

## **Introduction**

The enlargement of NATO with the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary decided in 1997 is one of the most important events of security policy since the end of the so-called Cold War. NATO faced the difficult task of acknowledging the legitimate security interests of the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and, at the same time, not arousing Russia's distrust, i.e. avoiding to create the impression that Central and Eastern Europe would once again - this time very much to Russia's disadvantage - be divided. The limitation of NATO enlargement or, in any case, its first step, also brought on the danger of new dividing lines from the viewpoint of those countries, which are not at all or not to be considered in the near future as belonging to the circle of eligible applicants. These countries could feel subjected to increased Russian pressure.

In order to dispel Russia's reservations, NATO suggested negotiations on a revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), to accommodate Russian wishes for a new definition of national and territorial upper limits (see chapter 13.2). Likewise, in March 1997, an offer was made to Russia for negotiations on a new agreement for nuclear disarmament (Start III), which could accommodate Russia also in the area of nuclear armament. Finally, Russia's inclusion into the circle of the leading industrial nations, G-8 instead of G-7, was offered, and lastly, a certain inclusion of Moscow into the politics of the North Atlantic Alliance was achieved by the NATO-Russia "Founding Act" (May 27, 1997) and the establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. It can, however, not be definitely predicted whether Moscow will acknowledge these preliminary performances by constructive cooperation or whether it will use them to obstruct NATO - and, in particular, of course, its enlargement to the East - to the extent possible, by continuous new requests for "a stronger voice" in the decision process.

NATO has officially left the door open for further enlargement rounds. This perspective for the Central and Eastern European countries is at the same time a strain on the relations with Moscow. Russian politicians and writers continue to point out that Moscow has not at all accepted NATO enlargement but has to acquiesce to it for the time being. Further rounds of NATO enlargement, however, they warn, would lead to a strong worsening of relations and "force" new priorities in Russia's security and defense policy. Individual countries, among them especially France and Italy, had requested - much to the U.S.A.'s discontent - the admittance of further candidates, in particular, Romania and Slovenia, at the Madrid NATO summit in July of 1997. The selection of further countries will also in the future present a potential for dispute in the alliance, as in the area of a new

organization of the military structure (and especially in connection with France's consideration to reintegrate into this structure).

The current enlargement of NATO and the considerations for future enlargement take place against the background that the alliance has evolved more and more from a primarily defense centered alliance into a diverse, flexible instrument for measures of collective security. The restructuring of commands and the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) provide instruments which build on the cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the program "Partnership for Peace" (PfP).

After the last large round of enlargement of the European Union by the inclusion of the so far neutral or alliance-free countries Finland, Austria and Sweden, membership negotiations of the EU have now started with six of the total eleven official applicants. The enlargement policy of the European Union also has significant security policy effects. Therefore, in the following sections, the effects of the enlargement of NATO as well as that of the European Union shall be studied. This concerns, in particular, their geopolitical and geostrategic significance, their relevance for NATO and the organization of the EU itself, and, finally, the policies and politics of Russia and the relations of the great powers.

## **1. The Background of the Development of the European Situation**

The constant increase in world population, among other factors, due to the gigantic population growth in practically all developing countries, aggravates the problems of resource allocation and is so doing, magnifies not only the differences between the developed and the less developed world, but also those within the Third World itself. In spite of a slackening of the debt crisis of the developing countries, population growth creates a higher acuteness of the economic, social and ecological problems (esp. caused by obsolete production processes). These in turn create big population migrations which endanger the social and political stability of the immigration countries, and promote radical and fundamentalist movements and cultural clashes in those countries where systems of democratic order do not function yet or, are non-existent. The disappearance of East-West bloc confrontations of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has not led to a more peaceful world - on the contrary, many conflicts, above all in the Third World, have appeared or, escalated since the breakdown of the Soviet imperial domain.

### **1.1 Increase in Importance of Regional Powers**

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the weakening or, final breakdown of the Soviet Union (1991), the restraining effect of the large

military alliance systems that existed at one time has ceased. The influence that the great powers had on the national policies of friendly, allied or dependent countries has diminished considerably. This has created a new framework of conditions, not only in Europe but also elsewhere. Since the time that the East-West opposition existed world-wide, a greater capacity for action has now come about, also globally, for individual players. The new situation expresses itself especially in the increase of importance of regional powers or, even great powers, who owe their importance to economic strength, population, size, natural resources, military potential and desire to dominate.

With the cessation of Soviet expansionism in Asia and Africa, accompanied by a diminishing military presence of the U.S.A. in Asia, the opportunity now arose for old and new regional powers, to act creatively on their own to a higher degree, and to be able to or, be obliged to become self-reliant by looking after their own actual or pretended security interests. Apart from China, India has to be mentioned here, but also in Africa and Latin America, the emergence of regional leading powers - at least in an incipient form - can be observed (Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil); the strengthening of Japan as an economic power could finally also have security policy consequences.

In general, an increase of the importance of economic potential in international relations can be observed, together with a simultaneous decrease of the importance of military power in security policy. This change in the relationship of economic and military power certainly does not mean that the latter has become unimportant. The globalization of economies, the opening of the national economies of the former Eastern Bloc, the economic liberalization in China, Vietnam and some other countries has, in connection with the transaction possibilities in the global financial networks, which are hardly controllable any more by national authorities, not only opened up immense opportunities for the economic players, but has also created competitive situations which become evident especially in the competition of geographies in the form of a "permanent economic race". In this environment, national states try to find a certain amount of protection from competitive pressures by forming macro-regional economic blocs.

Sharp competition between big national economies and economic blocs determines global events more and more. This applies in particular to the fight for market share between the EU, the U.S.A. and Japan. Under this aspect it is not at all self-evident that security policy cooperation of these countries (except in the area of essential global cooperation requirements for the maintenance of international law, trade law or democratic political conditions) will prevail even with respect to regional problems.

## 1.2 Diverse Fragmentation and New Security Requirements

In the era of globalization, finance policy, production, investment and especially communication and information handling are considered in world-wide terms. In parallel, a contrary trend of diverse fragmentation can be observed, expressing itself in the formation of new states by secession; in the decline of political authority in many countries; in regionalization tendencies in old national states; in the pulling away from the center of economic or political activities, especially in larger countries; as well as in the autonomy seeking efforts of ethnic and cultural minorities.

With diminishing or lost protection from the world powers, the new ambitions of regional powers cause new security requirements for the smaller countries which - totally contrary to the development in Europe and North America - often result in military armament. Especially in East and South-East Asia an armament race has started which, of course, might be slowed down by the acute financial and economic crisis there. With the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May of 1998, a new dimension of armament has arisen in South Asia.

In general the result therefore is - also in security policy - a less easily comprehensible global order. Nuclear proliferation, transfer of nuclear know-how and technology for carrier missiles to Third World countries, and the formation of new nuclear powers render not only regional but also global situations less predictable. A consequence of this development is that the predictability of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence has become more difficult.

## 1.3 Regional Powers with Their Own Objectives

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has - even though Russia still is a great nuclear power, as before, - ended the globally effective "total hegemonic system" of two superpowers. The U.S.A. as the only remaining superpower, however, has not been able to achieve comprehensive, and effective world predominance. On the contrary, the role of the regional powers has clearly increased since the end of the East-West conflict and has also reduced the possibilities of the U.S.A. to exert influence. The regional powers pursue their own objectives and become partners to be courted or pawns for other regional powers and the U.S.A. itself.

The most important regional powers (in military respect also great powers) are Russia and China; apart from them, India has to be mentioned. They have areas of influence which can be called "zones of predominance" and they are busy extending them. Also, in other individual cases, as with Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa, the prerequisites for a regional hegemony (in the sense of predominance based on distinct superiority) totally exist; its exertion is curtailed by the narrow limits of available resources (Nigeria) or by limited willingness for action based on international considerations

(Egypt). Powers like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brazil or Argentina exert no hegemonic position since the proximity of equal or stronger countries prevents it or at least limits it considerably. So Turkey faces Iran and Russia, Iran - Turkey and Pakistan, Pakistan - India, Indonesia - India, Vietnam and Australia, Vietnam - China, Brazil - Argentina, Argentina - Brazil and the U.S.A. They can, however, exert influence (sometimes even pressure) on individual neighbours and take over limited order establishing functions; thus e.g. Turkey will certainly be in a position to influence the policies and politics of individual countries both due to its water resources as well as its transit function for gas and oil transport and strategic trade routes (Bosphorus). Some countries, on the other hand, that could be regional powers (e.g. Zaire, Republic of Congo) on the basis of a naturally given geographic environment (no strong neighbours, limited interest of influence on the part of global powers) lack the strength. In the case of Japan, no strength is lacking, but there is no political will to build its own zone of influence in East and South-East Asia (in competition with China and possibly also the U.S.A.).

Beyond that, there are zones of predominance which are within the area of interest of greater and stronger countries, whereby a position of predominance achieves no greater importance or international effect (e.g. Saudi-Arabia's predominance on the Arabic peninsula is limited by the interests of the U.S.A., or, Mexico's geographic predominance in Central America and parts of the Caribbean cannot come into effect in the "backyard" of the U.S.A.). Australia's dominance in the South Pacific relates only to small and very small states and is limited by possible interests of the U.S.A., and also possibly of France.

Any regional exertion of power is, however, limited by the sphere of influence of global powers. At present, only the USA is regarded as such a power. The return of Russia to the role of a global power is, however, (after an economic recovery) absolutely feasible, and China obviously aspires to the role of a global power.

