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ANNEX I: A SYNOPSIS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS AS IDENTIFIED BY OUR AUTHORS

Albania

Achievements

According to Zija Bahja (2002), Albania, after reassessing current threats by foreign powers and prevailing resources, downsized its active strength of Armed Forces drastically. The personnel of 31,000 will be reduced to a final number of 16,500 in 2010. In 2000, Albania published the National Security Strategy (NSS) and supporting Defence Policy, and in 2002, approved the National Military Strategy which specifies on the implementation of the MoD Defence Policy. The NSS presents the strategic framework for the execution of MoD responsibilities at the leading Ministry for Defence issues in Albania. ‘The NSS addresses all essential aspects of national security and provides a clear picture of Albania’s perspectives on its environment, threats, risks, and enduring national interests.’

Albania has established two courses called ‘Defence College’ in the Albanian Defence Academy every year. The courses are led by civilians, military experts, certain Members of Parliament (MPs) and journalists. They focus on organising principles of effective democratic oversight and management of the military. In more detail, the courses emphasise:

- division of authority between the President and the government and suggest a clear chain of command for the military in times of peace, crisis, and war;

- legislative oversight of the military and control of the defence budget, including all minority and opposition parties in appropriate committees;
- interagency coordination;
- a civilian defence minister;
- ‘peacetime oversight of the General Staff and military commanders by civilian defence ministers and staffs’;
- ‘development of qualified civilian defence experts in the government, the legislature, and in public institutions, as well as training military officers on the principles of civilian control’;
- ‘ensuring military prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability through an active outreach programme to the nation’s citizenry’;
- ‘clarification of the role of the judiciary in the military justice system’.

Furthermore, Albania has consecutively established principles for the legal foundation for civilian control of the military. The criteria have been put in place according to the Constitution and are directly reflected in documents such as the NSS and the Defence Policy.

Regarding the educational aspect of security and defence institutions, the system provides its staff with adequate training to support efficient functioning, self-initiative and exchange of knowledge and ideas. Besides the area of civil education, employees benefit from training courses at regular intervals throughout their education. The schema of education presents itself as follows: ‘workshops, training courses, upgrading seminars and others’.

Needs

Though achievements have been made over the past two years, Albania still lacks a multi-year planning, programming and budgeting process, which links defence priorities and available resources over time.

This aspect presents a need to focus the efforts of expert formation programmes on the future, preparing proper teachers and specialists working in these spheres, as well as the parliamentarians, journalists and NGOs, concerning transparency, accountability and parliamentary oversight of defence spending.

The development of a personnel management system should also be pursued. It should help the development of a quality force, including timely retirement for all grade levels. Regarding defence policy and planning, Albania is encouraged to establish the Inter-Ministerial Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (ICI). The Committee holds a crucial role in the coordination process of country policies towards NATO and NATO member states, including participation by all leading ministries. Furthermore, the Committee presents itself as being important in reconsidering defence policies and planning within the context of general national priorities. However, this Committee requires full-time experts and certain bureaucratic principles. Experts need to be well educated in the fields of nation state and social development, ‘such as conflict and cooperation, security analysis, power and regime theory, as well as conflict resolution and transformation in the complex emergency situations’.

Concerning the defence planning system, a more developed and analytical system is necessary. The system should follow a multi-year timeline, which requires the introduction and strengthening of programming and budgeting mechanisms. Without the establishment of such a system reforms will be ineffective. ‘Therefore, the expert formation initiative needs to be focused nationwide according to the framework of the EU.’

In the field of democratic control of armed forces, expert education has not yet reached a high standard. There are only two to three teachers of

this subject in Albania. Furthermore, none of the NGOs conduct any research in those fields. Therefore, experts need to be educated with the help of short-term courses in the area of democratic control of armed forces and Civil Military Relations (CMR). In order to enhance previously mentioned structures, MoD and General Staff need to cooperate more closely and intensively to reduce suspicion and organisational tensions between the two staffs. To achieve proper and smooth transitions, trained defence specialists and military professionals with civilian working experience could provide the necessary institutional knowledge. International assistance would further allow civilians in the MoD, National Security Agencies, and the Albanian National Assembly to gain more knowledge in defence-related matters.

Regarding command and control, an existing gap still needs to be filled. It is the responsibility of the MoD and Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) to assess the modest size of the military structure. The consolidation of all service components directly under the General Staff might be viewed as a good proposal.

Concerning the education of security and defence institutions, high priorities have been set. Education in defence transformation plans and with regard to security and defence institution plans throughout the country have gained major importance. People should be trained and educated to understand and adapt to processes, changes and challenges of the new security environment. They ought to possess the ability to apply and transfer obtained information in order to benefit environment and the national security system. Specific institutions for higher education, such as Tirana University, have not yet included defence studies in their academic structure. However, the university has begun to set up courses in managing defence in democratic societies, to provide education in the area of defence, and to participate in various defence system activities.

Therefore, National Security Studies should be added as part of the structure of civilian university education. An interfaculty multidisciplinary postgraduate course should be set up and provide for the possibility of obtaining scientific degrees in the field on National

Security, in accordance with regulations applicable to higher education and scientific research.

Additionally, postgraduate institutions should offer courses of short duration that deal with strategy and security studies. 'An inter-university multidisciplinary national security study should be established including civilian universities, to provide education and training for highest-ranking positions in the management and commanding structure.'

Quality personnel present one of the crucial factors to differentiate among various armed forces. The cooperation between military and civil personnel proves important for the level of readiness of the armed forces and their ability to carry out tasks and respond to possible threats. The future should even increase the importance of civilian servants – government employees and staff members – which allows them to gain a significant functional role in the MoD and the Armed Forces in the Republic of Albania.

Improvements also need to be made in the emergency environment of the soldier. Therefore, the military education system should provide soldiers with skills that are necessary for the successful execution of their tasks and survival in the environment of operation. The country has made efforts to provide junior officers with a BSc. and BA degree in management and the possibility of electives in technology, telecommunication, navigation and political science.

However, in organising and starting the new curricula for cadets in September 2004, Albania lacks the appropriate and well qualified teachers in the fields of management, anthropology, security studies, conflict studies, research methodology, social and development studies, and political studies.

In conclusion, the Chief of the General Staff should annually propose to the Minister of Defence a selection of specialties that are in high demand for each service and support the command of the AAF. As a consequence, people from all sources could be considered for recruitment as long as their qualifications are appropriate and they meet the necessary criteria.

Bosnia and Herzegovina¹²⁴

Achievements

According to Nikola Radovanovic (2002), a lack of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) may threaten the political, social and economic development of the country. Diverse processes have already successfully contributed to internal improvements regarding security sector reform. Those include the following: the final phase of the security policy definition, beginning of the defence policy implementation, creation of the military doctrine, reduction of the armed forces, reduction of compulsory military service to six months, introduction of the civil service, an increased level of the democratic control of armed forces, better defence budget planning and transparency, creation of the State Border Service and better cooperation among interior security services.

Advisors tend to be appointed by officials in their specific mandates. Military advisors exchange and complete personal knowledge on security sector issues with other advisors. They usually benefit from detailed knowledge in military education, practice and experience. Furthermore, the majority of them have gained additional experience due to active support from international community representatives and have passed through several different training forms. In conclusion, military advisors play a crucial role in the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) decision-making and decision-implementation processes, in military diplomacy and in the defence part of overall reforms. However, they lack connections to civil parties and maintain less influential and developed social contacts.

Most non-military advisors have achieved expert knowledge in economic law. Nonetheless, huge discrepancies among different advisors can be noticed. Some have attended seminars dealing with

¹²⁴ The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official position of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

security sector reforms, whereas others still lack such experiences and have just entered the working field by means of their undergraduate diploma. Certain advisors have mastered several foreign languages and IT technologies, whereas others lack all these capacities. Therefore, non-military advisors present a less coherent group of people than military advisors. Overall, the majority of advisors have little interest in further and permanent education and training.

