the wish of establishing an effective multilateral system.

IV. Comparing the content

IV. 1. Challenges and Threats

The central parts of the two strategic documents, i.e. the chapter dealing with challenges, threats, and risks are practically identical. This concerns, first of all, the hierarchy of threats. The HSS repeats the first four points of the ESS, namely terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure. The first difference arrives at the fifth point, whereas, instead of the ESS's concluding point of "organised crime", a threat that does not figure in the Hungarian text (it is located somewhere else – among internal threats), the HSS lists further points, such as illegal migration, economic instability, challenges of the information society, global natural, civilizational and health risks. To continue the differences, in the Hungarian text two further levels are included – below the global one –, namely, regional challenges, and internal challenges. Thus the Hungarian document seems to be more systematically elaborated and deeper structured.

Threat perceptions

ESS GLOBAL LEVEL	HSS GLOBAL LEVEL
terrorism	terrorism
proliferation of WMD	proliferation of WMD
regional conflicts	unstable regions,
state failure	failed states
	illegal migration
	economic instability
	challenges of the information society
	global natural, civilizational and health risks
	REGIONAL LEVEL
	Central Europe
	South-eastern Europe
	CIS countries
	Mediterranean, Near East, Middle East
	INTERNAL LEVEL
organised crime	organised crime
	shadow economy, corruption
	drug proliferation
	political and religious extremism
	demographic challenges

As to threat number one defined as terrorism in both documents, certain nuances have to be mentioned. Although the Hungarian document literally borrows the term “strategic threat” when referring to terrorism, it treats terrorism as a rather abstract phenomenon, avoiding any references to Hungary as either a transit or target country. Thus the occurrence of terrorism as a strategic threat in the HSS seems to be resulted by an alignment to the European interpretation, by making a “homework” of foreign policy, and terrorism as a threat remains something far-away, clinically clean, for that we only care for reasons of solidarity. Even when listing the tasks related to fighting terrorism, the HSS only emphasises international co-operation or tasks that make possible for Hungarian authorities to participate in this international co-operation. The general impression is that terrorism is put on the first place rather mechanically copying the European document. This observation appears to be even more valid against the background of a rather consensual evaluation in Hungary that there are marked differences in the level of terrorist threat in the US, Western Europe or Central Europe.

It might be interesting to note that the HSS, contrary to the ESS, avoids linking terrorism and religious extremism. Though it deals with political and religious extremism, it is listed as an internal challenge, without any reference to terrorism, while the European document, surprisingly enough, explicitly links the most recent wave of terrorism to “violent religious extremism”.

IV. 2. Regional dimension

The ESS also deals with the regions neighbouring the Union, this part is included in the chapter dealing with the “strategic objectives” while the similar Hungarian document elaborates on the regions that are relevant in the chapter having to do with “challenges, threats and risks”.

REGIONS OF OBJECTIVES	REGIONS OF CONCERN
	Central Europe
East/Balkans	South-eastern Europe
East/Southern Caucasus	CIS countries
Mediterranean	Mediterranean, Near East, Middle East
Middle East/Arab-Israeli conflict	

Besides the fact that the relevant regions are treated in different functional chapters of the two documents, it is also important to note that there is a substantial overlap of them. At the same time, the emphases differ considerably. The overlap covers the Balkans, parts of the post-Soviet space, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the differences have to do with Central Europe and Middle East that are missing from the list of the Union. The ESS does not mention the whole CIS region, but rather, (referring to the countries of the former Soviet Union as “our neighbours in the East”) puts strong emphasis on the Southern Caucasus. As to the substance, Hungary’s concern seems to be much narrower and just mechanically listing – among others – the Middle East, which is named a “strategic priority” for Europe.