## **2. A Hegemony-Free Europe**

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union itself, the question arose as to whether, or to what degree is Russia still a world power. Indeed the strategic arms potential counts in its favor, however, economic decline and the downfall of the central state power count against it. The circumstance for the loss of world power status (for the time being) speak for themselves in that Russia does not have an unchallenged predominant position in as large an area as the former the Soviet Union. Another factor is the disappearance of the world-wide mechanisms for ideological influence on communist parties. Nevertheless, Russia still or again exerts a certain degree of predominance in most parts of

the area of the former Soviet Union, the Community of Independent States (CIS). Moscow is not willing to give up the claims to world power status and tries to consolidate and extend its own sphere of influence

The former Soviet hegemony in Eastern and South Eastern Europe was based on the de facto division of Europe between the two main victors of the Second World War; apart from the then existing strategic and military dominance, then followed by the economic dominance of the Soviet Union, it was secured by international ties (bilateral treaties, COMECON, Warsaw Pact). The position of predominance of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe was unchallenged; the division of the continent into spheres of influence strengthened the stability of the American-Soviet balance of power policies.

If balance of power policies had been known to avoid the formation of sole, predominant hegemonic powers in earlier phases of European history, then nuclear parity brought about a new form of world-wide "cooperative-condominial" hegemony of two enemy superpowers with "protected" spheres of influence, but also sources of irritation. It was a form of a (European and, beyond that, limited globally effective) divided total hegemonic system of two rivalling powers.

For Europe - at least outside of the CIS - since the end of the East-West confrontation and in view of a reduced American presence, the situation amounts to freedom from hegemony: neither is Western Europe under American predominance nor does Central Eastern Europe belong to a Russian sphere of influence.

On the basis of historic experience of the behaviour of countries it is, however, to be expected that zones of influence will develop again - and, namely, first by a restrengthening of Russia which might be followed by the formation of a counterbalance. Diverse variations are possible: renewal of an engagement of the U.S.A. in Europe and a strengthening of NATO; foreign and security policy capability of the EU (activation of the WEU); new alliance considerations not yet foreseen, e.g. around France, Germany and Poland. A Russian-German cooperation for the building of new spheres of predominance seems at present (at least at present) not realistic.

But also another process could determine the conditions for the development of spheres of influence, namely the security policy integration of Western Europe (with or without US participation) with an enlargement to the East, against which Russian restrengthening would then be directed. The difference in results between the one case (restrengthening of Russia versus Western European counterbalances) and the other (rapid integration and enlargement of Western organizations to the East versus Russian restrengthening as an opposing force) would probably be that the sphere of influence will be larger for whoever starts to build it earlier. This is also valid with regard to the debate of NATO enlargement to the East.

### **3. The Situation of Russia and the CIS**

After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there was a vacuum of power in Central and Eastern Europe. The withdrawal of Soviet troops coincided with the post-communist countries gaining their own action capability. At the moment they are outside the hegemonic sphere of great powers. They realize the power vacuum and count on admittance to the EU, NATO and WEU.

Also the successor states of the Soviet Union - at least it seemed so in some cases - gained national sovereignty. Most of them, however, could never completely separate from Russia economically and militarily. Their future status is still open; in any case it is obvious that Russia regards (at least) all of the former Soviet Union as its sphere of interest and influence ("close neighbours abroad"). The economic relations between the former Soviet republics are exceptionally close as always; a network of production capacities exists and there is strong dependence (at least for certain sectors) on Russia for energy and natural resources. Beyond that, Russia is a significant market that cannot be relinquished. These circumstances ensure Russian dominance. This is, in particular, also valid for the other two Slavic successor states of the USSR, Belarus and Ukraine. The first, under the leadership of the authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko makes efforts to completely "reunite" with Russia; Lukashenko is said to wish for that since he believes that he has a prospect of being president in such a "greater Russia". Also in Ukraine the continuing heavy economic crisis has caused disappointment in independence for many people - and not only for ethnic Russians who are mainly concentrated in the east and the south of the country. The future course of the country will depend to a large extent on the result of the next presidential elections in 1999. In total, however, national consciousness is higher than in Belarus, so the chances for maintaining sovereignty are higher (see chapter 3.5).

#### **3.1 Turn in Thinking**

The euphoria about the gained national sovereignty in the non-Russian successor states of the USSR gave way increasingly to a sober appreciation of the situation, especially from 1993 on; in view of the general economic decline and the worsening of living conditions of wide layers of the population (with simultaneous getting richer for a few) a more or less poignant "nostalgia" for Soviet times arose, which caused Russian appeals for increased "integration" into the CIS in all areas - politics, economy, military, but also culture, science and media - to often fall on fertile ground.

In Soviet times there also was a redistribution between the individual regions, in particular, from the wealthier republics like Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to the poorer, especially in central Asia, whereby a certain, even "though modest, standard of living was ensured. After the breakdown of the

"command economy", redistribution did not work anymore. The lowering of the standard of living may also be attributed to the breakdown of the former uniform Soviet market. The disturbance and interruption of the distinct regional division of work in many important areas of production has led to economic damages the dimensions of which cannot yet be evaluated even today.

### 3.2 Russia's Instruments in the CIS

Moscow is allowed an almost unlimited authority by the West - for whatever motives - for the area of the former Soviet Union (with the partial exception of the Baltics). Russia tries to stabilize her surroundings according to her interests - both within as well as outside the CIS or, the former Soviet Union. After the loss of the Warsaw Pact (as the "outer imperium") the imperialistic claim to power is still maintained in the "inner imperium" versus the former Soviet republics.

The interest of Russia in the CIS not only pertains to the rights of the so-called "Russian speaking" (i.e. the approx. 25 million Russians plus other Russianized Slavs), but also - of course under its leadership and dominance - to the creation of an economic union and a common CIS market as well as a system of collective security. Moscow states explicitly to have security interests in all of the CIS. These are maintained, among other things, by numerous military bases and institutions in almost all countries of the CIS, stationing of border troops on so-called "CIS external borders" and direct or indirect siding in separatist conflicts (Dnestr area, Crimea/Ukraine, Abkhazia and South-Osetinsk, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan).

In addition to this, there were military actions where the borderline between peacekeeping and intervention faded from time to time. Russia has tried now and then to obtain mandates from the CSCE/OSCE or, the UN for its "peacekeeping missions" in the so-called "hot spots" of the CIS (Dnestr region /Moldavia, Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia/Georgia, Tajikistan), which according to its opinion, would also have to entail financing from these organizations; however, this has not happened. In such a case, Western tax payers would in the end have had to pay at least partly for the stationing of Russian soldiers in crisis areas of the CIS. In addition to this, the Russian Ministry of Defense wants to build or, maintain "friendly armies" in the CIS republics which shall remain equipped with Soviet, or rather, Russian weapons and whose officers shall be trained in Russian military academies to the largest extent possible; with this Moscow wants to keep possible Western influence on the armies of the CIS states as small as possible.

### 3.3 Forcing of "Integration" Within the CIS by Russia

Russia's stated goal is the creation of a "common defense area" of the CIS dominated by it. Moscow also regards a NATO enlargement to the East as a challenge to its intentions for the area of the former USSR. With special

emphasis it keeps warning against NATO-membership for former Soviet republics even if this is not up for discussion in the alliance itself.

Moscow's efforts to create feelings of threat in the former Soviet republics, to mobilize them against NATO enlargement and to rally them behind it in this issue were only partly successful. Only Lukashenko supports the Russian position without condition. In opposition to that, especially Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have made it clear again and again that they do not share Moscow's concerns and that they not only do not see a danger in the alliance but want effectively to cooperate with it.

Also the particularly intensive "integration" of Russia and Belarus is not directly connected with NATO. Without doubt Russia would also aim for a military pact within the CIS without NATO enlargement, as this would be an important element of its dominance in the so-called "post-Soviet sphere". Moscow's pressure for an "integration" as close as possible within the CIS does not correspond with NATO's behavior. Therefore, a stronger pressure from Russia on the other CIS states because of NATO enlargement is not likely at this time and need not be considered yet.

### 3.4 The Special Case of the Baltics

The three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are not part of the CIS and wish to be integrated into Western economic and political-military organizations. Russia tries above all to prevent an integration of the Baltics into NATO. On the one hand, it has threatened the alliance with "most severe consequences", i.e. end of relations, in the case of an admittance, and, on the other hand, it has always criticized in a harsh tone the situation of the "Russian speaking" minorities in Estonia and Latvia (who, upon reestablishment of independence in 1991 did not automatically receive citizenship) whose human rights are allegedly being violated. The determined Russian position has led to the fact that the Baltic states 1. in reality barely have the prospect to be admitted into NATO in the foreseeable future, as NATO does not at all want to put its relations with Russia at risk; and 2. Moscow has in some cases actually been successful in mobilizing Western countries and international organizations against Estonia and Latvia because of the situation of the "Russian speaking" population.

### 3.5 Will Ukraine Stay Independent?

The future development of Ukraine will influence the situation decisively in all of Europe. It is in any case so important for Russia's interest geopolitically and geostrategically that - and this shows all of its policy vis-a-vis Ukraine - it can be assumed that Russia has not acquiesced to its "loss" for good. Even diplomatic recognition and numerous bilateral treaties cannot change this. Observers in the West like to point out the "Russian-Ukrainian treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership (May

31, 1997) with which Russia has "definitely" acknowledged sovereignty of Ukraine as well as the inviolability of its borders. In doing so, they certainly overlook the fact that Russia and Ukraine had already committed themselves in 1990 in a treaty (i.e. still as Soviet republics) to acknowledge the territorial integrity of each other - and this has not prevented numerous politicians as well as Russia's parliament, to raise territorial claims vis-a-vis Ukraine (most of the time for the port of Sevastopol or the whole of the Crimean peninsula).<sup>1</sup>

Ukraine does almost half of its foreign trade with Moscow and, especially with respect to energy resources, is strongly dependent on Russia. In addition, the Russian Black Sea fleet (according to the Russian-Ukrainian treaty on its division of May 28, 1997) will remain on the Crimea at least until the year 2017. Therefore, Ukraine cannot afford a "one-sided" Western alliance, and a NATO membership, discussed on various occasions, is totally unrealistic for the foreseeable future. Moscow reacts with great sensitivity and always with a vehement protest to any alleged or actual sign of Kiev drawing nearer to the alliance.

