

Frederic Labarre

REGIONAL INTEGRATION THROUGH THE STABILITY PACT

Introduction

This paper attempts to argue that the current structure of relations in South East Europe (SEE) and in the Balkans in particular requires regional, or local, integration before any membership in greater bodies (like the European Union) can be considered.

To demonstrate this, I will require a more specific definition of just what is integration. The end of the Cold War has articulated the proposition that the amenities of the West could be extended to former communist societies in the wake of their transition to a market economy. Implicitly, this would mean that there are material rewards for the majority (although these may be reaped in a relatively distant future) of peoples and countries hoping (sometimes expecting) to one day be members of the EU. During the 12-odd years that we have been living in the post-Cold War world, the necessities of membership and reform have been so pressing as to make these two concepts identical. In other words it seems that integration is only seen in its legal or geopolitical sense, and is limited to the goal of EU membership.

Integration is much more than that, and a large part of this paper focuses on a definition of membership that puts the onus on a deep transformation (or at least reassessment) of the identity of the would-be EU members. The second part of this paper describes the spirit of the Stability Pact as a tool of integration that is informed by a logic of cooperation and interdependence. This is a significant departure from the recent Balkan history to say the least. Therefore, a theoretical shift must precede the attitudinal shift. Realist policy-making must cede before institutionalism. This change, if the Stability Pact (in effect a legal

illustration of liberal-institutionalism) is to succeed, must be made consciously. That is, theory must become policy.

Our demonstration proceeds along two seemingly unrelated paths. The first part of this paper gives a thorough definition of the meaning of integration based on Claude Ake's theories. We will find that a more supple definition of integration breaks new ground in the reassessment of identity in SEE.

The second part of this paper puts realist and cooperative security theories in opposition and demonstrated that theories provide the characteristics for rational policy-making. From that demonstration, we infer that realism –an exclusive approach– must give way to cooperation if integration as we understand it is to succeed. Part 2 also provides a set of steps to be covered to succeed with integration and make the Stability Pact work.

Part 3 proposes the creation of a multi-national (multi-ethnic) regional peace support operations training center as an initiative that would harmonize regional and great power policies relative to the SEE, develop long term trust and democratic transparency, and lay a partial foundation for a secure peace that will redefine the region as an all-inclusive entity to which the EU can enlarge.

For the purpose of this paper, we deem those participants to exclude Western European or North American States. These are considered “sponsors” or benefactors. At best, this can only be considered a sketch of a study, but still, it should provide a good sense of whether the region is integrating and thus, if this paradigmatic shift is being accomplished. This can provide an explanation for some shortcomings, and indicate the level of resistance that can be expected in the near future.

I do not think I am going too far on a limb by stating that the Stability Pact is better than the *status quo* or the alternative system of relations that has been operating in the SEE. However, the notion that regional integration through the Stability Pact must precede EU integration needs to be examined on its own merits.

Part 1: Integration in Question

What do we mean by integration? It seems that lately, membership in European and/or Atlantic institutions has become equivalent to integration. In other words, integration is synonymous to the enlargement of a geopolitical entity or region.

What is perhaps more important to grasp is that the members (or would-be members) of a region or organization would acquire a certain measure of like-mindedness associated with this enlargement. Whether the acquisition of like-mindedness must precede membership or whether membership will achieve like-mindedness gives an indication of the dilemma faced by decision-makers of both sides, and it also gives an idea of the complexity of the notion of integration. These difficulties and the errors they may trigger beg for an examination of the concept of integration. The complexities often prove so daunting as to leave analysts unsure of the Pact's real potential. Analysts do not deal well with uncertainty, and tend to deride any nebulous concept. The oft-derided Stability Pact is often the target of derision. The reality is that the Stability Pact cannot do for others what others are not willing to do for themselves.

For our purpose, we ascribe Claude Ake's theory of integration to the entire SEE. While Ake was devising a theory for the stabilization of post-colonial countries, we can safely use his theories for a region that was under the empire of socialist ideas. We can use his theories provided that we think of countries as if they behaved as individuals. There are limits to this approach because it suggests that consensus within a society is complete and/or that the leader is so strong as to be able to impose his/her will on society. This is rarely the case in the best of circumstances. Still, we need to start somewhere, and ascribing to a country human characteristics is a good starting point for discussion.