The category of leading civil servants includes civil servants, heads of departments and directors of directorates. An expert level is required to meet basic legal principles such as legality, transparency, publicity, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness and professional impartiality. The process for the enhancement of expert level is also supported by different international community institutions. However, at a state level, leading members predominantly present military backgrounds. The employees at the department of interior affairs maintain a special cooperation with INTERPOL. Though such advancements have been accomplished, the department itself provides no room for reform planning activities.

Parliament staffers at different parliaments consist of civil servant employees. The MPs who are of interest for our report either join work programmes of various councils, committees and delegations in association with international organisations, or actively publish on security sector issues. For many years, diverse demands for the better education and training of MPs in the security sector were ignored. Political as well as public awareness has neglected any specific means of support for an educational improvement of MPs in the security sector, either in the democratic control of armed forces or in the area of reforms. Therefore, improving factors have to be implemented on the basis of the Muslim-Croat Federation (FBiH) Parliament and the Repulika Srpska (RS) Parliamentary Assembly. Both of them play an important role regarding security sector issues.

Among military, police and law enforcement agencies, professional technical expertise is highly emphasised. Employees within those structures are all supposed to work at expert level. However, the educational background of individual employees plays a crucial role for

the successful implementation of later steps in security sector reforms. Concerning military structures, both the General Staff and Joint Command participate in reform processes. All commanding officers, usually at the rank of general, are required by law to pass through a process of the structures of the executive and legal branch in order to be eligible for possible appointment. The final nomination of every single commander has to be approved by members of the Commander of the Stabilisation Force (COMSFOR). The COMSFOR further possesses the right to dismiss any military personnel who purposely intend to threaten or disrupt the implementation of the Peace Accords.

Before 1992, several institutions educated students from high school to PhD level. Unfortunately, many of those centres were destroyed or no longer existed for various reasons. As a consequence, security sector scholars lacked appropriate opportunities to re-establish their academic authority within the country. 'Reasons were: resistance to accept changes, staying out of science for an extensive period of time, sanctions, isolation and low salaries.' Today, a total of seven universities provide an approach to Western standards by offering law studies (for example, international law) that contain links to security sector issues. Often, helpful relations to foreign universities can be established and the OSCE mission to BiH supports the establishment and work of an Inter-University Steering Committee on Security Studies.

In BiH, NGOs have gained more importance due to serious and systematic work after the year 2000. Universities originally established in ex-Yugoslavia served later during the democratisation process as an active source for the functioning process of the first NGOs. However, it has taken a long time to generate important processes on the side of NGOs dealing with the security sector. Even today, security sector issues tend to be kept classified or at least present themselves as sensitive societal topics and issues.

Several steps have been undertaken over the past couple of years to enhance the status of the media and its level of independency. Positive changes can be noticed in the media's approach to reaching international standards. The electronic and print media mainly report on security sector issues. The training of young journalists has been a crucial factor

in professionalising the media. Another attempt was made to include them into public life. However, an insufficient number of journalists has had the chance to specialise in security sector issues due to weaknesses in the educational system.

International organisations situated in BiH have employed local staffers and provided them with a unique opportunity to work directly with international experts. Most local employees hold graduate diplomas, are fluent in English and possess in-depth knowledge in IT technologies. As a result, many of them have accomplished a level of knowledge comparable to that of international experts.

Overall, possibilities in the field of expert formation remain modest in Southeast Europe. Only one institution – the Department of Criminal Sciences at Sarajevo University – provides a four year of undergraduate, as well as postgraduate studies concerning security sector issues. The Centre for European Studies offers a younger approach to the field of international relations and democracy. Those programmes have been supported by EU Tempus programmes, which symbolise a new tendency in the educational process of BiH. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, NGOs have started to take a leading role in the process of security sector expert formation. International efforts in every aspect are necessary and push the reform process forward.

Needs

Due to the complex relations network in the security sector, the demand for more competent officials is high. Regarding representatives of the executive, more top-level decision-making meetings are necessary. The meetings should focus on the enhancement of general and military diplomacy skills and develop the potential of public relations.

Concerning Parliament and parliamentary staffers, years have passed without sufficient energy and time devoted to the personal education process of security sector experts. Parliaments at the canton and district level lack specialised bodies to handle security sector issues. Members of Parliament often lack personal advisors due to lacking financial and

other appropriate resources. Additionally, parliaments at all levels are understaffed and only gain professional support in functional and technical areas. All other elements remain mostly uncovered and therefore provide another obstacle to further improvements.

Though most military employees have attended specific military academies, they often lack the knowledge on how to successfully implement new strategic concepts in the security sector. Current international seminars only provide professional development in accordance with international standards in the ARS, but cannot be specifically applied to prevailing concepts in BiH. Furthermore, staff officers that are important for security sector reforms range in terms of education, age and experience between two extremes. Therefore, this group faces a high level of incoherency which negatively impacts a common understanding and approach to reform processes. In conclusion, military experts are small in number and face professional as well as political pressure concerning their work on reforms. Then they are too numerous to be effectively trained within a short period of time.

NGOs often lack an appropriate number of experts within their institutional setting. This deficit is related to the system of higher education, which struggles to educate enough experts for possible engagement in NGOs. Also, the budgets of NGOs are fairly small, which prevents them from attracting a bigger and wider number of experts. This negative chain reaction even prevents NGOs from establishing at least one think tank in the security sector area. In conclusion, experts within NGOs demonstrate the necessary amount of motivation to learn and advance in terms of international understanding, but lack financial as well as structural support.

With regard to the media in BiH, analytical and research journalism has not been well developed. Only a short period of time has been dedicated to specialised programmes regarding the electronic media. Additionally, BiH still faces the trend of high military personnel trying to avoid publications in military magazines. Journalists also tend rather to occupy themselves with other topics than the security sector, mainly because BiH still maintains political sensitivity to security sector issues.

Bulgaria

Achievements

According to Valeri Ratchev (2002), the Bulgarian Parliament consists of a proportional representational system, which enables diverse interests and groups in society to be represented in the Parliament. As a result, prevailing policies improve the legitimacy of the political system. After 1990, the first National Security Committee was established on the order of the National Assembly. The newly established committee was further broken down into the sectors of foreign policy, defence and security, to combine similar issues under one specific state body. However, only a small percentage of parliamentarians possessed enough professional political experience to contribute successfully to further improvements within their sector. This tendency was changed after the 39th parliamentary session. More and better educated experts were consulted to improve conditions among parliamentary staffers. As a result, the current use of experts in the Parliament has never been greater since the start of the democratisation process.

Regarding the presidential staff, the first democratic president decided to establish a military cabinet that consisted of four senior officers. The overall perception of the cabinet was positive, but critics noticed a certain incompatibility between the general and presidential staff. Under the next president, the cabinet was abolished and replaced by a defence secretary. The following president decided to maintain the two advisory positions, but for the first time they were occupied by civilians. Therefore, those changes only partially contributed to positive improvements, since the ongoing disruptions weakened the fundamental structure of the system. In addition, the President is part of the Consultative Council for National Security. 'The council has a unique task by bringing together the President, the Prime Minister, all ministers being related to national security responsibilities, all parliamentary leaders and the Chief of General Staff.' The council's decisions have strong domestic and foreign implications and play an important role in the decision-making process in times of crises.

The Council of Ministers is supported by the Security Council. This separate council was established in 1998 on the basis of the national security concept. Its main tasks include the conduct and analysis of incoming information on security risks and threats, the processing of short- and long-term risk assessments, the proposition of concrete resolution plans in times of crises, and the decision on the consultation of the executive regarding the allocation and use of resources.