The leadership of Ukraine regards its "integration" in the CIS, especially in the military area, with scepticism; but due to its economic dependency on Russia, the country will in no case be able to disconnect itself totally or even to a large extent. Thereby Ukraine automatically remains in Russia's area of influence, even if it simultaneously looks for cooperation with NATO and the EU.

When evaluating the security policy orientation of Ukraine, the next presidential elections also have to be taken into account. The present holder of office, Leonid Kuchma, was successful in 1994 (against Leonid Kravchuk who led the Ukraine to independence at the end of 1991) with slogans of drawing closer to Russia, and the explicitly pro-Russian communists decisively won the parliamentary elections in March of 1998. Therefore, it can be predicted that also in the next presidential elections the candidate who most credibly conveys to the voters that he represents "proximity" to Moscow will win. Therefore, at least until the presidential elections, further effective steps towards the moving on the Ukraine closer to NATO can hardly be expected.

A possible "return" of Ukraine to Russia at present depends less on Russian attempts than on the inner strength (or weakness) of the Ukraine itself, which again is determined decisively by economic development. The sooner it manages to overcome the economic crisis, the faster independence

<sup>1</sup> See Wjatsheslaw Pichowshek/Inna Pidluska: *Hauptaspekte der Militärpolitik der Ukraine (Main Aspects of the Military Policy of the Ukraine)*, in: *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ)* 3/1997, pp. 257f.

can be reaffirmed. Should recovery, however, be delayed, or further election successes of parties and candidates who stand for "proximity" with Russia occur, even the reestablishment of the USSR, could be the almost inevitable result.

The interest of the West in Ukraine and particularly in ensuring its independence has always been limited because relations with Russia always had priority. Due to its reservations, Western politics consisted in demonstrating to Moscow that there was no intention to "mingle" in its exclusive "area of interest" (i.e. the CIS), e.g. by increased attention to the Ukraine and its existence within secure borders.

### 3.6 Russia's Activities in East and South East Europe

In the aftermath of the political upheavals of 1989, Moscow to a large extent lost its area of influence in Central Europe; however several possibilities for regaining its influence have remained. This first concerns economic matters which it tries to use especially vis-a-vis Bulgaria (which due to its special loyalty towards Moscow in communist times used to be called the "16th Soviet republic" at times). In Bulgaria, the government formed by the post-communist socialists had failed in the beginning of 1997 due to economic reasons and in "early" parliamentary elections in April 1997, the conservative opposition won and declared integration into the EU and NATO to be its most prominent foreign and security policy goal. Moscow reacted by "reminding" Bulgaria, amongst other things, of its economic dependency in the negotiations for a new delivery agreement on Russian natural gas. The Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, Bogomil Bonev, accused Russia at the end of September 1997 of 'economically placing his country against the wall'; Moscow would have to 'overcome its imperialistic attitude towards Bulgaria'.<sup>2</sup> The present Bulgarian leadership is very unpopular in Moscow. The main reproach is that it committed "treason to Russia" by turning to the West.

An important role in Russia's calculations for Central Eastern Europe is reserved for Slovakia which officially also aspires to NATO membership but pursues this goal less vigorously; Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is, therefore, much more highly regarded in Moscow than most other Central Eastern European politicians. Should Slovakia not join NATO, and should Austria for the time being also not aspire to membership in the alliance - and there is some indication of that after the failure of the Options Report of the Austrian federal government at the beginning of April 1998 - then a long neutral "belt" would exist from Western Switzerland to the Carpathians; this in geopolitical and geostrategic respect is in Russia's interest and would provide its foreign policy with new opportunities. Apart from that, the

<sup>2</sup> Cited according to Austria Presse Agentur (APA) 518, Sept. 25, 1997. 16

NATO integration of Hungary and the inclusion of South Eastern European countries in NATO would be made more difficult.

Moscow's main ally in South Eastern Europe is without doubt Serbia. Russia has always used its influence to protect Belgrade from sanctions or even - as discussed in the course of the escalated Kosovo crisis since the spring of 1998 - from air attacks by NATO (by threatening a veto in the UN Security Council), but hardly to motivate Belgrade to change its policy. Therefore, the hopes of Western politicians that Russia could "influence" Serbia to "restrain" itself are unfounded.

Moscow also entertains demonstratively good relations with Greece which amongst other things are expressed by their joint support of Belgrade. Russia's Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov talked about 'historic, traditionally close ties' between the Russians and the Greeks<sup>3</sup> during a visit to Athens in mid-February of 1998, and the U.S. political scientist Samuel Huntington even said that Greece is already 'almost more an ally of Russia than a NATO member'.<sup>4</sup> Greece proves that NATO membership and close contacts with Russia do not at all exclude each other. Even Greek arms purchases in Russia are under discussion and Moscow has also - among other things, by the delivery of S-300-air defense missiles in the summer of 1998 - left no doubt about its support for the Greek Cypriots against the Turks.

### 3.7 Russia and China

In the case of a NATO enlargement to the East, Russia has threatened the West again and again with a new foreign policy orientation towards the "East" (China) and the "South" (Arabic countries, Iran, India). The Russian efforts to mobilize China against a NATO enlargement to the East were successful, inasmuch as China has actually declared its opposition to it several times. In return, Moscow supports Beijing's point of view that Taiwan and Tibet are "parts of China". Both countries do not criticize each other officially, demonstrate a similar foreign policy direction and cooperate in many areas where civil nuclear technology and armaments are of particular significance: China modernizes its army (also) by substantial arms purchases in Russia. The "strategic partnership" agreed upon by the two countries is also an expression of a common rejection of America's security architecture visions.

For several reasons all of this, however, does not mean that Russia - as is argued again and again in the West - is being "driven into China's arms". On the contrary, it is very unlikely that China would commit itself to an anti-

<sup>3</sup> Cited according to *Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ)*, February 18, 1998, p. 4.

\*\* Interview, in: *Conturen* 2/1997, p.32.

Western alliance with Russia. First, Beijing is strongly interested in amicable relations with the U.S.A. and the West and second, as a rising economic and military power, it has no rational grounds to "align" its foreign and security policy with a Russia shaken by crisis, which, in addition, has approx. only, one eighth of China's population, or to peer to be even "consumed" by Russia. Historic experience also speaks against that: China declared itself independent from the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1960s when it was a lot weaker than the latter. It is, therefore, less to be expected that it will now let itself be used for Moscow's ambitions. Besides, tensions between the two states are quite possible in the future. There have already been for a considerable time fears in Russia that an overpopulated China may be casting desiring looks to the huge and thinly populated wide areas of Siberia. Already numerous Chinese live illegally in Russia's Far East.

The widespread idea that a NATO enlargement to the East will "drive" Russia away from the West as if by force is not applicable also for other reasons. It would mean that Russia could in fact be "steered" by the West into a certain direction: a NATO enlargement would have the effect of its drawing closer to China, Iran, etc., while a renunciation of enlargement would make Russia "Pro-Western". This, however, completely misinterprets the real decision mechanisms of Russian foreign and security policy.

The (re-)drawing closer of Moscow to Serbia, China, Iraq and Iran, observed already since 1993, is not originally related to NATO or its plans for eastward enlargement, but is above all an expression of a distancing from the West required by "patriotic consensus"<sup>5</sup> and the admiration of not only communist, but also nationalist Russian politicians for the non- or anti-Western development of the countries named. A renunciation of a NATO enlargement to the East would not lead to a "reconciliation" of Russia with the West, also because Russia would regard it as proof that an alleged or actual orientation of its foreign policy to the East is suitable to accomplish its interests in the West. It would therefore only be a question of time until Moscow would pose new requirements to the West or NATO - again with the remark that in case of noncompliance it would draw closer to China, etc.

#### **4. Conclusions for European Development**

For Western Europe no current threats are visible and the collective defense capability of NATO seems to be a given in the "case of cases" as

<sup>5</sup> *A term introduced by the German professor of political science, Gerhard Simon, which designates the unity of basic opinions of all relevant Russian political forces - i.e. from the nationalists to the centralists to the communists to the (mostly marginalized) "democrats" - esp. in questions of foreign and security policy.*

before. However, since 1990 - as, e.g., the former National Security Adviser of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated it - 'the artificial stability which allegedly was inherent in the dispute of the blocks in the Cold War is over. That stability - as far as it existed - was artificial from a historic point of view'<sup>6</sup>. Since then non-calculable conflict potential exists in wide areas of Eastern and South Eastern Europe which is based above all on continued instability due to political, economic, social, religious, and ethnic causes.

#### 4.1 Determining Factors of a Future European Security Architecture

- Russia tries to prevent the narrowing of its potential area of influence. Neo-imperialistic and restorative trends dominate the political landscape and increasingly determine foreign policy.
- Russia has made it clear that it wants to be included in the solution of the current crisis situations in world politics - the Balkans, Iraq, Middle East. Its representatives continue to repeat that without "Moscow's voice" there must be no decisions and, above all, the veto right in the UN Security Council, and the NATO-Russia Council open up extensive possibilities of exerting influence.
- The strategic cooperation of the West with Russia (NATO-Russia Council, G-8, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and conventional disarmament) is an important opportunity of structuring international politics which can and will be in a relation of tension with the security requirements of the Eastern Europeans (vis-a-vis Russia).
- With Germany reunified there is - at least theoretically - a new player for European power politics and a potential "agent" for independent Eastern European politics. The possible role of Germany as independent player in European politics is presumed as a theoretical one only because it would be illogical for the country, poor in natural resources and dependent on foreign trade, to take on geostrategic security tasks on its own based on its own strength; in its own interest it will probably rather depend on free trade and avoidance of international tension.
- For the U.S.A., Europe now is only one of several important geographies.
- The U.S.A. naturally only has a limited interest in taking over security policy tasks on a regional European level and in disputes

*" Zbigniew Brzezinski: Postkommunistischer Nationalismus, in: Europa-Archiv, issue 24/1989.*

which for it, e.g. with respect to their ethnic causes, are often difficult to understand.