The claim that States behave within a region as individuals do within a State can be made because the European Union is a political system not unlike that which we find within a State. That is, a system operating on

the transmission of inputs and outputs⁷, but also a system that is grounded in certain values, and a system that sees clear political and geographical boundaries to its influence, and which tries to accommodate all the members it feels are located within these boundaries. This is the crux of integration. According to Ake, and according to what we have just said about an EU in relation to the SEE, political integration is closely related to the problem of increasing “normative consensus governing political behaviour among members of a political system”.⁸ Norms and values have something to do with membership in organizations and regions only insofar as new members have absorbed these new values and norms as their own, and apply them consistently.

Readers will notice that in the introduction, we drew a sharp distinction between the concepts of membership and integration. At the very least, membership is merely the geographic inclusion of a member of an outside group into a larger or more influential (or more desired) one. This does not mean that the new member is “integrated” in any other more meaningful way. For example, I may be attracted to the prestige of membership in a country club, but this is of little value if I am not seen by the club members as being an avid golfer. To reap a sense of belonging, I need to be a good enough golfer to warrant membership in the first place. The ethics of that sport can be quite difficult for me to grasp if I am a pro hockey player. Indeed, I may even have trouble seeing it as a sport in the first place! But once I have learned and applied that body-checking your opponent on the golf course is against the rules, we can say that I am integrated, i.e. more than a member.

It is this “absorption” process which I define as integration. Integration is not synonymous with membership, but to the application of the responsibilities of membership, which incur little sacrifice because responsibilities become second nature once integration is complete. Integration is rather the difficulty of inducing commitment and

⁷ Michael CLARKE & Brian WHITE Eds.: “Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach” Southampton, UK, Edward Elgar, 1989, p. 29.

⁸ Claude AKE: “A Theory of Political Integration”, Homewood IL, Dorsey Press, 1967, p.1.

obedience to beliefs, symbols and values that define the situation where the political action will take place.⁹

There are four ways to induce such commitment: authoritarian, paternalistic, identific and consensual.¹⁰ The Stability Pact is the embodiment of a system of norms and values that present themselves as the alternative to the current structure of relations at work in the Balkans and in the SEE that is confrontational and exclusionary.

Authoritarianism or paternalism does not drive adhesion to these norms and values, because this would require a strong personality at the head of each participant country of the Stability Pact. The recent presidencies of such strong-willed individuals such as Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, Alija Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic in Bosnia and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia proper indicate that there was little willingness to adopt a non-confrontational regime of relations in the region. The secessions of Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)¹¹ may have been more successful and less bloody, but they are betraying the fact that there was no willingness to work together as a reconstructed or redefined region. This is because there was more effort being devoted at reconstructing each new country's identity in hostile reference to the "other" than there was in reconstructing a whole region under a new common identity.

This is why identific theory presents a problem. In the case of SEE, the pride of being "Slovene", "Bulgarian" or "Albanian" superseded the pride of being a South Slav, or if one is desirous of including Albania more fully, a "South Eastern European". If the latter option of all-inclusiveness takes precedence on narrow identification, the new region can be integrated as a whole to a wider process of integration. But this is extremely difficult to do at this point in time, for no sooner had each former Yugoslav Republic become independent -in essence given *itself* a new identity through the disintegration of Yugoslavia- that it needed to

⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 102-114.

¹¹ Turkey recognizes Macedonia under its constitutional name.

wrestle with the identity that the recent Balkan wars had given *each member of the region*.¹²

Ake's consensual approach, which he describes as "optimal" seems better suited to describe what is happening with the Stability Pact. Consensus theory of political integration subordinates coercion of a method of ensuring commitment to new norms and values. It is useful in the case of SEE because, according to this point of view, all anti-social (or anti-associative) behaviour is considered deviancy.¹³ Looking at the positions, statements and actions of the NATO and the EU communities during the Balkan wars, we see two organizations representing the nations of Western Europe and North America exhibiting signs that they share the same values and beliefs regarding a non-violent approach to conflict management, respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In other words, North America and Western Europe are perfectly integrated as regions and peoples because their statements and actions reflected commonly held beliefs within their respective populations.