Concerning political cabinets, the Act of Public Administration and the Act on Civil Servants have drastically changed the area of public administration. This change positively impacted the work of law enforcement agencies, because the key elements included a transparent and clearly structured system of administration, a clear delineation of expert and political levels in the system, the introduction of political cabinets and the introduction of common educational and professional criteria as well as well-defined career paths.

Since 1997, the judiciary and executive fell under the control mechanism of European Union practices, laws and directives. The judiciary was far from up-to-date, which caused international institutions (both EU and world related), to emphasise modernising the judicial branch of the government. Since 2000, attempts have been made by way of training offers by NGO-government cooperations. Those have become characteristic for Bulgarian politics and have spread to many other fields too.

Among civil academies, universities were among the first institutions to notice a lack of knowledge and training in the security sector field. Before the 1990s, most educational programmes belonged to the military sector. For the first time, during the 1990s, expertise among civil academicians on security matters was developed. To fill the identified gap on security issues, the Centre for Personnel Training on National Security was established within the framework of the Ministry of Defence. The centre, as the only institution, provided an environment where civilian and military personnel could work together. The centre further contributed to the organisation of the first national and international conferences. Published by the centre was the security and

defence magazine called the *Bulgarian Military Review*. Besides the Centre for Personnel Training on National Security, the Police Academy presents the second important training institution. The education within the academy focuses now on three separate departments of the prevailing police system: 'The Department for the Theory of Investigative Work, Crime Prevention, and Legal Matters'. Furthermore, the Centre for Specialisation and Advanced Training has been created in recent years. In the year 1998, a Master of Arts programme on Countering Crime and Maintaining Public Order was established. The programme mainly focuses on EU law, strategic management, policing strategies, and psychology of policing.

Since 1990–91, Bulgaria maintains freedom of speech and diversity within the media throughout the country. Problems have only prevailed regarding state-owned radio and TV stations. The perception of the public towards security issues predominately depends on the level of education, access to new information and age. Those factors crucially determine the citizen's commitment to their country's security. Further, a tendency among interviewees with residency in large cities – highly educated and middle aged – are more likely to defend their country's security. After 1998, more and more people have become concerned about security sector issues.

Issues such as personnel arms reduction (especially destruction of SS 23 missiles during the summer/autumn period of 2002), the debate over the political control of the Special Services, the preparation for the integration into the NATO, and the fight against organised crime and corruption became a focus in the daily agenda of most Bulgarians.

Two reasons were led to this change: a more transparent functioning state administration and an enhanced professional reflection of the media. In conclusion, the influence of the media on defence and security issues considerably increased. Regarding the written media, the majority regularly reflect on the security situation and institutional activities. Several newspapers even hire specialised journalists to conduct in-depth news on security sector and defence issues. Concerning the electronic media, independent TV programmes with national coverage provide the best source for the state of Bulgaria. They also occupy specialised

journals on defence and security sector issues. However, independent expertise still tends to be a rarity on television.

Over time, a large number of NGOs have been established in Bulgaria. By the year 2000, a total of over 4500 were registered. Around 700 present full-time organisations. Those institutions are well funded even on a financial level and take over an amount that is equal to 1.5 per cent of the total GDP. Bulgarian NGOs further receive support from Western societies and international foundations. They attract one-tenth of all foreign investments, of which the majority is funded by EU and U.S. projects. NGOs have been a driving force in the accomplishment of democratic principles in Bulgaria. They actively support and contribute to governmental and parliamentary processes on their path to modernisation. Crucial to mention is the fact that NGOs exist in the fields of economic development, foreign policy and security, too. In this regard, an NGO commission in the National Assembly has been set up to enhance and improve control over governmental policy formation and legislative intentions.

General first efforts in the field of expert preparation were made in 1988. A significant influence on those first moves within this still young sector was the Vienna process of arms control and a non-proliferation policy. This first approach mainly dealt with international relations, arms control, early warning, and international military cooperation for conflict prevention. Further efforts have been made to exchange experts and speakers with more competent personnel in order to enhance the quality of the security sector to a maximum.

Since 1995, the Marshall Centre has provided Bulgarian experts, executives and parliamentarians with a series of seminars, workshops and conferences to support the democratisation process of the security sector and the modernisation of the security sector management. Until the year 2002, the focus was towards defence management (1995), defence planning and budgeting (1996, 1997 and 1998), civil-military planning and performance in crisis and management (1999), resource planning and management (2001). High training quality and an adequate selection of topics with regard to national needs, is guaranteed by professors from the College of International and Security Studies,

experts from the Defence Analysis Institute (Virginia), parliamentarians and experienced generals and senior officers from Germany, the USA, and other countries, as well as distinguished institutes and research centres.

Needs

Many Members of Parliament (MP) lack useful professions to contribute successfully to parliamentary committees. The highest number of MPs occupies a position in the profession of an engineer, lawyer, economist, lecturer or medical doctor. This lack of educationally prepared and experienced MPs is well portrayed by amendments and draft laws related to the national security sector. The fundamental draft laws and normative acts were prepared by executives and therefore do not properly mirror changes concerning democratisation and the power sector by parliamentarians. This practice further negatively impacted the process of overcoming the division of labour within the security sector organisations. It also had an influence on the interest of security related parliamentary committees to participate in certain training activities. In conclusion, most political parties lack members that have the knowledge and experience to effectively perform in their parliamentary job and to contribute positively to areas of change.

Parliamentarian committees lack internal knowledge on how to support permanent and invited experts. On the one hand, party members oppose the sharing of certain information with external support personnel and, on the other hand, they cannot benefit from professionalism at individual as well as parliamentary party group level.

Diverse problems exist at the presidential level. The President faces the obligation of approving diverse documents, which he is unable to do systematically due to a lack of appropriate staff. He is further prevented from an adequate access to information which would crucially assist him in executing certain acts. As a result, his actions take place without any awareness of possible consequences. The President's appointment or dismissal of the higher command of the Armed Forces could only work positively if he had a sufficient relationship to his advising experts. He

totally lacks the opportunity to create new personal connections within the prevailing system.

Generally, there is no expert organisation within the Council of Ministers that is oriented towards security issues. Additionally, the Council lacks an appropriate number of staff members, which has remained unimproved because of no political will and understanding. However, an improvement is more than necessary, because the council starts to play an important organisational and coordination role. For instance, the press secretary, as the link between military and civilian structures, lacks practice in defence and security related topics. 'This connection presents itself as the weakest connecting link in the line of communication between the uniformed and civilian sectors.' Another weak element is the fact that serious organisational problems within the political cabinet of the Ministry of Defence have been in existence since the beginning. As a consequence, the ministry is overloaded, lacks time for in-depth analysis or problems and is unable to come up with suggestions for possible solutions.

The media sector still shows problems of in-depth analysis regarding the security sector information and therefore reports more vaguely than substantially on such issues. Experts believe that the strengthening of NGO expertise and the enhancement of transparency will accordingly improve the value of media reports. To achieve further improvements, the number of journalists that focus on security policies should be increased. Possible topics could include the following: 'methods of journalist investigation in the area of security and defence policy, procedures in defence planning and procurement, illegal arms trade and proliferation, global threat of nuclear and biological weapons and the spread of political terrorism'.

An assessment of possible courses for the improvement of the security sector is crucial and of great importance. Certain key topics should be covered concerning the education in civilian universities as well as security institutions. The course titles could be listed as follows: 'Peace and war studies, national security, democracy, civil-military relation studies, governmental studies, strategic leadership, crisis management and conflict resolution, human rights and humanitarian and international

law, and national security decision making processes.’ Those previously indicated courses provide only basic improvements and therefore need to be interrelated with additional training in order to be relevant in a comprehensive modern context. Further, national security sector experts with the competency to overlook security organisations are either elected or promoted from parliamentarian, executive or management positions. Often, they negatively impact relations between society and security sector professionals due to their formal appointment. Experts from the non-governmental sector are only provided with fundamental education in the security field and, therefore, only few see themselves capable of participating in important debates. The absence of periodic forums prevents civilians and uniformed people from establishing a closer network of cooperation with each other.