- The U.S.A. in any case allows Russia such an order establishing function for the area of the former Soviet Union. Also the EU has made no efforts to question the dominating role of Russia in the CIS, even though, by signing cooperation and partnership agreements with most successor states of the Soviet Union, it has created a basis for a certain degree of economic and political influence in the area of the CIS.
- NATO enlargement to the East beyond the current three candidates is open. There are indications that a possible second enlargement round will be postponed to "spare" Russia.
- The WEU will be networked, even though slowly, but systematically, with NATO for possible regional European military tasks. The connection of components of both alliances for crisis management also serves this purpose.
- Enlargement of the EU to the East is under preparation. It is, however, questionable whether it can be realized before the year 2005.

#### 4.2 Democracy Level and Inclination to Wage War

The transformation process of the successor states of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia towards democracy and order is a central problem of security policy. If the results of the historic study by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder on the relationship between the political status of states (as democracies, autocracies, mixed systems from both or, respectively, transition phases in between) and inclination to wage war<sup>7</sup> apply also today, there is really little room for optimism with respect to European development. The central result of the study says that states in a democratization process are more inclined to wage war (than in a stable status) and that the relationship between democratization and waging of war is strongest in the first decade after the beginning of the democratization

<sup>7</sup> Edward D. Mansfield/Jack Snyder: *Democratization and the Danger of War*. In: *International Security* 20/1 (Summer 1995), 5-38; Edward D. Mansfield/Jack Snyder: *Democratization and War*, in: *Foreign Affairs* 74/3 (May/June 1995) 79-97; see also Erwin A. Schmidl: "Halbstarke" Demokratien: Gedanken zu den Arbeiten von Jack Snyder und Edward D. Mansfield über das gesteigerte Kriegspotential von Staaten im Übergang zur Demokratie (Thoughts on the work of Jack Snyder and Edward D. Mansfield on the increased potential for war of states in transition to democracy). In: Erich Reiter (publisher): *Maßnahmen zur internationalen Friedenssicherung. Schriftenreihe Forschungen zur Sicherheitspolitik* 3, 'Graz/Wien/Köln 1998.

process. Especially in the transition phase from dictatorial to democratic circumstances the danger exists that the developing democratic structures are taken over and used for securing or extending power. Especially in connection with aggressive nationalist movements this results in, according to Mansfield and Snyder, a highly explosive mixture<sup>8</sup>. According to this, only developed democracies have a small inclination to wage war.

The fact of decreasing strength of organization of politics on an international scale, which makes international relations increasingly anarchic and less influenceable, suggests that a global "disorder problem" exists as the true strategic danger, which is not limited to the traditional crisis regions Africa and Middle East, but also shows itself in East Europe. Based on this circumstance, the following criteria can be deduced, which will substantially influence the security architecture of Europe in the near future:

- Consolidation of the EU, by reform of its institutions, further development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as the eventual enlargement of the EU. The success of the European Monetary union would be an important element for the development of a European consciousness.
- Engagement of the U.S.A. in Europe, in particular, with regard to a second round of enlargement of NATO; U.S. interest in strategic cooperation with Moscow.
- Internal political development in Russia which will be decisive for the short term foreign policy behavior of the country.
- The role of Germany, i.e. the question if it will remain the "integration engine" of the EU or whether it will want to create more freedom of action for itself with regard to its Eastern policy.

The main players of the future security architecture and power structure in Europe will be Russia and, as a natural counterbalance, the EU. Should the EU, however, prove not capable of action in the sense of a factor of international politics, the danger of a far-reaching renationalization exists in Western Europe, with power politics ambitions of the bigger European powers and a search by the smaller countries for new alliance partners.

#### 4.3 The Security Policy Future of the EU

The substantial changes after 1989 have created a new pluralistic situation. In former times, the U.S. policies of building alliances in Western

\* See Fareed Zakaria: *The Rise of Illiberal Democracy*. In: *Foreign Affairs* 76/6 (November/December 1997), pp. 22-43. Zakaria gives considerations similar to Mansfeld-Snyder's.

Europe had the effect of suppressing possible confrontation scenarios between the European powers; the respective contribution of NATO is, however, perhaps already historic. The U.S.A. which has reduced its engagement in and for Europe will not be able to "force" Western European harmony. In the long term, only an effective EU ensures that the old balance of power and alliance politics of the European powers do not rise again after the end of the East-West confrontation.

The EU would therefore need a security policy concept which encompasses all economic and military components and which is based on an identification of the (in fact existing) common security policy interests, in particular, with regard to the regions Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Apart from the visionary long term goal of collective security for all of Europe, it would have to guarantee collective defense; until the establishment of a system of collective security - i.e. in the short term - there would in addition be the requirement to perform security policy tasks in the region in order to limit or, to alleviate crisis situations and wars by political and, if necessary, military interventions.

The special suitability of the EU for security and defense policy organization comes from the fact that it would allow the combination of economic, political and military power. It is, however, hardly probable that there will soon be an autonomous defense policy of the EU itself, i.e. an extension of the second pillar of the EU (without the WEU). The EU can, of course, hardly have a genuine common defense policy or a common defense as long as it does not take the shape of a state-like structure and does not have independent institutions, i.e. institutions that are not dependent on the will of individual members, for decision making in security policy issues. A common defense and a common defense policy of the EU would, however, really require a joining of all defenses.

The present second pillar of the EU, the CFSP, is a cooperation of members; this cooperation, by intent not part of the first pillar, can be done either by the EU members in a special organization form of the CSFP itself, or it can be transferred to an organization outside the EU. The present model provides for a combination of these possibilities: decisions in the organization of the CFSP and execution of possible military actions by the WEU.

A substantial further development of the security and defense policy of the EU, which needs to be distinguished from the alliance-like cooperation form, would be the direct handling of this policy within a „state-like" EU by creating its own institutions and structures for the planning and execution of these tasks. Based on the already existing size and the EU enlargement to be expected, a state-like structure also means increasing majority decisions. An "effective defense policy would require simple processes for obtaining the

necessary decisions in a parliament and the executive power of one authority (minister of defense). What the EU gains in executive power over military resources, the members lose. This means a decisive transfer of sovereignty from the EU members with regard to a key area of national sovereignty. With this, the EU would have assumed a state-like character.

The events in former Yugoslavia have demonstrated that inter-governmental cooperation does not yet lead to a concrete common foreign and security policy because governments are not in agreement on appropriate objectives and measures; and a genuine requirement to act does not exist. It can be assumed that this will always be like that when human lives and money, as well as political risks, are at stake.

The interests of the European powers obviously still seem to be threatened too little or, alternatively, the European powers do not feel decisively challenged when evaluating taking sides, interests, costs and political risk. The impression prevails that in the end they still regard security policy as a task of the national state and not as a European task. On the other hand, the European powers individually do not any more have the means available for military intervention over longer distances (except, perhaps, in the case of an extraordinary effort which would, however, only be undertaken in their own national emergency). Not only for this reason would they have to cooperate (and would maybe also still be dependent on U.S. help in the areas of logistics and reconnaissance), but also just for political considerations. If in a particular situation, a single greater European power would intervene on its own due to the lack of a common European will to act, this would irritate the others and maybe initiate a total renationalization of Western policies and politics.

The increasing interweaving of economies world-wide and strong competition in trade, science and technology on the one hand, as well as the regional requirement of the necessity of a counterbalance to Russian aspirations for hegemony and peacemaking in Eastern Europe, on the other, should in themselves exert a logical pressure for a stronger integration of Western Europe. Europe is in danger of falling behind in the major industrial sectors and of not being able to keep pace with the U.S.A. and Japan in technological development. The economic position of Europe in the world is also endangered by the east and south-east Asian "threshold" countries, even if they are without doubt slowed down in their development, or set backward by the most recent financial crises.

#### 4.4 The Postulate for a Strengthening of European Solidarity

Political leadership, conscious of its responsibilities, should, in the next years, promote the raising of awareness of the necessity for European solidarity. But for the EU to consolidate itself and fulfil the role of a European order powers-will, require intelligent political leadership in the

most important member countries, which will adjust to the new situation and be capable of also obtaining internal acceptance of the integration policy. This is, however, not to be expected very soon, and the EU, even though already facing a dramatic escalation of the security policy situation in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, could not bring itself decisively to a further development of the CFSP. Improvement of the decision-making process as well as organizational and institutional reforms will not achieve too much in the short term. But any further development of CFSP would improve the starting situation for a more rapid organization of an effective CFSP - if the will to act should still emerge from within the member states of the EU (because the need to act would become inevitable).

The development of the EU/WEU into a European order power is a medium term perspective. Until then, also short term measures are required for increasing the stability and security in the area between NATO and the CIS. To this end the limited first enlargement of NATO has been offered; this and the debate on further enlargement rounds will provide the time needed by the EU to become a militarily effective organization itself (or to have one). The development of a European order power for crisis management, conflict prevention and possible intervention in war and conflict areas, to reinstall peace and order, and of the concept of a common security policy of the EU (both in the case of an extension of the second pillar as well as in the case of a strengthening of the EU) would have to be based on a far reaching congruence of the EU (and WEU) and the European NATO partners. The new EU members, probably in the short term will face the decision on NATO membership, so that they can be included in the WEU, which again is important for the EU to be able, through it, to organize a security and defense policy.