Furthermore, we can also say that adherence to new norms and values that the EU represented were already somewhat understood by the relevant populations of SEE. Brian Hall in his "Impossible Country" tells how some Croats felt that subservience to Serb dominance in a reconstructed Yugoslavia would hinder their EU (then EC) accession dreams. Similarly, the recent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic's regime indicates that a decade of fixed elections has not dampened the ideals that Serbs have set for themselves. The reversal that we have witnessed in Yugoslavia at the end of the 90s shows that Serbs' hopes closely resemble that of the Croats, insofar as pursuit of wealth and welfare are concerned. Pyramid schemes in Albania in 1997 demonstrate that the

¹² Events and actions in part define identity. This is why a soldier with whom the author worked at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in 1998 attributed to former Yugoslavs several unsavory epithets. This is understandable since the soldier in question had spent a week chained to a post as a human shield to an ammunition depot in 1995. It remains that this outburst betrays the mindset of the soldier insofar as he has a conception of what is acceptable behaviour and what is not in a bellicose situation. This is in essence a clash of values operating over different norms concerning human rights and the law of armed conflict.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

population is eager for the material rewards that were impossible during communist rule and political isolation.

Whereas the pursuit of wealth is in fact the pursuit of the *benefits* of integration rather than integration in itself, it denotes a significant departure from earlier norms. More importantly, it denotes that this departure is more widespread in the region. Consensual integration of new European and Atlantic norms is thus theoretically possible. The problem seems to be that there is a double consensus: one revolving around the pride of nationhood, and one around the desire for better living standards. There is a real risk that the Stability Pact may be used to provide a semblance of stability that answers the needs of human development and betterment (because it will encourage investment and delivery of aid packages) while at the same time allowing ethnic exclusiveness, the basis of identity-building and national defence formulation, to remain as a source of national consensus. Such a scenario could explain the laborious conflict recovery of Bosnia, the slow pace of change in Serbia and the apparent “reversal” in Macedonia.

Thus, optimal integration can only happen if there is a change in the perception of identity, because identity informs the structure of relations in the region by affecting the way in which we think about national security.¹⁴ Individuals constantly exposed to violence have trouble imagining that conflicts may not always escalate into warfare. While disagreement can always degenerate into violence, this possibility is difficult to imagine between certain sets of countries. This is why the EU’s explicit aim is “to create in South East Europe a situation in which military conflict will become unthinkable and *thereby* to expand to South East Europe the area of *peace, stability, prosperity and freedom*

¹⁴ Notes on a talk from Paolo Calzini at the 15th ISODARCO Winter School in Andalo, Italy, on “Internal dynamism and external intervention in the Balkans”, January 20-27th 2002. Calzini believes that the Balkan bloodshed is only explicable in relation with history of the region. This, combined with the knowledge that identity is constructed in reference to the past, makes bloodshed inevitable. See Brian HALL: “The Impossible Country”, New York, Penguin, 1994, and Robert KAPLAN: “Balkan Ghosts”, New York, Vintage, 1994.

which the 15 member States have created [for themselves, it should be added] in the last 50 years”.¹⁵

The reader will notice that there is a causal relation between the creation of a situation void of violent conflict and the expansion of the zone of peace (a euphemism for the EU). The reader will also notice the relationship implied in peace, prosperity and freedom.

There is something to be said about whether prosperity brings peace or the other way around. Certainly, as far as donors and investors are concerned, stability and peace is a *sine qua non* condition for the outpouring of funds.¹⁶ However, the alternate view is that where some sort of distributive justice exists, there is the possibility that society will tend to cling to and improve the level of wealth it enjoys.¹⁷ But neither stability nor wealth came the way of the SEE. Therefore, for intervention and aid to take place, stability and peace, even imposed from without, must reign. This would seem to put the theory of consensual integration on its head, as it suggests the muscle of some outside power. The promise of material welfare is conditional upon the success of the Stability Pact. This is undeniably a form of pressure that is being brought to bear by the EU, but also by the participant countries themselves. After all, they are the signatories of the Pact, and the foreign powers and international organizations its sponsors. Wealth and prosperity here are tools of appeasement that show no sign of triggering a real rapprochement between participants.¹⁸ In this sense, the Stability Pact is having real difficulties.¹⁹ Several commentators of the Stability

¹⁵ The EU and South East Europe – Overview
www.europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/intro/index.htm Italics and brackets are the author's.