In addition to general improvements within the security sector, new areas of security need to be discovered and expanded. Examples are: ‘political and criminal terrorism, non-traditional military missions abroad and at home, cross-border corruption, international crime networks and cyber criminality’. Also, more experts need to be found that are able to deal with issues in the NATO and EU context. Other areas that require more precise work on security issues include the legislative sectors of the executive and Parliament, the presidential staff, constitutional and administrative courts, the civil sector and media. Future experts should also benefit from training and educational programmes that are set up in accordance with allied countries.

What problems still remain regarding the security sector and how do they negatively contribute to its positive advancement? Many state officials still lack the ability to consider independent security organisations as being part of the security sector. Expert and policy institutions are separated in their structures and therefore prevent an establishment of a coherent security sector concept. Additional problems for a solidification of the security sector are given by the fact that professionals lack interdisciplinary knowledge, current information and major practice. Also, the tendency of political parties and private businesses to hire former security experts prevents long-term investments into education and training. The country further lacks the necessary expertise to improve the educational system according to

modern standards. Even the help of foreign experts does not always find its optimal implementation if they are not well enough aware of the political system in Bulgaria. However, possible support institutions could provide Bulgaria with help in the following areas: comprehensive programmes, security expert training programmes, professional training, multinational research and other specialised programmes.

Despite the progress that has been achieved in Bulgaria over the past ten years, security sector reform processes remain among the top priorities in the country.

In this context, the primary mission of the security sector expert formation is to prepare civilian and uniformed leaders that are skilful to formulate ends (objectives), coordinate (balance of interests), communicate (motivate), and provide resources (motivate defence as a priority).

As a prerequisite for such achievements would be excellence in the art of security vision, planning and performance skills that have not existed so far. A top programme in security sector issues would be based on actual achievements and EU/NATO practice. The following areas indicate specific programmes that serve as possible means to fill identified gaps in the security sector:

- conceptualising the security sector with a general design for security sector reform;
- education of civilian and uniformed professionals;
- training of civilian and uniformed professionals;
- training of civilian and uniformed experts;
- comprehensive and systematic security studies;
- development of a system for the collection and deliverance of security related information;
- creation of legal, administrative and social status of security experts;
- establishment of a security community.

Croatia

Achievements

According to Mladen Stanicic, Stefan Imobersteg and Jan Trapans (2002), overall achievements of Croatia include membership of the organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. Since the start of its participation, Croatia has continuously contributed to the work, tasks and goals of those institutions.

Regarding Parliament and parliamentary staffers, there have been several achievements. In 2002, Croatia officially became participant of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the beginning of the same year, the Croatian Parliament further accepted two strategic documents – National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia – which present national security and defence policy objectives in accordance with NATO's strategic concept. The National Security Strategy includes specific concepts for the restructuring of the military-territorial division, the reduction of professional brigades and the downsizing of overall military personnel. Additionally, Croatia established a network of cooperation with NATO and members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Two years earlier, the Parliament created a specific commission for the Oversight of Internal Politics and National Security Committee. The committee's main task was the surveillance of previously mentioned services to detect any possible legal rights violations of the institutions. The commission indirectly served the rights of citizens and guaranteed the proper working conduct of Internal Politics and National Security Committee.

Concerning journalism and media, the government has generally respected the protection of press and media by the Constitution. Further protected are speech, public expression and the establishment of institutions of public communication. At the beginning of 2001, the Law on State TV was adopted by the Parliament. From then on, public television has been controlled by an independent Council consisting of representatives of CSOs and confirmed by the Parliament. As a result, transparency on political control over state television was enhanced and more publicity on the identities of major media shareholders was gained.

In terms of non-governmental organisations, starting efforts were made during the first half of the 1990s. Established NGOs were conceptually and financially supported by foreign institutions and mainly contributed to solving civil or humanitarian war related problems. Additionally, prevailing NGO structures paid attention to activities of the intelligence and security structures. According to some Croat sources, several cases of abuse of political services in political interest have been documented. Currently, around 20,000 NGOs exist in Croatia and contribute to previously described tasks.

Concerning military and civil society, incongruencies between the media and military seem to be decreasing slowly, mainly through increased levels of cooperation. Improvements have been achieved through press conferences, the attendance of media representatives at seminars, public debates and open conversations organised by the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence has acknowledged the media as a means to emphasise problematic issues related to the security community and has agreed to cooperate more intensively.

Needs

As one of the aspirant transitional countries, Croatia needs to undertake technical as well as organisational steps slowly to achieve standards set by Western societies. In the field of Parliament, possibilities for education are still wanting. Most Croatian parliamentarians have not gained a chance to enhance their skills on democratic security sector reforms. Most Western influence has been directed to the military, and civilian structures have been predominantly neglected. This imbalance detracts from effective security sector reform, because it prevents a successful exchange and compatibility between civilians and the military. Therefore, military as well as civilian personnel are required to gain new skills in the political, managerial and international areas. The Parliament specifically needs to claim authority over defence plans and their implementation. Currently, Senior Ministry of Defence Officials do not report often enough to the Parliamentary Committees. As a result, inefficiencies and failures are not appropriately discussed or

communicated between Parliamentary Staff and Committees on Internal Policy and National Security. The Parliament further did not succeed in establishing the Council for Oversight Security Services (VNSS) and institutions for control and oversight. This lack of guidelines, directions, control and oversight of the services prevents the system from functioning according to democratic principles.

Croatia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) consists of over 3000 members. This number is far too high and presents a clear overpopulation within this specific sector. Most members lack adequate education in the area of security sector reform and new educational programmes are unable to properly deal with such an immense number of people. Therefore, a successful security sector reform requires the downsizing of the security and defence area community. Though government and MoD agree on downsizing the defence sector as part of the defence sector reform, no concrete plans exist among the significant documents of security, defence and military on how to implement those ideas. Furthermore, the MoD still controls and interprets too large an amount of classified and confidential information without any counter interpretation from the civil sector, such as the media. On the other hand, the media lack knowledge and an adequate number of experts to consider such sensitive topics appropriately. Press conferences are seldom organised by the MoD to increase the quality and quantity of the information being released. However, the press themselves do not always attend meetings offered by the MoD, which places the blame for a lack of communication and cooperation on both sides.

Though the Croatian media is free, diverse media segments lack adequate experts. Often, only one reporter works per media segment. The media further tends to pursue the path of a tabloid press and neglects serious and quality research, as well as reports. An imbalance exists with regard to the dissemination into English and local languages. Information is predominantly disseminated into English rather than local languages. The distribution is rather limited, especially regarding the electronic press. The Croatian website has been under construction for over one year without any success. The flow of information is still limited and there are no experts to support the ongoing process.

Problems regarding Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) exist in terms of foreign experts viewing Croatian problems in their own framework, which prevents possible solutions from being successfully implemented. This lack of communication between foreign experts and members of Croatian NGOs reduces potential experts from being educated. Furthermore, NGOs lack major connections to the government and have minimal impact on new governmental policies. This is mainly due to the fact that governmental representatives are unwilling to open their field of work to external organisations such as NGOs. Unfortunately, most Croatian CSOs do not receive any state funding and therefore completely depend on foreign financial support. For CSOs to remain active over time, they will have to find financial aid from institutions inside the country. In conclusion, the space of active operation of NGOs needs to be extended. The civil society sector is forced to engage itself in a wider range of public policy issues, attempting to establish a position in the policy-making process.