In the longer term, this concept would mean that a Western Europe, cooperating on security policy and militarily, would be capable of presenting itself in its own region as an order power, also with regard to military measures. This would in no way hinder the possibilities to act for the organizations of cooperative and collective security, i.e. the OSCE and the UN - on the contrary: the existence of an order power, capable of action and willing to take action, would in many situations decisively increase the willingness to use the services of the OSCE or to comply with the recommendations and resolutions of the UN - if there were to be any.

However, since this will still take its time, NATO is a non-renounceable element of European security for this transition phase until the emergence of a common European will to act.

## **5. NATO as Counterbalance to Renationalization of Security Policies and Politics in Europe**

NATO is first intended as an alliance for collective self-defense. Especially in the time of the East-West conflict, the U.S.A. had to bear the main burden of defense efforts and to make a nuclear deterrence capability credible. NATO was originally not intended for other, limited tasks - as e.g. the present policing and observing task in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR). It was, however, never a purely military organization. It promotes the cooperation of its members in numerous ways; the scope of problems with which it deals, has for many years included, for instance protection of the environment. The significance of its civil and political components has naturally increased after the end of the Cold War.

The earlier political function of NATO was the limitation of the Soviet area of influence in Europe. It is doubtful whether the Western European states would have been able to do that by themselves. Their economic potential and military capabilities would actually have been sufficient for that because in population and, especially, in economic strength and state of technological development, Western Europe was significantly superior to the Soviet Union. However, the will for common action was lacking and the European Western powers were still indulging in great-power thinking; they thought of balance of power and alliance politics not only vis-a-vis the Soviets but also among themselves. In this, NATO has brought about a strong change which still is not recognized by many in its full significance, because it has prevented hegemonic fights or even opposed alliance formations among the Western European powers and has thus also protected the Western European countries from themselves.

The U.S.A. as the leading power in NATO had a great interest in preventing the Soviets from extending their sphere of influence in Europe. By including Germany, it prevented Germany from playing an independent autonomous role again. Also the close ties of Great Britain to the U.S.A. contributed to the prevention of new inter-European alliance formations. The effects of France's attempt to follow a special path because it did not accept a dominant role of the U.S.A. in Europe therefore remained limited.

Thus, NATO - together with the European Communities/the European Union (which on their part owe this development to the conditions in Europe created by the existence of NATO) - had built a zone of friendly cooperation in Western Europe which, at the same time, also prevented the enlargement of Soviet influence.

NATO has brought about a certain hegemony of the U.S. over Western Europe and limited the hegemonic area of the Soviet Union in Europe. Possibly this "keeping together" of the Western powers - as the basis for the military alliance which "held off the Soviet imperium - could only be

achieved because of a comprehensive threat to the West (i.e. not only the military and political, but also economic and social challenge on the part of the communist Soviet Union). After its collapse the need to secure the "keeping together" has become significantly weaker.

As before, NATO fulfils important functions, even if the original "official" main function as defense alliance seems to have been lost for the time being and, therefore, the question of its further development has arisen. As long as NATO continues to exist with its strong structures, it prevents the return to a complete renationalization of the Western Europeans and makes power politics more difficult in the whole European sphere; in particular, because with Germany it includes the only Western European power which (if it should want to), both due to its economic significance as well as to its geographic position, would be at present able to carry out effective power and alliance politics in Eastern Europe.

After reunification, Germany clearly is the most important Western European country according to population and economic strength, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union it has a new freedom to act in the East and the South East this opens the door for speculation on the future role of Germany. Thus the presence of the U.S.A. in Europe is a necessity for some, in order not to be subjected to the future hegemony of Germany (and at the same time also in order to be spared new Russian ambitions). For some South Eastern Europeans, however, a restrengthened Germany represents the hope for a continental counterbalance to Russia, since Germany is acknowledged to have a higher interest in Central Europe and the Balkans than the U.S.A.

NATO as before represents a certain military reassurance for its members and offers the basis for a return of increased U.S. forces to Europe in the case of necessity; NATO remains the connecting link between the U.S.A. and Western Europe in security policy and provides the U.S.A. with the opportunity to participate in European politics. It can also be worded like this: the far reaching military withdrawal of the U.S.A. from Europe creates the impression that NATO is an alliance with the function of a reserve. It worked in former times and it still has the same capable structures as before; something like that is not to be given up easily.

A decisive reason for the further development opportunities of the alliance is, of course, the U.S.A. interest for and in Europe. The U.S.A. concept of its global leadership role for the democratic countries - in its view, as a pioneer for values such as democracy and human rights - guarantees its interest in Europe, at least for the time being, and NATO is the anchor of European and Atlantic stability in this respect. The lasting interests of the U.S.A. in Europe will, in the end, depend not only on the further development of Russia and the opportunities of strategic cooperation "with this country, but also on developments in East Asia; therefore,

concretely, the role of China and Japan. The U.S.A. attempts to achieve global objectives by cooperation and balancing of interests with various partners, in which the development of the Chinese-Russian and the Russian-Japanese relations will play a substantial part.

## **6. NATO Today - a Global or a Regional Alliance?**

NATO is in a phase of new orientation. According to its original conception its mission is not to carry out the tasks of a regional order establishing power for Europe and to execute limited regional or local peace support actions in the framework of an all-European security system. The "crisis in meaning" - as it is often called - of NATO causes deliberations on its future role (apart from its enlargement).

Contrary to the regional-sounding name "North Atlantic Treaty Organization", NATO was and is to be seen primarily in a global-strategic dimension, due to the membership of the U.S.A. Is such an alliance the suitable starting point for the solution of the security policy and order establishing tasks in Europe and for the clearing up of the security problems of the Eastern Europeans? Since the U.S.A. has the unchallenged leadership position in the alliance, it would also well be required that it understands itself as an order establishing power for the management of Eastern or South Eastern European conflicts, or, that it awards special powers for action and respective support to its European partners for dealing with these conflicts.

After the Dayton agreement (1995) there now is a regional policing and peacemaking effort in Bosnia which takes place not exclusively with European NATO troops, but with massive, direct participation of U.S. troops and under U.S. leadership. However, one cannot deduce from this a permanent direct engagement of the U.S.A. in European conflicts. Due to the cultural dispute component in this multi-cultural country and Moscow's interest in or, its willingness to support the Serbian side, the conflict in Bosnia was especially liable for a limitless international escalation. The American engagement for a solution in Bosnia must rather be seen as an effort to prevent further conflicts arising from the war there. From this, however, it cannot be concluded that the U.S.A. intend to take over a permanent order establishing task in Europe, which the EU was not capable of achieving.

For taking over the role of a regional order establishing power, NATO, however, would still need some adaptations because it was not created for routine, limited actions in the framework of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement.

In the present times of a dramatic reduction of military resources in Europe one can consider that, for a foreseeable time, the building of new military organizations<sup>f</sup> for regional order establishing and order maintaining

tasks is unlikely just for financial reasons. The really decisive cuts in the defense budgets and the forces in the Western European countries at present definitely make the construction of new military structures in Europe impossible. For the foreseeable future, there can only be a further development of what exists in the military area. The conditions for starting have been created - so, e.g., the PfP provides for various cooperation and training programs in the areas of peace support and disaster relief.

As already explained, the development of the EU into a defense organization is to be considered only as a long term perspective, and because of that in the short term only NATO remains as the basis for a European (military) order establishing and order maintaining policy. This basis will not be NATO as a whole, but an element to be created within the alliance which would thus become two-dimensional: one of the two dimensions is global. One level below NATO then receives a regional-European dimension for non-strategic tasks, which primarily would have to be assumed by the European members (with differing support by the U.S.A., depending on the cause). - One of the most important internal tasks of NATO in the next years will consist of exploring the political and institutional consequences connected with the establishment of this new European pillar within the transatlantic alliance, which includes also the definition of the future role of the WEU and of multi-national forces such as the Euro-Corps. The U.S.A. (and Canada) will finally agree to this development: also the U.S.A. needs a partner for representing its interests in the world because it cannot manage everything on its own.

From these points of view, the question of NATO enlargement is also a decision on the path for a possible further development of the alliance in the direction of a (also) Europe-oriented order power. The measures for a reform of NATO clearly point in this direction.

## **7. New Tasks by the Reform of NATO**

The fundamental changes both of the political as well as of the military framework conditions in Europe (and beyond that also world-wide) have not gone by without leaving a trace in NATO. It was fully aware since the times of the big change in Eastern Europe that it would have to adjust its structures to the new situation, and it has also defined this in its resolutions at the summits in London (1990) and Rome (1991). Since then NATO is in a process of transformation.

In parallel, however, the development of the EU must also be considered. With the treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, CFSP was brought to life. Its final shape is not clear yet, but the political objectives exist, and from them a common defense policy and even a common defense could emerge some day.

However, it has to be noted especially, that the WEU has become a central component of the development of the EU: it was declared the military arm of the EU. Since then, there are strong signs of life from the WEU with the objective to really make it an effective military organization. The WEU now has a double function. On the one hand it shall represent the defense component of the EU, on the other hand it shall form a stronger European pillar within NATO.

Due to the new conditions in Europe, NATO should in the future be able to perform two functions: first, "crisis fire brigade" (as the new main task), and second, carrying out all order establishing and order maintaining tasks in Eastern Europe. NATO can only to a very limited degree fulfil these tasks with its old structures which were designed for counteracting a Soviet attack. Therefore, the CJTF concept was established, which provides a framework for putting together appropriate headquarters for various operations (also outside the NATO area, the so called "out-of-area" operations) for the purpose of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. Such operations will be based on the integrated structure of NATO, but are not necessarily carried out by it as such.