¹⁶ IISS: “A System for Post-War South –East Europe” in *Analisti I Ballkanit*, 3:14, July-September 1999, p.82.

¹⁷ Alvin RABUSHKA: “Economic, Civil, and Political Freedom: The Cases of Singapore and Hong Kong” in Michael Walker, Ed. *Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare: Proceedings of an International Symposium*, The Fraser Institute, 1988, p. 151.

¹⁸ Hanns. D. JACOBSEN: “The Stability Pact for South East-Europe: Did it Work?”, paper presented at ISODARCO's 15th Winter Course *South Eastern Europe: Internal Dynamics and External Intervention*, Andalo (Trento), Italy, 20-27 January 2002, p. 14.

¹⁹ Albert RAKIPI: “The Marshall Plan and the Stability Pact – A Comparative Approach” ” in Albert Rakipi, Ed., *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2000, p.85-86.

Pact note that the responsibility of stability lies with the donor countries, whose dishing out of funds is a recipe for success.²⁰ In fact, success will be measured when SEE countries will be able to agglomerate their respective identities around a new notion of region, trade amongst themselves first, and then graft their region to the rest of Europe.²¹ This is by no means seen as a mechanical occurrence, but these goals were stated both by Stability Pact participants and the EU. A major attitudinal shift must happen so that the Stability Pact succeeds and its success is seen as the entry key to the EU.

Conclusion

This section has dealt with a thorough investigation of the meaning of integration. What we have highlighted instead is an educated distinction between membership in an organization and integration of its values. Furthermore, we have noticed that actors sought to reap the benefits of integration without fully achieving it. The following section will demonstrate the size of the challenge as political theory and policy-making are taken as tools for decision.

Part 2: The Necessity of a Theoretical Transformation

While it seems evident that the realist point of view best explains the pattern of relations in the Balkans, there seems to be an indication that

²⁰ This is indeed alarming: many point to the need of investment before donors or investors would be comfortable with giving. See Marta MUCO: "Four Questions for the Stability Pact. A Regional Approach" in Albert Rakipi, Ed., Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2000, p.102. Jelica MINIC: "Reconstruction and Development Programme for South Eastern Europe" in Albert Rakipi, Ed., Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2000, p.123-124 says that the outpouring of funds is merely a pacifier, yet, in the same article, that author recommends as a matter of priority "essential reforms and foreign capital inflow, especially foreign direct investments..."

²¹ Bodo HOMBACH: "The Balkans-A Difficult Journey to the Stability Pact" in Albert Rakipi, Ed., Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2000, p.14. See also Pandeli MAJKO: "Albania and the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe" in Analisti I Ballkanit, 3:14, July-September 1999, p.5. And MINIC, op.cit., p.124.

the theory also serves as a policy. In opposition to this approach, the Stability Pact acts as an alternative, as a new theory “not so much for explanation, but rather for the building of new international relations.”²² It could be the core of a “security community”. For this to happen, participants to the Stability Pact must change what they conceive as national security.

Realistic security focuses on the State security in an egotistical manner. Being so, it is inevitable that security is concerned with that State alone, to the detriment of neighbours. Realism is inherently exclusive. The only stability that can be achieved in such a scenario is that of the balance of power. Realism may be confrontational, but it carries the seed of its own peace.²³

Stability for its own sake is for some highly undesirable because it does not lead to a sustainable peace (a controversial concept in itself). To Daniel Nelson, the Stability Pact is “an effort to buy stability cheaply and to substitute stasis or quiescence for balancing threats and capacities.”²⁴ This perception may be overly pessimistic, but he has a point; stability is not security. If the Stability Pact makes consensus among its participants, it remains that the sponsorship afforded them by the EU also makes integration paternalistic or authoritarian. Similarly, the integration that Tito achieved within Yugoslavia may have been highly consensual, but it was also very paternalistic, and therefore far from optimal.²⁵ Hence various ethnic groups having not united around the idea of Yugoslavia, tensions dating back centuries remain available for future figures to use authoritarian (identity-based) integration.