Specific programmes should focus on the training of highest ranked officers, considering the establishment of an interdisciplinary multidisciplinary national security study. Courses and seminars should be open to everyone – including public workers, civil servants, journalists, politicians, military commentators etc. Further attention needs to be paid to the education of military personnel regarding duties, and international headquarters, including NATO and SHAPE. Higher ranked officers have to be provided with advanced lectures in the field of operational and managerial skills. The military management field should further establish a concept which allows the recognition of gifted personnel and possible promotion to higher positions with an increased level of responsibility. Young students should be provided with the possibility of gaining a military insight during their time at civilian universities, with the purpose of enhancing the chances of later success in their military careers. The military itself should focus on new aspects of security such as peacekeeping operations, regional arms control activities, demining, cooperation with neighbours and participation in PfP and MAP exercises. Further programmes concerning foreign aspects include the formation of civil-military teams with the purpose of attending educational programmes outside Croatia (GCSP, Marshall Centre, and Baltic Defence College).

Macedonia

Achievements

According to Lidija Georgieva (2002), transformational processes in the Republic of Macedonia have been fairly slow. The start of reform processes of the security sector in 2001 has proven challenging and slow to proceed. The strengthening of the security sector depends highly on international help and funding, and improved relations with NATO and MAP conclude that there are still open reform issues to be covered in the security sector. However, the assessment of the current level of expert formation in civil-military relations has not led to any well-developed reform strategies. Moreover, the analysis has caught people's attention due to large publicity and strengthened their beliefs that future reforms with the goal of improving democratisation, civil-military relations, and efficiency of the security sector are necessary. Nonetheless, the main reason for the agreement to reforms in civil-military relations and the security sector is based on criteria set by NATO, and not due to a fundamental necessity of the country.

Regarding expert formation in the Parliament, two commissions on defence and security – the Commission on Defence and the Commission on Euro-Atlantic Integrations – were established to support the function of the Parliament.

The competence of the Commission is to address issues regarding European and Euro-Atlantic integrations; to provide an adjustment of views concerning Parliamentary activities on key issues related to the process of integration; to perform evaluations and initiate new activities that are of particular interest to the Parliament; and to undertake activities on the harmonisation of the Macedonian legislative with the EU and the documents of international organisations.

This commission has the opportunity to advise the Commission on Defence and Security with the country's integration into EU and NATO. Additionally, since late 2001, a democratic educational control

programme has been active for parliaments and parliamentary staff in South East Europe. The programme discusses following topics: 'bases of legislative control, Parliaments in South East Europe and reform priorities for the security sector, promotion of successful parliamentary control of the security sector, co-organised by CESS and ISPPI'.¹²⁵

Concerning expert formation in the MoD, Macedonia maintains educational programmes for civil experts on defence within the framework of higher education. However, the main societal reform focused on the military sector, which enhanced the impact of military aspects on security. This tendency specifically manifested itself in the ratio of civil-military to military experts. Since 2000/01, this ratio has presented a constant imbalance. Many positions (under-secretaries, assistants to the Minister), which in other democracies would be covered by civilians, are occupied by military officers. A recent assessment showed that the MoD lacks sufficiently educated civilians and military professionals regarding defence issues. Civilian experts have been exclusively educated in the civilian system of higher education but their expertise has never been recognised as successfully transformable to the defence system. The imbalance even reaches levels of confrontation between civilians and military experts, which worsens overall cooperation. Each side accuses the other of not having an adequate number of experts to support various work processes. Unfortunately, programmes are often being developed in the absence of civilian expert personnel, which causes military solutions to prevail. Therefore, a well-balanced positioning of civil and military experts is desirable and should be pursued with great effort.

However, it can be concluded that expert and sub-expert formation does exist in the Ministry but is not appropriately placed or engaged in the existing work processes. Further achievements include the joining of Partnership for Peace (PfP), where Macedonia's educational and training needs are determined and accordingly planned in the Annual National Programme. The pursuit and accomplishment of set goals is defined by priorities and methods of the Partnership programme. However, the

¹²⁵ Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), Groningen, Netherlands; Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research (ISPPI), Skopje, Macedonia.

Republic of Macedonia possesses two institutions where civil as well as military experts are educated and trained. Members at cadet level are trained according to national and NATO standards. The staff comprises military and civilian professionals to best educate the students. However, the institutions lack funding and therefore prevent external experts from being attracted to open or newly created positions. The institutional achievements in terms of programmes include postgraduate specialist studies in the peace and defence area on the level of MA and PhD. 'The institute is currently preparing a programme for assistance and training on civil-military issues for military officials and parliamentarians, as well as other experts interested in defence and security issues.'

The Ministry of Interior comprises an adequate number of experts. Nonetheless, their inappropriate placement within various areas prevents them from successful engagement and utilisation. As a result of accumulated problems, a working group was founded – consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice – to deal with police reforms. Another goal of the joint working group is the decentralisation of the Ministry to turn it into a less expensive and more efficient service. The Police Academy, besides the basic police course, provides courses of higher education over the period of two years, with a high of four years and the opportunity for specialisation in specific spheres and postgraduate studies.

Regarding Macedonia's civil society, several improvements have taken place. The number of NGOs has risen and strengthened its community due to generous international programmes. International programme coordinators must have considered Macedonia an ideal market for various humanitarian and training programmes. A number of them had been implemented many times in other countries. As a result, around 3300 NGOs were registered and 200 presented their programmes at the second NGO market towards the end of 2002. However, many NGOs lack a solid organisational basis and therefore misdirect their efforts towards advertisement of programmes and sponsor donors instead of education and training. In conclusion, the civil sector is not on the right track and faces a great need for further development.

Needs

The Macedonian security sector is characterised by a rather small number of experts that have the capability of professionally engaging in diverse tasks related to the sector. Certain experts even find themselves dealing with issues that do not meet their specific knowledge and capabilities in any way, which necessarily leads to inefficiency and additional problematic situations.

Concerning expert formation in Parliament, it should have a central oversight function in the security sector. Parliamentary development, which builds a central aspect within a parliamentary democracy, still lags behind due to its secondary role in the political process following the independence of Macedonia. The Parliament soon gained help from established commissions such as the Commission on Defence and Security, and the Commission on Euro-Atlantic Integrations. Therefore, it is crucial that members of the commissions in assistance to Parliament possess solid knowledge to advise Parliament appropriately on the oversight of the security sector. There is further need for qualified civilian experts to support the different tasks of the Commission. However, an analysis on activities of the Parliament and its commissions related to defence and security showed that assignments have been handled unsatisfactorily. Therefore, a more detailed analysis on expert formation and its requirements is necessary. It has to be further determined what the needs of Parliament, its delegations and commissions are, and what educational methods can improve the situation. 'Another important issue suggests the support of the Commission on Defence and Security with appropriate expertise on parliamentary oversight of the security sector.'

The MoD has the need for civil experts in the defence area with knowledge and coordination capabilities in democratic and civil control of civil-military relations. The MoD also failed to establish a policy, which is a prerequisite to comply with Western standards of democracy and civil control over the military. Due to a lack of civilian experts within the MoD, military experts take over positions that should be occupied by civilian personnel. As a result, the development of programmes happens in the absence of civilian experts, which causes

military solutions to prevail. Therefore, it is important that a better balance between civilian and military experts prevail in the future.

The Cabinet of the Minister presents another target for expert formation reforms. It exerts a crucial role in the functioning and coordination of activities. However, until 1992/93, no expert executive had been established and an individual executive has only existed since the years 1993/95. A further problem prevails among the independent sectors of the Ministry. They lack adequate and efficient structure, relations and coordination. Observations state that certain segments receive more expert support than others, which threatens the successful achievement of goals of the Ministry itself.

In this case, inappropriate expert formation and burdened ratio of civil-military experts influenced the efficiency of the sectors and its cooperation. For that reason, a definition of the sphere of activities and responsibilities is necessary.