In this, differences have emerged (especially) between the USA and France on questions like the exact definitions for the establishment of CJTFs, the locations of the CJTFs high commands, and the role of the Commander in Chief NATO-Europe (SACEUR). It has already taken two and a half years before agreement on the principles of the CJTFs was reached in the NATO ministerial council in Berlin in June of 1996. The problems have not all been solved yet, but at least an enormous progress of NATO is to be seen in the fact that the USA accepts military operations of the Europeans with NATO resources under WEU leadership. If the NATO Council agrees, the WEU shall undertake peacekeeping, humanitarian or peacemaking missions outside the area of the alliance, and can use or, receive equipment as well as support from NATO. The concession to the U.S.A. was that all of this should happen within NATO and that in the end no European actions take place without its agreement.

Through the CJTFs it will be possible for the countries especially interested in a peace mission to put together a common force, which forms itself within the framework of NATO and can use structures of NATO. Such operations can take place under the command of the WEU within the framework of NATO.

Even after an agreement on a concept for realization of the CJTFs it is not clear how this will work in real life. This will depend on whether a sufficient common will to take action will exist. It will be easier to find a common will if not all members have to participate in an operation. For legitimizing an operation, up to now the UN (Security Council) and/or the OSCE have always been considered. This situation is unsatisfactory in the

case of an acute need for action, and requires a new starting point for a solution, which e.g., could consist of a legitimization by the EU.

An additional problem arises with operations in which the U.S.A. do not want to participate. Why should the U.S.A. grant considerable military aid (air transport, satellite reconnaissance and planning capacities, possibly even the lending and providing of fighting means, of which the Europeans have none or too few) for these operations? If all or individual European NATO partners want to form a kind of European order establishing and order maintaining power which relies on full American support, then, vice-versa, there will well have to be a support of the Europeans for the Americans in their global activities. Why should rich Europe on its part put the U.S.A. under obligation to help its own actions, but remain passive in the other case, when problems in other regions of the world are at stake, which disrupt international order or could create new power relation conditions to the disadvantage of the West? The Europeans on their part should (e.g., at least for actions in the area of the Middle East) be willing and ready to participate in case of need in direct military actions. It is difficult to say whether the Europeans would actually be willing to do that in the foreseeable future, because their politicians currently lack the will to deal with threats at a distance, which could, at some time, influence also their own situation negatively.

It is in any case a fact that Western Europeans and Americans are mutually dependent on each other, both in tasks of order establishing and order maintaining in Europe as well as with regard to the global international security architecture; whom except Western Europe does the U.S.A. have when it searches for a strategic partner for cooperation in the management of global challenges? If, therefore, reason prevails, it would then still lead to a renewal of the strategic partnership USA-Western Europe, and the framework for this is a reformed NATO.

## **8. The Debate on NATO Enlargement to the East**

The development process of NATO enlargement to the East creates a demand for reform. According to Lothar Rühl,<sup>9</sup> NATO changed its enlargement policy four times from 1992 to 1994:

1. 1991 - final breakdown of the former Eastern Bloc as a geopolitical entity by dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. 1992 - reserved position of NATO vis-a-vis all countries of Eastern Europe with preference for a "Visegrad" - security zone and higher valuation of the CSCE; in addition, direct external relations of NATO with all countries

<sup>9</sup> *Guest commentary, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), April 29, 1995.*

of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

2. 1993 - turning towards the four Visegrad states with variations from time to time, e.g., prerequisite earlier admission to WEU membership and the intention not to accept former Soviet republics in any case; extended waiting period before accepting the Central Eastern European states on certain defined conditions and without any commitment by NATO on a process or a time schedule.
3. Fall of 1993 until January 1994 - commitment to make the PfP offer in order to win time, get Russia used to the idea of a NATO enlargement and introduce a kind of trial time for candidates, but offer others a substitute for the alliance.
4. 1994 - shortening of the waiting period for negotiations on NATO membership and definite concentration on "Visegrad", but still with the concept of an open, evolutionary enlargement process and at the same time establishment of a connection with EU enlargement.

Germany initially played the part of the "engine" of enlargement and in the meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Travemünde (Oct 20-21, 1993) it got its way with the "principle of considerations" on NATO enlargement: the summarization of the NATO General Secretary presumed that there had been support for the thought of NATO enlargement. In addition, the PfP concept would be a useful step and not a substitute for the enlargement.

In spite of Germany's strong engagement for NATO enlargement, other important NATO states were, however, very definitely not willing to provide the former communist countries even with a prospect for NATO membership, that is, e.g., formulate criteria for membership acceptance. Germany for the time being had to "give in" in the debate on NATO enlargement. The "principal yes" of the NATO foreign ministers conference of October 1993 became a "practical no" since neither the conditions nor a possible date for acceptance into membership were determined. Nevertheless, the German Minister of Defense, Volker Rühl stuck to the declaration that NATO enlargement was not a question of "if but a question of "when" and "who" - and, in the end, he has remained right.

The U.S.A. as well as Great Britain and France were at that time against enlargement to the East. Great Britain saw no current need for action: there were and are no (serious) conflicts between the Western European states, and the solution of the disputes between the Eastern Europeans was not a task of NATO. For France, NATO would not gain importance - until 1994 - as a factor of political order in Europe, because NATO becomes effective via the influence of the USA which the French have always wanted to curtail. The Southern Europeans saw in NATO enlargement not only a

participation in new risks but also - jointly with the British and the French - the danger to be "pushed to the side" more strongly. In many cases, a strengthening of Germany was expected as a result of NATO enlargement; it would thus move to the center of the organization and could count on the support of the central and eastern European countries as a key industrial power.

Even though the NATO summit of Jan. 10-11, 1994, stayed with the preliminary No to enlargement,<sup>10</sup> the process finally evolved again according to German thinking. The PfP decided upon in this meeting played a role as pacemaker in this which it probably initially was not intended for. According to the opinion of numerous observers, the PfP was actually initially meant as a reaction to German insistence to delay discussions on precise NATO enlargement to the East and not to endanger the good relations with Russia." After the success of the nationalists and communists in the Russian parliamentary elections of December 1993 the offer then gained more significance than originally planned.

In the scope of the initiative mentioned it was intended by NATO to upgrade the NACC (not to make it independent) and offer bilateral cooperation agreements (NATO with the individual CSCE countries), where this offer was valid for almost all CSCE members (therefore also for Russia). The agreements within the scope of the PfP should serve the enlargement and deepening of (security) political and military cooperation in all of Europe - including the offer of NATO to enter into consultations with any active PfP member, if it sees itself faced by a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. Time and scope of the cooperation are determined according to capability and desire of the individual member states. The objectives of cooperation are: transparency of defense budgets, promotion of democratic control of the armed forces, common planning, joint military exercises and development of the capability to work together with NATO forces in the areas of peacekeeping, search and rescue services, as well as humanitarian or other possibly to be agreed on operations. The partners are invited to participate in political and military institutions of NATO and to maintain contacts through permanent liaison officers at NATO headquarters as well as at their own partnership coordination office.

<sup>10</sup> See *Declaration of Heads of State and Government Participation in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10 - 11 January, Press Communiqué M-1 (94) 3, Jan. 11, 1994.*

" See, e.g. Zbigniew Brzezinski: *The Way Forward for an Inspired NATO. In: International Herald Tribune (IHT), Dec. 2, 1993; William Pfaff: NATO Should Be Clear About Eastern Europe. In: IHTribune, Dec 20, 1993.*

The PfP can, therefore, also particularly assist with "getting to know" NATO and with the process of democratization and restructuring of the armed forces of the applicants. Viewed like this, it actually offers the possibility of an individual preparation for NATO membership in the sense of general and military suitability. One can, therefore, view the PfP as the beginning of Western integration of individual post-communist countries. The US Secretary of Defense at that time, Les Aspin, once declared in an interview that the PfP provided the possibility to develop military capacities which are compatible with NATO. The partnership was "self-selecting" with regard to further NATO tangency since the more activities a country would develop within the framework of the PfP, the more relevant its defense would become for NATO.

Russia has on purpose kept its participation in the PfP to a minimum since it feared that a wider involvement could be interpreted as an indirect agreement to NATO enlargement to the East - an impression Moscow wants to avoid at all costs.

### 8.1 U.S. Policy on Enlargement to the East

Still in the NATO meeting of January 1994 in Brussels, U.S. President Bill Clinton had rejected the plans for NATO enlargement to the East. Clinton had applauded the division of security policy work between the U.S.A. and Western Europe and welcomed the new self-sufficiency of the Europeans on issues of security policy. But in the summer of 1994, there was a decisive turning point in President Clinton's foreign policy which was connected with the reproach in the internal American debate of losing the leadership role of the U.S.A. in the world; Clinton answered this reproach with a new, more energetic foreign policy.<sup>12</sup> The "rediscovery" of foreign policy by President Clinton was probably partly also caused by the fact, that due to the Republican majority in Congress, foreign policy provides the President with a freedom of action which is not available to him in U.S. domestic politics and which he can use to demonstrate his leadership capability and willingness to act. In fact, American leadership proved essential for peacemaking politics in Bosnia, in Haiti, in the Middle East, and even in Northern Ireland. Regarding the European security architecture, NATO, as the central pillar, moved more and more to the foreground for the USA. In July of 1994, NATO gained an advocate as a European order establishing factor in Richard Holbrooke when he took over the European department in the U.S. State Department. For him NATO was the central

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<sup>12</sup> • Ernst-Otto Czempiel: *Global Leadership*, In: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 6/1995, pp. 707f

security pillar of the new architecture in Europe; America should remain a European power.<sup>13</sup>

In connection with the revived leadership claim of the U.S.A. in Europe and with the revitalization of NATO as its implementation, NATO enlargement to the East receives strategic value. In the December 1994 meetings of the NATO ministers of defense and foreign affairs, the process of rethinking on the part of the U.S.A. was already clearly evident. This date marks the beginning of an internal NATO debate on political, technical, and financial conditions for membership candidates. Since then, the enlargement now really is on the agenda: a study was ordered to define the criteria for accepting new members. Before the meeting of the NATO defense ministers on Dec. 14-15 1994, there had still been talks to enter into concrete investigation of enlargement to the East and to start first talks with candidates for membership before the end of 1995. At the end of the meeting, however, the wish (as expected) of most defense ministers became evident, not to carry through the enlargement to the East too quickly. In 1996, however, the speed was increased and 1999 targeted as point in time for the acceptance of the first new members.