Just like ethnic groups needed to unite around Tito’s Yugoslavia, today’s SEE country must unite around the Stability Pact’s theoretical underpinnings: that of a Kantian view of security, where liberal

²² RAKIPI: *op.cit.*, p. 85

²³ John HERTZ: “Ideal Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” in *World Politics* 2, January 1950, pp.157-180.

²⁴ Daniel N. NELSON: “Stable Peace or Secure Peace?” in Albert Rakipi, Ed., *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2000, p.36.

²⁵ AKE, *op.cit.*, p.137.

democracies trade together, and settle their differences without resort to violence.

This is an elusive prospect because the quest for independence of each of the former Yugoslav republics is often the basis of consensus in each of those respective societies. As a result, secessionist tendencies seem to be driven by mass parties. It is not surprising, therefore, that the parties and their leaders start to believe (until independence is achieved and factionalism begins) that they are the legitimate incarnation of their respective societies' wishes. In the end, party and individual interest become synonymous to national interest.²⁶

Because this is so closely associated to nation-building, assessment of national security in the SEE will tend to be ethnic-driven and non negotiable. A zero-sum outcome is inescapable, and realism, no longer a theory, finds its characteristics transposed into the policies of very few, but very powerful individuals. It is this train of thought that has spawned Europe's first war in 50 years.

A disintegrating Yugoslavia's values collided with an integrating Europe's which now saw the situation there as deviancy. Europe, as an evolving cooperative security system whose "members must be prepared to engage in collective diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action in areas outside their common space which may threaten their welfare and stability"²⁷ cannot help but intervene. In the post-Cold War world, the international community can not stand idle in the face of "deviancy".

SEE countries must effect a shift from an orthodox vision of security to one that favours cooperation. There must be a conscious decision by those in power to switch to a policy that will prescribe "consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction and

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.19.

²⁷ Richard COHEN: "From Individual Security to International Stability", Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Marshall Center Papers, #3, April 2001, p.2.

interdependence rather than unilateralism.”²⁸ The Stability Pact is a tool to achieve this, but there are reasons to believe that there is hope that projects and investments will achieve that shift for the participants rather than the participants willfully choosing a new outlook. SEE leaders must individualize security. The only way to do this is to guarantee basic human freedoms and living standards. If these guarantees are collective to a society (irrespective of ethnic background), individuality is reaffirmed. Thus, any promotion of the “national” interest ceases to be ethnic or group-oriented, because human security is ensured²⁹, making the national interest individual-oriented, that is, aimed at the maintenance of the privileges and guarantees of basic human freedoms and economic needs. As we have outlined in part 1, there are indications that participants are seeking the benefits of integration without the effort of absorbing new norms and values. The academic literature emanating from the Balkans certainly supports that claim. It is essential that participants believe in the new approach to integrate as a region, and to make the Stability Pact a resounding success.

If participants are unconvinced, as I believe they are, it is because they do not trust each other and a cooperative approach. They do not believe that a change from a realist policy to a cooperative/internationalist policy will bring them security. The removal of Milosevic is seen as a great step forward in eliminating mistrust.³⁰ Still, other SEE countries, most notably Slovenia, have started their integration of EU norms and values without waiting for the departure of such irritants as Milosevic, Tadjman, et al. Slovenia is now well on its way to NATO and the EU. The prospect of membership, and not membership in itself, will exact a change of policy and theoretical outlook. To think that “successful integration... would produce changes in attitudes and enmesh each national, political and economic system with the others”³¹ is applying

²⁸ Gareth EVANS: “Cooperative Security and Intra State Conflict” in Foreign Policy #96, Fall 1994.

²⁹ COHEN, op.cit., p.10.

³⁰ Janusz BUGAJSKI: “Balkan Contradictions: Yugoslavia and Regional Stability” in Albert Rakipi, Ed., Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2000, p.39.

³¹ James H. WYLLIE: “European Security in the New Political Environment” London, Longman, 1997, p.180.

the logic in reverse. If this were so, there would be no reason to exclude Turkey from the EU, since its NATO participation would have modified its norms of behaviour.