The Ministry also did not successfully implement educational programmes being offered. Basically, the security sector did not emphasise long-term planning and support in the implementation of educational programmes.

Regarding expert education in the two existing military academies, a lack of financial stimuli prevent external experts from being attracted to open positions. Though the Academies have developed several research programmes, a wider range of experts needs to be engaged in order to strengthen civil-military research and educational ties. Furthermore, the Academy does not provide officer education as a continuation after basic training and education. This is just another reason why the Academy desires civil experts in the area of national security. The institute even established an internal programme with the objective of educating students on political, social, economic, humanitarian and other factors of national security. The programme clearly intended to educate students specifically in the area where the MoD lacks an adequate number of expert personnel.

Regarding expert formation in the Ministry of Interior, the creation of a Police Academy for the preparation of basic police personnel was suggested. The academy should provide police aspirants with a more thorough education and raise the level of difficulty of courses offered. Another possible course would cover the management segment. The realisation of this course needs the cooperation of different academic institutions. 'The priority would be cooperation in designing the curriculum, elaboration of methodology of education, exchange and training of teaching and expert personnel.' Cooperation can primarily be enhanced through exchange and cooperation with international centres.

Moldova

Achievements

Regarding good governance in Moldova, by Viorel Cibotaru (2002), civilians and the military are required to possess knowledge on security and defence issues at strategic level and the necessary know-how concerning successful cooperation. The following text will elaborate on achievements and needs concerning the education and training situation of civilian and military personnel, the recruiting and promotion system, and how force ministries, Parliament, and parliamentary staff work together.

To evaluate the level of education and training of the National Army, the Military Council of the MoD conducted a session in December 1995 in the presence of the President of the Republic of Moldova as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The session was crucial for the fields of military education and training, and the building of the defence system. In detail, the session included the presentation of an annual report on military education and documentation of the analysis on the development of the defence system building. The President in his speech declared that the army positively contributes to the cooperation with armies of different states. He further expressed his appreciation for the positive participation of the army in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. This mainly includes the following aspects: 'granting the necessary assistance for personnel education and training, consulting,

and the exchange of experience for conducting peacekeeping operations'. Furthermore, the MoD created fundamental principles on national military art, which met the characteristics of the military-political situation, the economical status and the military policy. As a result, the training quality at platoon and company level improved considerably. Additionally, a number of field applications improved the commanders' and headquarters' ability to plan combat actions.

In order to strengthen the army's overall capabilities, an education and training system was developed by the National Army. The system resembles that of the former Soviet Union with a few noticeable deviations. The tactical level still consists of institutions that prepare military personnel. Until 2001, the Military College educated officers in infantry, artillery and communication units. In the year 2002, the institution turned into the Alexandru cel Bun military institute, where junior officers are educated for the National Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops. Overall, the Military College has been successful in educating its officers. Graduates from this institution possess better professional qualities than lieutenants from military schools, Romanian colleges and CIS states. Regarding the operational level of military personnel, it has to be noted that almost all commanders and chiefs of departments participated in graduate studies at universities in the former Soviet Union. Concerning the strategic level, opportunities are more limited. The only possibility to educate high-ranking officers has been in abroad programmes. The few officers that received the chance to study abroad attended courses at the US War College, the General Staff's Military Academy in Russia, the US Postgraduate School and the Marshall Centre. A further positive factor is the high level of communication that officers maintain with the civilian-ministerial staff, cabinet, parliamentary staff and parliamentarians as well as the presidential staff and the President. In conclusion, 32 officers were educated between 1992 and 1997 in military academies abroad. Currently, 89 military members study overseas.

Since 1997, the MoD has continuously participated in international military exercises with the goal to strengthen the framework of peacekeeping missions. Officers further participated in exercises at the

international headquarters and generally successfully completed their tasks.

Regarding the education of civilians in the defence and security sector, achievements have been made at different levels. Two universities in Moldova educate people on defence issues. The Medical University prepares military medical staff, and the Pedagogical University educates junior officer staff for infantry. The US Government in annual seminars contributes to a more advanced understanding of military problems on the part of civilians. Most courses discuss issues related to the management of defence resources. The seminars are mainly attended by parliamentarians and chief of departments in civilian ministries. Another contributor is the Marshall Centre which arranges seminars on defence planning and economic analysis. The audience consists of Moldavian civilians and military officers.

It is also of great importance that certain parliamentarians have knowledge on state defence and security issues and are provided with access to expert information in order to update their skills whenever necessary. So far, seminars held by the MoD have positively contributed to an increase of knowledge among parliamentarians regarding defence and security matters. In decision-making processes parliamentarians receive support from experts of the following ministries that are involved with defence and security tasks: 'MoD, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Border Guard Troops etc.'. Even expert knowledge from NGOs influence the decision-making process of parliamentarians.

Needs

Though a high percentage of highly qualified officers of Moldavian origin returned to the country by the end of 1992 and actively contributed to the establishment of the National Army, a shortage in staff was still prevailing. Officers lacked language skills and often maintained a Soviet military philosophy which was incompatible with the new reality of the country.

Regarding professional military personnel, the National Army struggles to win the younger generation for a possible career in the military. The unattractiveness of the service – low payment, undefined future possibilities for army and officers, and better opportunities in civilian businesses – leads to the fact that less than 50 per cent of graduates pursue a military career after one to two years of service. If the army is unable to resolve these problems, it will soon lack the required number of low- and mid-level officers. Additionally, the military is short of faculties and lags behind the modern requirements of technical and scientific research. At operational level, brigade commanders and chiefs of departments of the MoD and main staff no longer meet the requirements of the system, and therefore should be replaced by younger personnel. At strategic level, the situation is even worse. Only one person of the National Army graduated from the General Staff's Military Academy, which also is the only educational facility that prepared a strategic level of chain of command in the former Soviet Union.

Regarding the education of civilian personnel on the defence and security sector, facilities only focus on the tactical level of the chain of command. Therefore, civilians in the role of ministers with decision-making competences only possess knowledge on defence issues at a tactical level, lacking any other type of knowledge that would be crucial to fulfil the assigned tasks of their position appropriately. Often, high-level civilians and military officers can only be educated through the help of Western facilities, since the necessary infrastructure in Moldova itself is missing.

Problems are also prevalent in the civilian promotion system. Occasionally, civilians are not promoted based on personal achievements and professional qualities, but according to their loyalty to superiors. This tendency weakens the quality of the civilian system and threatens the conducting of tasks among civilians and related institutions. Unfortunately, there are currently no legal criteria for the promotion of all public bodies in Moldova. They are still subject to further development.

Regarding Parliament and Security Committee, only some members have background knowledge on defence and security issues. The assistance of a special staff committee is still missing and needs to be developed to support Parliament and the Security Committee properly wherever needed.

Romania

Achievements

According to Julian Bujoreanu (2002), the national system of defence planning in Romania was established by law and has ever since served as the basis to collect natural, material, as well as human resources to implement fundamental changes in the field of national security and defence. The National Security Strategy (NSS) develops from the basic defence planning process and relies on the following specific subdivisions:

Identification of values and national interests, as well as their risks and threats; definition of national security objectives and policies for their achievements; establishment of state bodies in the area of national defence and security; determination of the required resources and their allocation for the accomplishment of security goals.

Additionally, the Romanian Military Strategy is released by the Ministry of National Defence, which depicts the central military policy objectives of the Romanian State as long as the NSS is valid. This strategy describes and elaborates on force structure, missions, organisation, procurement, level of training, logistic, support and infrastructure. This information is crucial for the military system to pursue national military objectives, as well as the concept of training in military operations.