The criteria for enlargement established by the NATO paper (Study on NATO Enlargement) of the fall of 1995 were: democratic political system (both constitutional and in actual politics); free-market economy; solution of open border issues and the status of minorities; civil control of the military (civil ministers of defense); capability and willingness for full participation in NATO - i.e. full military integration; capacity to share in the prorated cost of the enlargement.

The criteria were thus designed so that the enlargement does not decrease the existing coherence in NATO and that the efficiency it has had up to now is not diminished (interoperable forces); the new members shall be fully integrated militarily (no new "France" or "Spain"). But under no circumstances shall the enlargement introduce bilateral problems (be it between two new or a new or an old member) (no new "Greece-Turkey" problem) or create unnecessary open problems of a new member with outsiders.

Central issues concerned the stationing of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. If such stationing does not take place, the question arises what quality the security guarantee of NATO really has and if the nuclear umbrella is to be extended to the new members at all. On the other hand, the new members should not be obliged to join the military structure of NATO immediately. Opinions were voiced which

"\_Richard Holbrooke: *America, A European Power*. In: *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1995.

feared that through this NATO could become a "two-class society" which has members with full participation and full protection and members with limited participation but also with limited liability.

Development had, however, progressed so far that NATO could not any more reverse its turning towards enlargement to the East initiated in 1994 without experiencing a significant loss of political credibility. The attempt of the U.S.A. to upgrade NATO to the main instrument of the new architecture of Europe in order to furtheron exert with its help the American leadership claim in Europe will, however, not be successful over time. The process started for an eventual reintegration of France into NATO demonstrates the U.S. intention only in appearance since Paris in NATO only wants to start the fight there against "American hegemony" in Europe.

## 8.2 NATO Enlargement and Russia

Until 1994, U.S. President Clinton was disinterested in NATO enlargement because he did not want to draw "any new dividing lines further East". In order to put the relations of the West with Russia on a firm long term basis, it was considered to postpone NATO enlargement for the time being. The reasons were the presidential elections of 1996 and the bad health condition of Yeltsin; it was said that advantage should not be taken of Russia's temporary inability to take action. Instead of a postponement of NATO enlargement, however, the idea prevailed to work on a document which would put the relations between Russia and NATO on a new basis. Institutionalized relations were to be established and a permanent mechanism for consultations and also for joint actions was to be installed. In any case, matters such as peacekeeping, crisis management and non-military disaster operations were to be discussed jointly with the Russians. De facto such an inclusion of Russia would be equal to a decisive voice in NATO. Russia, however, also wanted to have a decisive voice on NATO enlargement itself. Russian policy has been and still is ultimately aimed at preventing or limiting NATO enlargement.

NATO enlargement with respect to Russia has geopolitical and geostrategic significance. Opinion is widespread that the extent of the first NATO enlargement could at the same time be understood as a signal, by which the "rest" of Eastern Europe would be awarded to the Russian zone of influence (others, on the other hand, argue that this would definitely be the case after a second enlargement round; therefore, there will only be one enlargement round).

## 8.3 Russia's Policy vis-a-vis NATO

On the one hand, by the inclusion of former Central Eastern European Warsaw Pact countries in NATO Russia's self-understanding as a great power received a heavy blow in any case. On the other hand, the strategic possibilities of Russia are also curtailed by it.

The attempt to prevent the inclusion of the Visegrad countries in NATO, however, had specific geopolitical significance. The verbal assaults and threats of Russian politicians and the military in this connection, which went as far as threats of war, were therefore not surprising. The considerations of the general staff to aim nuclear short range missiles on targets in the new member states in case of NATO enlargement were also meant to be intimidating and threatening. In case of an indication of the inclusion of the Baltic states in NATO even the invasion of the Baltics was demanded in some cases.

Further speculation arose in connection with the question of whether Russia wanted to prevent NATO enlargement or whether it only wanted to bargain for a price as high as possible in return for quiet acceptance. Russia's policy vis-a-vis the Eastern enlargement of NATO has by some Western commentators been called an obstruction policy since it announced its rejection in a more or less aggressive form. Russian indignation over the "policy of revanche" of the West and the "lapses back to the Cold War", however, has not been verbally reciprocated and was dealt with very diplomatically in order to avoid any provocation. This conciliatory policy could, of course, also be interpreted as a weakness or indecisiveness of the West.

However, Russia has repeatedly also demonstrated its willingness for talks. Thus at least a dialogue between NATO and Russia has come into existence. Moscow's arguments to explain its willingness to talk with NATO most recently consisted in saying that it wanted "to minimize the negative effects of the Western policy of NATO enlargement" in particular, the extension of NATO's military infrastructure since this would inevitably require Russian "military policy consequences". Also, Russia wanted a larger voice within the out-of-area operations of NATO in the sense of a cooperative policy; at the same time, NATO should also be transformed from a military to a political organization.

Russia's decreasing or compressed military resources correspond to an increase of the military arsenal of NATO, due to the enlargement. The disarmament steps of the West already carried out or planned for the future do not impress Russia sufficiently (in spite of the fact that there already was a reduction of U.S. troops in Europe from 300,000 to 100,000 and a reduction of NATO fighter planes in Europe from approximately 6,000 to 3,800 units). For Russia, NATO enlargement was and is a curtailment of its own possibilities and is therefore demanding a number of security guarantees, including a freeze on modernization of weapons and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO enlargement to the East in the end means the definition of new spheres of influence in Europe. Why should Russia be ready to accept an 'enlargement of the Western (and, in its view, U.S.) sphere of influence when

it means a reduction of its own sphere of influence at the same time? For Russia, NATO enlargement means a strengthening of the American leadership role in the world and the guarantee of a continued American presence in Europe. Therefore, in attempting to determine an institutionalized relation with the West, for Russia it is important that the determination of its position correspond to its own understanding - a great power. It wanted and wants to be included in decision making on global political matters, where also the solution of the problems of the Balkans, in the Middle East, Afghanistan or Cyprus should be included; last but not least it wanted to be included (accomplished by now) in the group of the leading industrial nations (now G-8). But also for its own interests Russia had to be interested in an agreement with the West because it cannot any longer afford its military in the present form and because it will also be forced into modernization measures.

Poland certainly is the most interesting and most important country for NATO enlargement. The relationship between Poland and Russia is traditionally tense. In today's situation, Poland also geopolitically is the key country for the creation of spheres of influence in Europe. From a Russian point of view there is no reason to fear the military potential of Poland, and also Poland as a NATO member does not pose a threat to Russia. But in the Russian internal political debate things look different, and NATO membership of Poland could very well be used as an argument for Russian armament.

In the difficult development of democracy in Russia and with the uncertainties created by economic reform, the search for an external enemy remains a "rewarding" means of internal politics; especially for the older generation of Russians, NATO was and is - independent of its behaviour - a declared enemy. The political elites are concerned about NATO enlargement, but the people hardly notice most of the time; in elections, foreign and security policy topics hardly play a role, and, therefore, also those observers (in Russia as in the West) are not right, who warn against a NATO enlargement because allegedly it would strengthen communists and nationalists against Yeltsin and the "democrats". Since, in addition, all relevant political forces of Russia speak out decisively against a NATO enlargement (patriotic consensus), it would not make sense, also from a Western point of view, to renounce such a step out of consideration for the internal power relations in Russia, since by so doing one side of NATO opponents would practically be supported against the other while on this issue both are in total agreement.

The people in Russia are more interested in an improvement of their well-being than in NATO. It is by no means certain that the Russians would be willing to tighten their belts for armament. The quick return of an aggressive Russia as an immediate consequence of NATO enlargement will,

therefore, not happen inevitably, because for Russia NATO is not a real but only a hypothetical, potential threat. NATO has reduced its forces considerably since the end of the Cold War and the members are in the process of restructuring their forces in order to be better able to carry out new tasks of peacekeeping. Also the alert level of the forces of the NATO members has been reduced significantly. An essential aspect is also the reduction of the nuclear forces of NATO. All American ground supported nuclear systems, including nuclear capable aircraft and artillery, have already been withdrawn from Europe. In the sense of an improvement of the security policy climate, NATO is aiming at a further reduction of the nuclear forces, as soon as the START-n treaty has been ratified by the Russian parliament. This should actually also be in Russia's interest. However, numerous Russian politicians are of the opinion that they are able to exert pressure on NATO via the non-ratification of START u (even though these two questions are not related to each other), and, therefore, there is no ratification in sight.

The cautious proceeding in NATO enlargement to the East seems geopolitically unfounded. This, in particular, includes the intentions of NATO to limit its arms arsenal in the eventual new members in the East and the concession (among others made in the Russia-NATO "Founding Act") not to station nuclear weapons and permanent foreign troops there. The intention of new disarmament talks for another drastic reduction of the nuclear arms potential of the U.S.A. and Russia (START III) can effect a further decrease in tension.

The intended strong inclusion of Russia in NATO activities as well as the concessions already made or indicated have raised concerns in the West - even though only rarely voiced. In fact, it had become clear immediately after the signing of the "Founding Act" that Moscow intends to interpret the capacities of the NATO-Russia Council extensively. This is in line with the course Russia has been already following since 1994, but especially since 1995, namely, to search far less for a genuine cooperation on military policy which is beneficial for both sides than to establish an obligatory mechanism by which it can articulate its interests both vis-a-vis and in the alliance, and by which it can carry through its interests as far as possible. The NATO-Russia Council now provides exactly this mechanism. Through it Moscow can influence the political agenda of NATO and can steer planned deliberations in the direction it wants. It has the possibility, in principle, to put any topic on the agenda and thus make it publicly effective. If NATO then does not want to face the reproach (in the West as well as in Russia) of "pushing Moscow aside" in the European security architecture, then it is under continuous legitimation pressure for its decisions and is thus de facto forced to arrange itself with a country that does not belong in NATO.