When people and States operate in a system with realistic characteristics, they are never sure of what the neighbours are doing, because secrecy is a policy feature of realism. The only thing they can be sure of is that, whatever they are doing, it must be detrimental to them. Even if it is not detrimental to individual or State security, realism fosters misperception. We do not need here to review the security dilemma, but we do need to be reminded of some features of the alternative, which is cooperation.

Cooperative behaviour may occur between participants of unequal strengths. The advantage of cooperation, besides the relatively equal distribution of rewards, is that any defection from cooperation is a clear statement of intention.³² Cooperative behaviour begets cooperation, as hostility begets hostility. The significant difference between the two is that cooperation brings security, while hostility can only achieve stability.

It would seem that to reach that stage, participants would have to choose not to be hostile, and abide by this new rule. The Stability Pact does not prescribe any rules of the sort, except reiterating the intent of each signatory, under the aegis of the EU, NATO and other organizations and great powers, that they will strive for the objectives of good neighbourly relations. Nowhere in the document is there a regional mechanism for conflict resolution. As such, this prescription is much too vague, and the role of other sponsors much too great to foster this choice autonomously within each SEE country. At present, I doubt that a policy change can occur to effect a real departure from realism; participants believe more in the responsibilities of the sponsors of the Stability Pact than in the advantages of a change in mentality.

Perhaps we can suggest a framework here. For neighbours to be certain of each other's intentions, we must start by democracy. Not because it

³² Robert JERVIS: "Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation" in World Politics, p. 321.

gives freedom, but because it serves as the illustration that a given society is not motivated by a single idea to its neighbour. There must be a transparency of plurality that serves to balance a society so that it doesn't seem to lapse back into extremism. Once this is achieved, investors and donors will be far more comfortable in forging ties. The resulting economic growth (which may not occur in the near term, but which will occur nonetheless) gives added security to individuals of the region. Freedom from want is added to freedom from fear. Once the region is secured by the application of democratic principles and some form of market economy (mixed in with some social guarantees³³ that can always be sponsored by NGOs, IGOs, or foreign governments), the new system of relations can now be codified, giving a legal meaning to a philosophical concoction that was hitherto merely "imagined".³⁴ It remains that it is the sum of the volition of the participants that makes this real.

Infrastructure projects themselves, such as roads, power grids and supply networks will be seen as traditional security liabilities rather than communication routes if the change in attitude does not come from within society itself. Democratization must come before anything else. Democracy relies on the application of measure and tolerance to political debate. These are no easy qualities to master for any population or leader after a decade of ethnic conflict. This is why it is doubtful that facilitated communications and infrastructure reform can easily be made as a prerequisite for the development of a spirit of tolerance, as Pandeli Majko suggests.³⁵ Security through trust must come first. Projects will only be successful not if they are generously funded, but if the region accepts that such projects are designed to foster interdependence, whose material benefits emerge out of the acceptance that the "others" are there to stay, and that survival can only be mutual. Trust will come if cross-boundaries accusations stop. What better way to prevent those than a democratic society, with an independent media, and a system of

³³ NELSON, *op.cit.*, p.37.

³⁴ Charles KING: "Strategy and Region-Building in the Wider Southeast Europe" in Albert Rakipi, Ed., *Stability Pact: Just Around the Corner*, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2000, p.49.

³⁵ MAJKO, *op.cit.*, p.6.

government endowed with an effective opposition. An effective government opposition seeks popular approval by questioning the efficiency of those in power, instead of having a dictatorship tell the population that its troubles can be blamed on the neighbour. Again, for a democracy to function, a society must believe in its mechanisms. Enough has been written about what constitutes democracy so that we don't need to reiterate it here. However, it must be said that every member of society is responsible for the maintenance of the democratic system. Basic individual freedoms must be guaranteed. Foreign direct investment, indeed, wealth will not give you that.³⁶

In the short term, it costs more to a society to develop projects it thinks will give it wealth than to implement principles of good governance. The Stability Pact, especially in its articles 7, 8 and 10, provides a tentative ground to effect a meaningful change in SEE relations, but the mentioning of so many sponsors and benefactors in article 1 begs the question that is answered in article 9, whether "countries in the region who seek integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, alongside a number of other participants in the Pact, strongly believe that this process will facilitate this objective."³⁷