Romania has already made efforts concerning the establishment of a European system of cooperative security, attempting to join NATO and EU, support OSCE developments, contribute to a successful strengthening of the subregional networks of cooperation and eliminate current security deficits by means of diplomacy. Several courses on

national security are being offered at service level academies. For example: geopolitics, geostrategy and defence resources management. Those courses tend to be selected by students after the successful accomplishment of a basic education in psychology, sociology, ethics and/or pedagogy. At a later stage, Romanian officers pass through a number of courses – long-, medium- and short-term – that are specifically related to their field of study.

The highest level of training courses in the field of national security, as far as the Romanian Ministry of National Defence is concerned, are offered by the National Defence College (NDC), the Partnership for Peace Regional Training Centre (PPRTC), and the Defence Resources Management Regional Centre (DRMRC). A short presentation of each of those institutions is given in Appendix 11.2.

Each of the three institutions provides competent training in its specific field for different categories of personnel. Among the institutions are Parliament; parliamentary staffers; political secretaries of the ministries of defence, the interior and justice; intelligence agencies; leading representatives of the executive; representatives of the civil society; journalists and nongovernmental experts (working in NGOs), both domestic and foreign. Courses last from one month to one year and are held on undergraduate as well as postgraduate level. Additional courses are offered whenever necessary and can be nationally or internationally focused. Courses in this area last for approximately one week and consist of various lectures and discussions, which are held by competent domestic as well as foreign experts.

Needs

Prerequisites for an integration in the European community and regional stability are an optimisation of the defence sector and a focus on the following objectives: enhancement of fighting structure potentials to guarantee the necessary defence resources; development of human resources; updating military education to a modern level; improvement of the procurement system; restructuring the defence industry; strengthening the bonds to civil society; and maintenance of strong

connections to the armed forces of other states and international organisations. Another objective deals with finding appropriate resources for the successful implementation of individual steps of the strategy. In conclusion, the training of employees within the sector remains crucial for the overall success of national security tasks.

Romania experiences a need of additional training of young officers and civilians in the field of national security. This tendency has mainly come into existence due to Romania's involvement towards NATO and the country's involvement in a great number of other international activities. Therefore, a training system for experts in security related issues on national and international level should be enacted as soon as possible. Everyone involved in the expert formation process needs to be European and not in any way affiliated with local political parties. Furthermore, the training of future experts should be based on a cooperative concept between teacher and student, so that the exchange of ideas and messages is guaranteed. This condition enables students and teachers to develop together real-life situations, which will provide the best training fundamentals possible. The work and presence of international experts is acknowledged and appreciated, but needs to be improved in accordance with basic concepts in the wider European and international context. In conclusion, the suggested training methods target national as well as international experts and intend to remove experts out of their familiar environment once every two years to adjust better to new and untraditional situations. In result, they are forced to cope with specific life situations and forced to apply their knowledge in diverse problem-solving processes.

Serbia

Achievements

According to Miroslav Hadzic (2002), no current data exist on the total number of security and defence experts in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). An upcoming questionnaire, issued by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, will provide more detailed insight into already existing achievements, and what needs to be done in the nearer future. Over the past few years, mainly foreign experts have been occupied with the analysis and development of new strategies within the security sector. Regarding FRY, federal and republic assemblies included committees that deal with defence and security issues. However, those committees do not represent any specialised services, because all committee members are Members of Parliament as well. Basically, they have never gained specific expert knowledge. Further, the President of FRY has been assigned an advisor for security and defence. Unfortunately, the advisor seems not to be involved in the establishment of new proposals for security sector reform. Regarding the civil society, an increased interest in issues concerning the defence and security sector can be noticed. Concerning NGOs, only one institution (Centre for Civil-Military Relations) has so far successfully dealt with security sector issues. The media sector only occupies few journalists on the level of the security sector. However, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in cooperation with the Media Centre has organised courses on this topic over the past three years.

Unfortunately, no current information exists that would allow a precise statement on specialised educational programmes. As far as is known, the Centre for European Security Studies, the University of Groningen, in cooperation with the Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, organised two workshops on Security Sector Reform for Members of Parliament, parliamentary staff, journalists, representatives of the MoD and Yugoslav Army and experts on civil society.

Another two workshops – legislative efficiency in security sector and democratic control of armed forces as well as implementation of conduct

– have been established by an OSCE mission in late 2002. Planned for the upcoming year are ten workshops on the democratic control of the army of Yugoslavia in association with the security sector reform and modern Civil-Military Relations (CMR). An additional seminar will be offered on the security sector reform in cooperation with G17+ at the beginning of 2003.

Needs

Politicians in FRY have to be provided with permanent expert support services in order to be capable of handling issues regarding the security sector. Furthermore, the President's security advisor should be able to influence directly proposals made concerning security sector reforms. The MoD exerts additional functions in the security sector, which are inaccessible to the public.

Regarding civil society, an increased interest in security sector aspects is noticeable, but unfortunately not professionally supported due to a lack in the number of experts. Especially people from the media field, such as journalists, demand more opportunities to gain detailed knowledge in the area of security. As a result, more educational courses will be organised by the Media Centre in 2003. Specific courses would have to be created in the following areas:

- Security integration of FRY in the Euro-Atlantic community
- Budget planning and control of budget
- Conversion of the military industry
- Training for work on conditions on democratic control and oversight

Regarding educational advancements that include experiences and knowledge of foreign countries, the following programme with specific contents in the indicated areas would have to be established:

- Security sector reform, CMR, legislative oversight, armed forces reform, respect of human rights in the security forces, role of civil society and media in the democratic

control of the armed forces and the importance of joining the Euro-Atlantic community.

Ukraine

Achievements

According to Leonid Polyakov and Anatoliy Tkachuk (2002), the level of security sector expertise in Ukraine has developed over eleven years of independence in strong association with three factors: ‘the heritage of the Soviet past, the security environment in independent Ukraine (internal factor), as well as the influences of regional and global security developments (external factor)’. However, eleven years is too short a period to overcome previously established security principles of a larger totalitarian state. Most qualitative achievements that have been made over the years of independence are reflected in the military sector, whereas the non-military sector still remains in great need of improvement. In conclusion, despite achievements in the area of institutionalisation and functioning, the security sector is still in the process of diverse forms of transition.

Although Ukraine inherited many Soviet scientific and educational institutions, it struggled to transform the prevailing potential from the security interests of a totalitarian state into an independent (according to Western standards), adjusted system. Therefore, Ukraine at the beginning of its independence lacked a National Security and Defence Council, MoD, General Staff of the Armed Forces and Armed Forces with other military formations.

During the first years of independence, the military sector gained major attention, until later the political, economic, social and energy sectors slowly gained more attention. ‘For instance, in 1992, almost 72 per cent of expenditures on defence research and development were channelled towards fundamental research, but in the years 1999–2002, this figure dropped to 0.01–0.02 per cent.’ Regarding the establishment of new national security policies, the laws and concepts were too basic in nature and prevented specific plans for a successful implementation. Finally,

towards the end of the 1990s, a regulatory legal basis was reputable, which included several aspects of security sector activities. Furthermore, the country was not only able to retain its number of academic institutions, but even successfully increased it to a total of 300 in 2002. This military system is now compatible with the civil system, and the number of experts that could occupy top-level positions is still rising. Many civilian specialists now hold positions that allow them to influence security structures and strengthen civilian tendencies in the managerial department. Certain politicians even emphasised an increase in expenditures on the level of intelligence and defence. However, Parliament did not follow the request and passed a budget that did not even cover what was needed by the Armed Forces.