Central Europe, as most of the countries that are thought to belong to this region were about to become members of the EU at the time of the ESS’s formulation, does not feature as a region of foreign policy-related interest in the ESS. The HSS also takes account of the change to be brought by these countries’ accession to the Union. According to the HSS, stability of the Central European and South-eastern European region and democratic transformation of the neighbouring countries is of great importance for the Hungarian foreign

policy. Special emphasis is put on democratic transformation, human rights, and rights of national and ethnic minorities when dealing with the neighbouring countries, with a view to the Hungarian minorities living there. Besides promising help and support to the integration efforts of those countries that do not accede to the institutions of integration in the same time as Hungary, the HSS also deals with organisations and groupings of regional co-operation. Referring to the importance of cross-border and regional co-operation, the HSS states that Hungary has to play an active role in fora like the Visegrád co-operation, the Central European Initiative and the Quadrilaterale. This commitment is all the more interesting since most of these groupings were regarded as a substitute to European integration prior to EU accession, and so they seemed to be deemed to oblivion in case the countries concerned became an EU member. Still, the HSS sees an important role for them also in the future as they serve for preserving the dialogue between countries that have already acceded to NATO and EU, and those that have not, thereby preventing the emergence of dividing lines. Obviously in this respect the HSS makes a fine difference between organisations the membership of which was completely devoured by the EU (e.g. the Visegrád co-operation) and groupings that have a mixed membership (e.g. the Quadrilaterale). However, “The issue of what kind of role regional organisations and groupings such as the Visegrád co-operation may play following integration requires further examination.” I.e. the HSS does not know an answer to the question if there is a place for Central European regional co-operation inside the EU.

The Balkans and South-eastern Europe are of a similar importance in both documents. In this respect we only emphasise the HSS’s commitment to support the ultimate goal of EU accession in the case of these countries, and the support for “the admission of countries that are prepared and fulfil the respective criteria”. A recent manifestation of this policy could be seen when Hungary fervently supported the starting of accession negotiations between the European Union and Croatia in March this year, as opposed to the majority of member states. The two documents show a significant difference when dealing with Russia and Ukraine. Whereas the ESS speaks modestly of “neighbours in the East” and refers to Russia only as a strategic partner but not as a challenge to European security, and does not mention Ukraine at all, the HSS takes account of Russia and Ukraine by identifying “durable stability based on the set of democratic values of Ukraine and Russia and their *rapprochement* to the organisations of Euro-Atlantic integration” [emphasis added] as a national security interest. The HSS, by drawing attention to Russia’s internal instability, the incomplete modernisation of its economy, and the fact that the functioning of its democratic institutions does not fully correspond to European norms, shows a more complex approach than the ESS. The HSS adds a new facet to the ESS concerning Ukraine too. There is a strong emphasis on the country’s co-operation with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, the completion of its democratic reform processes, and its successful socio-economic transformation. The accent on (this) eastern direction and the equal emphasis put on Russia and Ukraine can be identified as a Hungarian specific in the HSS. The HSS even puts its policy towards Russia and Ukraine in a European context by referring to the EU–Russia co-operation and the EU’s neighbourhood policy as means by which Hungary is able to help these countries’ *rapprochement* to Euro-Atlantic integration.

When speaking about neighbouring regions, the similarity in the formulation between the two documents is striking. When speaking about Central Europe, the HSS reminds of “the integration process and the extension of the zone of stability”. In connection with South-eastern Europe it sees a need to “prevent the emergence of new dividing lines”, whereas in case of Russia and Ukraine it identifies alleviating “the effects of European dividing lines emerging as a result of the enlargement processes” as a problem to be solved. The ESS, on the other hand, states that “our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of

the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean”, and that “it is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe.”

IV. 3. International order

The next point where divergence can be registered has to do with the topics discussed in the ESS’s subchapter on the “international order”. The first thing to be noted is that the notion of “effective multilateralism” is simply missing from the relevant part of the Hungarian document. In addition, international law does not appear in the Hungarian text in a positive way – the ESS text says “we are committed to upholding and developing” it – and is dealt with in the context of implicit criticism, arguing for the need of “adapting” it “to the new challenges”.