The lone paragraph stating the responsibilities of the participants of the Pact (SEE countries) indicates negatively that the Pact is a solution imposed from without, adding weight to any doubt we may entertain as to whether a theoretical shift has occurred in the minds of the leaders. So much depends on international organizations and countries outside the SEE, that we cannot help but be hopeful for some kind of success. The security of too many actors in the EU depends on it. Furthermore, this provides a litmus test for EU diplomacy both collectively and individually for all EU nations. International credibility demands that the

³⁶ Ramon P. DIAZ: "Capitalism and Freedom in Latin America", in Michael Walker, Ed., Freedom Democracy and Economic Welfare: Proceedings of an International Symposium, Vancouver, The Fraser Institute, 1988, Chapter 6. The experience of Latin American market economies that were also dictatorships demonstrates that. The cases of Argentina and Brazil show that there can be economic growth, social inequality and dictatorship within a society.

³⁷ Art. 9 of the Stability Pact. Notice that the definition of integration does not resemble what we have given in this essay, yet comes from official sources.

Pact succeed, so that the EU can prove it can mend the messes that occur in its own back yard.

For unrepentant nations, this can be a significant advantage, playing the necessity of an ill-defined success (which may limit itself in the near to medium term in achieving stability instead of real security) for more and more material benefits. Provided that success is not an illusion banking on stability rather than security, we should see the emergence of a new, fully integrated region able to bring completion to Europe. It may be that the test of security lies solely in the hands of the participants to the Pact. Still, there is no indication of what sanctions may be applied for any defection from it.

Provided that participants “accept that within each society there are contradictions and tensions that reveal what kind of community [they] really [are]”³⁸, the pride of demonstrating to the world that SEE countries abide by modern norms of international behaviour will bring them together closer as a region.

If article 9 can serve as indicator, regional integration should lead to EU integration. More than the pious statements of Eurocrats, the Stability Pact codifies Europe’s intentions vis-à-vis the SEE. It also leaves room for any country not choosing EU integration to opt out, thereby manifesting its sovereign right as a State. According to our definition, and also looking at historical experience, this should not be cause for concern. Switzerland does not exhibit signs of malintegration despite not being member of the EU.

³⁸ John Ralston SAUL: “Across the Great Divide”, in Queen’s Quarterly, 104:1, Spring 1997, p.14.

Conclusion

We have set in opposition realist and cooperative security theories, have found that either could render its characteristics available for policy formulation, and that if policy formulation was a rational action, then one policy could be substituted for another. In essence, what we have achieved in this section is some sort of “debate on a postulate” which defined our vision as to how and why SEE countries needed to foster a change from a realist to a cooperative outlook. We have found that in the case of the SEE, strong support from interested States and organizations, aimed at immediate stabilization, needed to be combined, above all, by a deepening of democratic principles before infrastructure projects and investment bids could be expected to develop interdependence.

Mistrust and group-specific policies need to be eradicated through the carrot of short-term advantage for participants to the Stability Pact. Now, the time has come for us to propose a project that should amalgamate transparency, hard security, dialogue and region building in a meaningful way.

Part 3: Hard Security Initiatives

On the one hand, Stability Pact participants are eager to demonstrate that they are making progress in the letter and the spirit of the Pact. Despite signing off on the role of international organizations, SEE countries are still likely to be ill at ease with the notion of foreign presence in their region. This is reciprocal. UN and NATO missions are also hoping for a way out, but not to the cost of a flare up in tensions.

On the other hand, European values and norms are not embedded enough to warrant western withdrawal, or to expect that meaningful cooperation will be genuine and mutually beneficial. Legal and social structures are not completely adapted to full transparency and neighbours typically do not trust one another.

Could the creation of a regional peace support operations training center be an initiative that could attain some or all of the objectives above? Functional civil-military relations could certainly be improved if officers could gain access to a common training center that would promote European models of military subordination to the civilian powers.

It would bring together military personnel of all corners of the SEE, where they would acquire the same knowledge, eliminating a form of security dilemma. Theoretically, courses at such a regional peace support operations training center would be integrated into normal career paths of the student-officers, meaning that they would return to their duties after their studies to greater responsibilities where they can practice what they have learned. The officers of the armies of SEE countries would have a chance to develop an ethos hitherto unknown to them, and, for some of them, offer closure from the events of 1991-1999, and develop a new sense of pride in the martial activity.