In 2001, the institution of State Secretaries was introduced to the security structures. At the same time, Information-Analytical Sections (IAS) continuously developed, and became supportive of previously mentioned structures. IAS sections are crucial for the collection and analysis of information concerning the state of readiness of subordinate units and their problems. The most developed structures were created in the Armed Forces. Here, they prevail in each service and are coordinated by the Information-Analytical Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In addition to the previously described improvements, the MoD- enhanced the quality of its inside structures in accordance with new requirements posed by internal, regional and global security developments. Furthermore, the Ukrainian political system portrays certain problematic characteristics regarding the use of power. The President and the NSDC Staff rule separate from the executive power branch, instead of being controlled by the cabinet. This distribution of power is crucial since the two political units contain operational and research segments, which employ among the best experts available in the governmental service. The NSDC Staff further controls a specialised department on Defence Security Planning. The tasks mainly deal with defence and military-industrial policy. The main structures described here are again supported by subordinate research institutions such as: 'the National Institute for International Security Problems and the Ukrainian Institute of Environmental and Resources Studies'.

Regarding civil society, the Ukrainian security sector expert community consists of three major branches: several research institutions, the design bureau of the defence industry, and newly developed security studies centres. For a long time, security studies centres have not been part of Ukrainian university structures and therefore represent a new, positive development. The financial aid of foreign institutions helps organisations grow to a more advanced and mature condition. ‘For instance, by the end of 2002, well over 600 Ukrainian researchers received grants from the NATO, and from the beginning of Ukraine–NATO cooperative programmes in 1994, over 1000 Ukrainian scholars were granted financial assistance for seminar participation and other events.’

More and more often journalists take on the role of security experts in Ukraine. However, their area of occupation deals predominately with defence issues rather than law enforcement, arms trade and intelligence activity. However, the number of media institutions dealing with military issues has risen significantly over the past few years.

Quality improvements can also be noticed regarding the work of NGOs. They have significantly extended their role in the security sector and reached the status of professional agencies. ‘From being mainly enthusiastic amateur organisations during the early 1990s, they grew and evolved into hundreds of different types of NGOs, including several influential think tanks, which are capable of producing first rate policy studies, independent research, substantiated proposals, as well as hosting international conferences.’ Due to financial support from Western countries, the system of non-governmental research and public organisations is still expanding. NGO research centres have gained considerable intellectual potential and their think tank experts rank among frequent commentators in the printed and electronic media.

In the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), Ukraine maintains connections to NATO member states, as well as NATO partners. Those relationships have developed continuously and qualitatively. Close to 600 joint activities are supposed to be carried out between Ukraine and NATO, which are, to a major extent, financially carried by the United States and other democratic countries. The PfP Consortium of Defence

Academies and Security Studies Institutes represents one of the most promising arrangements in terms of security sector expert formation. This international organisation intends to strengthen the military and defence education, as well as research, through increased cooperation. Further opportunities are being offered by governments of various NATO countries and partners. Among those, the US IMET (International Military Education & Training) programme presents one of the most efficient and financially strong programmes. Between 1994 and 2002, Ukraine received more than \$10 million for academic purposes and succeeded to educate 357 people. Additionally, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces provides another type of expert training support. It organises many conferences on essential security subjects and offers financial aid to different NGOs throughout Ukraine. Further, the Harvard Programme 'National Security of Ukraine', established by Harvard University (USA) has over 100 Ukrainian participants, including generals and their civilian participants. Several other Western countries – for instance, the UK, France, Germany, Hungary, Austria as well as others – offer specific individual education, training and exchange programmes that enable Ukrainians to participate.

Needs

Most achievements in Ukraine have been made in the military sector, whereas the non-military sector still calls for major improvements. The security sector is characterised by severe disproportions in its structure and functioning. Therefore, the state needs to come up with an efficient institute of civilian service in the security structures.

A general problem with the development and strengthening of the security sector is posed by low social benefits and incentives among experts working in governmental and parliamentary structures.

Regarding Ukrainian Parliament and parliamentary staff, more experience on security issues is required. Only a few Parliament and parliamentary staff members have received adequate aids to qualify to work on security-related legislations. It is said that the majority of

parliamentarians have no conceptual understanding of security sector related problems and that no personal incentives exist that would raise the interest of participation in the process of resolution. The absence of a single research centre presents another major obstacle to a better development of the Parliament in terms of security sector concepts. As a result, the Parliament is unable to perform all necessary tasks at the quality required.

The absence of civilian servants within political secretariats of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Justice, prevents Ukraine from establishing a direct mechanism of control and responsibility towards its civilians. 'An important element of the system, which provides control from the inside to the military and to other security structures has yet to be established.' Obstacles such as the lack of practice in organising joint peacekeeping operations, stereotypes of the past, and lack of initiative first need to be removed. Highly negative is also the low number of students training at senior academic level. This condition contributes to a worsening of the situation. However, the fault cannot only be found on the side of the students, but is strongly related to old curricula that do not correspond with modern standards. The curricula do not benefit from current knowledge in national and international security, theories in international relations and conflict studies. In conclusion, Ukraine has had little time to enhance its own security strategy and has not benefited from international reforms within this sector.

Financial shortages present another problem for the successful development of the security sector. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to the defence budget formation, which at the same time requires improvements on the competence level of planners. Again, the evil circle remains closed, due to the lack of necessary expert knowledge and practice on the various levels of the defence budgeting process. The most qualified members often find themselves escaping to private institutions where they receive higher salaries.

The role of journalists could still be improved. Only few have the courage to publish articles on law enforcement and special service institution activities. The number even decreases if the topic deals with corrupt officials or possibly involves the criminal world. Further

restrictions to the free conduct of journalism are evident in the generally limited freedom of press and uneven distribution of writing/broadcasting rights of various media segments concerning security issues.

Regarding NGOs and think tanks, two major limitations exist. First, the majority of think tanks are located in the capital city of Kyiv and secondly, most think tanks have not risen to the level where they are able to conduct research on politically sensitive areas of law enforcement and intelligence activities.

Nonetheless, there are opportunities for improvement in Ukraine. For instance, the National Defence Academy of Ukraine and other similar institutions could provide student seminars in specialised fields of security and defence issues. Also, invited competent Ukrainian and foreign civilian guest speakers could offer a detailed view into the advanced field of security structures. Further improvements could and should be made by training civil servants of high executive categories in relation with military servicemen. This would lead to enhanced defence decision-making processes. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine faces the task of establishing security research centres at leading Ukrainian universities. Regarding the help of foreign countries, courses being offered ought to be more specific and targeted towards the needs of the individual country, in this case Ukraine. Therefore, additional and new courses need to be specific and aim on the following areas: parliamentary staff, the democratisation of law-enforcement and security service structures, civilian candidates who obtain responsible tasks in security structures, and experts who draft budgets for the security structures. Currently, two expert groups, parliamentary staff and personnel of non-military structures, demonstrate the greatest need for additional courses. The method of Advanced Distance Learning (ADL) could be beneficial in this case and enable participants to receive adequate knowledge without having to be present at some institutions for extensive periods of time.

For the non-military security structures of Ukraine, which still remain in the form and substance of unreformed Soviet era relics, courses on traditions of securing basic human rights, the rule of law, freedom of

expression, Western practices of managing classified information, and working with the media should be considered.

As far as the military is concerned, in addition to what has already been done, foreign instructors on the fundamentals of national and international security, theories in international relations, joint and combined operations and conflict studies for the National Defence Academy and other military educational institutions could help. ADL courses and internships should be offered whenever appropriate.

More extensive internships and more ADL opportunities would be desirable for non-governmental and university research centres and journalists.

In conclusion, there are no simple solutions for the complex situation of Security Sector Expert Formation in Ukraine. Often, inappropriate salaries cause competent analysts and young experts to reject possible work opportunities. Therefore, 'the development of more effective personnel management and social reward cultures remain among the major challenges for the success of the security sector expert formation process at this point of transition in Ukraine'. Further, current threats to Ukraine are predominately of a non-military nature, which require future training and support within the field of expert formation to be accessible to non-military structures as well. As a first step in the new problem-solving process the following should be done:

A major focus should be on the segments that are most receptive to outside support. Those include the following: parliamentary staff and parliamentarian's aid, journalists, university security studies centres and independent think tanks.