Points of divergence on international order

ESS	HSS
committed to international law	adjusting international law
primary responsibility of UN SC	“primary but not exclusive responsibility” of UN SC
need for effective multilateralism	–
dominant position, but “don’t go alone”	recognition of the US’s special global role

When discussing international order issues, the Hungarian paper dedicates separate paragraphs to NATO, EU, transatlantic relations, UN and OSCE (in this order). In the document there is a general tendency to put on equal footing both NATO and EU, thus re-balancing the previously unilateral preference towards NATO in security matters, but still preserving NATO as “the primary forum of transatlantic security policy dialogue and co-operation”. With regard to EU the document acknowledges the CFSP as an “ever-increasingly important framework of Hungarian foreign policy”, at the same time it formulates a “newcomer small state” kind of fear of not to let our diplomacy “diluted completely in the ever deepening Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union”. When elaborating on Hungary’s role in transatlantic relations the HSS expresses a fear of being pressed to choose between Europe and the US. In order to avoid this situation the document states that Hungary wants to be “strategic partner of the United States also as a member of the European Union and to be a NATO-ally contributing to a stronger European engagement”. This formula appears to convey a rather schizophrenic Hungarian attitude: being Atlantist in EU, Europeanist in NATO. According to the HSS, an enlarged, strong, and united Europe results in a stronger transatlantic partnership. (Finally, although it is an academic remark nevertheless it is telling in connection with the preciseness of the use of notions, NATO is many times rightly qualified as an organisation of “collective defence” but twice referred to – incorrectly – as an institution of “collective defence”.)

Small state characteristics of the Hungarian position
fear of dissolution of national diplomacy
fear of being pressed to choose between Europe and US
Atlantist in EU, Europeanist in NATO

In sum, the main paradox of the comparison of the content of HSS with ESS is that while the threat perception is mechanically copied by the Hungarian document, it substantially differs from the main points of the mainstream European security culture (see table above).

IV. 4. Hungarian specifics

There are at least two elements that should be mentioned as important parts of the HSS which are less comparable with the ESS but which are of significance when characterising the Hungarian document: the so-called sectoral strategies and the issue of Hungarians beyond the border. The Hungarian paper defines 10 further strategies to be elaborated on basis of the HSS: military, national security, law enforcement, economics and finance, human resource development, information systems and protection, disaster relief, environmental security and the fight against terrorism.

As a traditional topic and an essential part of the Hungarian foreign policy priorities the Hungarian text addresses the issue of Hungarians beyond the border in one paragraph. Leaving behind the problematic formulations typical of the early nineties (putting the issue in the context of borders or presenting this question as a pressing security problem), the document focuses on harmony with European practices, human and minority rights, and integration perspective of the states where such minorities live.

A detail that takes account of the country's accession to the European Union and the "border country" status as a result of it, is where the HSS identifies the preparation for the earliest full application of the Schengen regime as a task in the fight against global threats and challenges.

V. Conclusion

The HSS puts Hungarian foreign policy in the framework of the European Union and identifies the EU also as a means of national foreign policy. It sets tasks to be pursued through European policies, by influencing European decision making, and by asserting Hungarian interests inside the EU. It aims at making use of the chances offered by membership in the EU, and notes the "widening" of Hungarian foreign policy agenda as brought by accession. By doing this, it shows a small state approach to European integration, willing to deepen its economic and political integration, promising active participation in the EU's policies and calling for the principle of equality and solidarity between member states to be observed.

However, the comparison of the two strategic documents reveals certain important specific characteristic features of the Hungarian case.

Musterknabe. Hungary, as a good pupil, as a new member of the EU exemplarily made its homework by disciplinarily copying the threat perception of the ESS, both its threat hierarchy and components.

Latent atlanticism. The HSS – rhetorically – tries to create a balance between transatlantic and European commitments but fails to do so. The Hungarian document while seeking to present a desired balanced and complementary and co-operative relationship between the transatlantic partners, represents a latently but substantially Atlantist position on major issues of the transatlantic debate.

Small state syndrome. Certain statements of the HSS tend to point out – quite understandably – a set of small state characteristics, such as a fear of dissolution of national foreign policy in the framework of the European integration, a fear of being pressed to choose between the US and Europe in the transatlantic debate, and playing the schizophrenic role of an Atlantist in the EU and a European in NATO.

Regional focus. As it has already been stated, from a certain point of view, the HSS is more than the ESS. Although it is hard to tell whether the HSS is “more” or the ESS is “less”. The specifics of the Hungarian regional approach are a good example of this. The fact that the word “Ukraine” does not occur in the European strategy and that the ESS does not identify Russia as a “target” of the EU’s foreign policy, adds to the specificity of Hungary’s interest towards Russia and Ukraine. Another important specific field is Central Europe where Hungarian foreign policy is searching for a possible post-accession role for the groupings and organisations of the region.