Presumably, this would be an initiative run by NATO countries with the help of other organizations, so there would also be room to learn English (in view to European integration). But more than stronger contacts between each SEE country and a Western sponsor through language, this could strengthen the spirit of dialogue that will lead to civilians trusting

their militaries more (an essential feature in some multi-ethnic communities emerging from civil war) and also lead to militaries within the region trusting each other more by virtue of the transparency afforded by the commonality of the program.

In time, the aim of this center would evolve as to develop a common regional doctrine for PSOs which could be extended to other areas. This is relevant in the context of parallel integration of the EU (which is crafting its common foreign and defence policy) and the of the SEE (which would then be developing the tools and the habits of cooperation to better graft the region to the EU in due time).

Peace Support Operations is a non-contentious sphere of activity. It is also an activity that requires qualified and dedicated manpower. A regional peace support operations training center would develop the skills and leadership needed to hand back the region to its own authorities in expectance of a greater pullout of foreign forces. So the intent would be far more than symbolic. It would be a practical tool destined to integrate the SEE countries, and to extirpate Western armies from the region. Any integration and any extirpation are dependent on the degree and quality of rapprochement that occurs in the region.

Perhaps the greatest achievement of a regional peace support operations training center would be that it would train military personnel for modern contingencies. Peace support is fast becoming the principal activity of responsible armies. As the expression of the values of European societies, their respective militaries have adapted to the new policies these norms commanded. An indication of successful SEE integration would be obedience to the notion that unjustified, proactive and aggressive use of a State's privilege of coercion is now proscribed in many cases.

If the military tool can learn restraint, it is easier for politicians to advocate policies demanding restraint. Furthermore, the army becomes a more useful tool for the other members of a community (like the PFP, the EU or NATO) as the capabilities are similar, and the outlook identical.

Provided the center is located in a neutral location, and that what is taught there is practical and applicable to real situations, provided that what is taught does not rub members the wrong way, that there is continued support from sponsors and benefactors, but mostly, provided that participants freely choose to participate in good faith, such an initiative could fit nicely in the defence and security sub table of the Stability Pact.

Conclusion

The Stability Pact has its shortcomings, but it is adequate grounds for successful integration. Membership follows integration if dominant EU and Atlantic values are absorbed and applied in the societies of SEE.

To absorb these values and norms, SEE countries must put in practice the characteristics of democracy and the rule of law. Only this can permit foreign investment and confidence in the region for more funding of projects. A rules-based region has better odds of developing true cooperative projects, because there is the implicit acceptance that the neighbour's well being affects your own. Infrastructure projects like roads and power networks cease to become liabilities, and instead foster greater trade and interdependence.

Trade cannot be generated in an environment ruled by instability. Therefore, this essay proposes a practical initiative destined to address the question of civil-military relations, regional relations, capability and region-building, all in harmony with national policies and priorities.

This could be a stepping stone in a long series of processes on the way to the successful integration and consequent membership in Atlantic and European structures. The above is proposed for discussion purposes and is quite open to criticism. I feel there is a certain logic to the transformation of SEE from a hotbed of tension to an area of peace. While donors have a responsibility during the incubation period of the Stability Pact, SEE countries are, in the final analysis, masters of their own destinies. And thus a simple positive decision from participant

leaders is required. Anything else that leaders of SEE may wish for outside EU structures, and indeed, outside EU norms, remain the privilege of sovereign States. “The new Europe [has demonstrated] that nationalism is a movement that over time cannot be suppressed or manipulated”³⁹ writes Madeleine Albright. But the experience of the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that nowadays, there are sharp limits to a State’s sovereign rights.

Either through their own willingness, or through the benevolent (or violent) pressure of neighbouring powers, SEE countries must dissolve their new-found identities within a greater European identity.

Frederic Labarre
International Liaison-Project Officer Royal Military College
Kingston

³⁹ Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT: “The Glorious Revolutions of 1989” in Larry GARBER & Eric BJORN LUND, Ed.: The New Democratic Frontier, Washington DC, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992, p. 12.