There are already now massive signs that Russia is very cleverly using the reluctance of the West to risk a worsening of relations to its advantage. Thus it threatened with a new "Cold War" in the case of an action against the Serbian security forces in Kosovo (according to the chief of administration for international military relations in the Russian Ministry of Defense, General Leonid Ivashov), and with withdrawal from the "Founding Act" and the PfP (according to Primakov stating to his German counterpart in office, Klaus Kinkel). The consequence in the West was that attacks on Serbia because of its actions against Kosovo-Albanians were becoming increasingly unlikely without agreement of the UN Security Council - and such agreement is unthinkable since Russia has announced that in this case it will use its right to veto (what can also be expected from China). Russia is, therefore, obviously making attempts to put pressure on NATO and thus establish in the end a veto right in central decisions of the alliance, not actually de jure but still "political" (and thus not any less effective).

## **9. Decisions on NATO Enlargement**

From a Western point of view, the NATO-Russia agreement should contribute to create the impression for Moscow that NATO enlargement to the East has no "anti-Russian" dimension. Russia has always made it clear that the document does not represent an agreement to enlargement to the East and that it shall, according to official language, only „reduce the damage". Russia also kept to the perception that NATO enlargement could only be directed against Moscow since there were no other motives for such a step. All reassurances to the contrary by NATO and the membership applicants are always rejected as not credible.

The "Founding Act" is a politically obligatory agreement but not a treaty according to international law, as Russia originally wanted. It declares that NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries any more and want to cooperate as far as possible on security policy. For consultations, the NATO-Russia Council was established. From the point of view of NATO it should be a forum for crisis prevention and for peace actions (including CJTF), for building of trust and for an informative preparation for Russia on NATO decisions. Beyond that, NATO stated or, that is, repeated that it neither had the intention nor planned to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members after NATO enlargement. This concession to Russia was, in addition, supplemented in such a way that the obligation to assist according to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty should, for the new members, not be carried out by permanent stationing of additional substantial fighting forces on their territory but rather by the extension of logistics and joint operating capabilities.

On May 30, 1997, the EAPC was created. It supersedes the NACC created in 1991 and continues to serve the purpose of cooperation between

NATO and countries which do not belong to it. Especially with regard to the PfP, an increased interoperability is being sought, i.e., the capability of cooperation between NATO and partners in crisis management. Within the framework of the EAPC an "enhanced" PfP was established. Aside from the provision of structures for increased political consultation with the partners, their role in the planning of the PfP programs shall also be enlarged. The partners shall be incorporated into the reformed military command structures; to that end, it is planned to establish PfP staff elements on a strategic level and on regional levels. Thereby the difference between members and non-members shall be minimized.

Thus there now exist three pillars within NATO: first, "old NATO" with the North Atlantic Council; second, the NATO-Russia Council for the inclusion of Russia; and third, the EAPC for the cooperation with non-members. This somewhat bloated structure, which of course requires a higher coordination effort in a cooperation of at present 44 countries (16 NATO members, Russia, Ukraine and a further 26 partners in the EAPC), is of absolute importance from an American point of view. Due to the principle of self-differentiation in the framework of the PfP (i.e., that every country can itself determine the extent of its cooperation with NATO) a very close cooperation on security policy is in fact possible. This lessens the problem for those countries which are not admitted in the first NATO-round.

The NATO summit in Madrid of June 8-9, 1997, then finally produced the very well prepared decision for the enlargement of NATO by these countries: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. With this "small solution", the U.S.A., Canada and Great Britain prevailed. The Nordic countries of Denmark and Norway reportedly joined them, because by a limited admittance, the chances for a later joining of the Baltic countries and, in general, a second enlargement round became more probable. In particular, France and Italy, which had supported admittance of also Romania and Slovenia, were, therefore, not able to push their position through. In favour of a larger first enlargement round it had been argued that the new character of NATO as a comprehensive European security organization may have been expressed better. Of course, one has to counter that, in particular, Romania has a geopolitically significant position and that its admittance would have contributed to the irritation of Russia to a higher extent than the admittance of other countries. It also is to be considered that the ratification of the enlargement to the East by the U.S. Congress - achieved in the meantime - threatened to become more difficult the larger the first enlargement round would have been, because NATO enlargement is above all also an extension of American security guarantees.

The rejected countries, - NATO in the meantime counts 12 candidates for membership in total r, have been given the prospect of a continuation of

the admittance process. Already in 1999 (which at present seems very unlikely again) the next enlargement step is to be discussed. The positive development with regard to democracy and a constitutional state of law in several South East European countries, namely in Romania and Slovenia, was praised. Slovakia - originally belonging to the serious applicants for NATO membership as a member of the Visegrad group - was not even mentioned.

NATO membership is seen by the applicants in Central and Eastern Europe not only with regard to the security guarantees and under security policy aspects. The issue is their organic belonging to the Western sphere. Soviet foreign rule and communist predominance were in a most difficult position in these countries because the awareness of their historic sovereignty and the permeation with Western ideas was strongest here. Thus, President Clinton underlined in Madrid that it was these three nations, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who led the resistance against communist rule.

As the last part of the total package of the first NATO enlargement, a "Charta" between NATO and Ukraine was also signed at the summit in Madrid. It is similar to the NATO-Russia "Founding Act" but is politically far from the same rank. At least a very conscious institutionalized cooperation or partnership was entered into with Ukraine which very consciously intended a higher valuation of Ukraine in the sense of its further independent existence. With this the situation of Ukraine has improved compared to earlier times. It had been feared that it would find itself in a difficult position by NATO enlargement, precisely in a kind of strategic grey zone between NATO and Russia. This had been - apart from the "consideration" for Moscow - also the main reason why Ukrainian leading officials had originally expressed themselves quite sceptically and even with rejection on the perspectives of a NATO enlargement to the East. Yet, in the meantime, Ukrainian authorities have even come to regard the enlargement of NATO as an increase of the security of Ukraine.

## **10. The Arguments in the Enlargement Debate**

The earlier arguments - and probably also the ones valid in the future - for and against the enlargement of NATO are to be seen against the background of the respective intentions and objectives, that is the arguments are often only comprehensible in connection with the motivation.

### **10.1 Intention and Objective**

Political intentions and the pursuance of certain interests often overlap political analyses. This mingling of political motivation and security policy aspects is often done in such a way that one central problem is considered as the issue to be resolved. The aspects and implications of NATO enlargement

are then evaluated according to how they affect the solution of the (presumed) central problem - and then you have the desired result.

If the central problem is the structuring of a total European peace order with the inclusion of Russia, the result of the evaluation of the NATO enlargement is clear from the beginning: according to enlargement opponents, enlargement could lead to a new confrontation with Russia, promote anti-Western reflexes within Russia and bring about a solidification of new East-West conflict structures. Since not all Eastern European countries can be admitted immediately, the countries not admitted would again come under Moscow's influence. NATO enlargement would be the relapse into the thinking categories of the Cold War, and Europe would again be divided into blocs. Viewed like this, NATO enlargement would contradict not only Russia's interests but also those of the West: it cannot desire a new division of Europe and new confrontations. The support of the Russian reform and transformation process by avoiding any sign of an isolation of Russia on the one hand and the consolidation of the development towards free-market economies in the East-European post-communist countries by their integration into the EU on the other hand, would thus be a sufficient alternative to NATO enlargement.

Such considerations which are based on the central positioning of the problem of establishing a total, comprehensive European peace order including Russia, however, have a decisive weak point: they drastically exaggerate the relevance of external factors - and, concretely, of the West - for Russian internal politics and for the internal balance of power of the political elite; this relevance is, in fact, minimal. In addition, such a „total European peace order" centering on the inclusion of Russia can in reality not be contemplated by the West - it is beyond its capabilities to carry it out. Expectations or hopes that Moscow would on its own part renounce the formation of a new or extended hegemonic area (not only in the CIS) are not to be found in real Russian politics.

Other central starting points for an evaluation of NATO enlargement are the development of the alliance and its inner cohesion. It needs new missions to survive; enlargement to the East could create a meaning. With regard to inner cohesion, enlargement can, however, endanger it in the alliance and dilute its objective. Thus, simultaneously, the survival capability of NATO is coupled with the enlargement and, contrary to this, it is stated that NATO can only continue to exist in its present form. In this connection, of course, the tasks and functions that NATO is allowed, are to be considered.

The complex subject of NATO enlargement requires a complex way of consideration instead of an argument only oriented on details. A correct evaluation also presumes clarity on the tasks and capabilities of NATO in

the future. For NATO, the question of its enlargement is above all a strategic decision.

Yet the debate is rarely circumscribed to its geopolitical dimension but is most of the time oriented towards a political motivation or towards the (happy) perception of a new European security architecture. Some arguments only create confusion, sometimes on purpose, in order to promote political goals, which is not considered favourable to openly admit.

An example of that, which also according to its nature reaches strategic dimensions, is: NATO cannot admit all post-communist countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe at once; by a limited enlargement, however, Russia would be challenged and would tend to consider NATO applicants which are not admitted as being outside the area of protection of NATO. A limited enlargement would, therefore, be the reason for such a development, which, in addition would strengthen the position of the nationalists and imperialists in Russia. The counterargument to this is that the renunciation of NATO enlargement - since this would be interpreted as "consideration" of Russia's interests - would provide the hardliners with enormous stature, because it would be evident that strong politics against NATO enlargement are successful; this would in turn really encourage Russia to ambitiously extend its area of dominance. Certainly both arguments can be made but both cannot be correct.

## 10.2 The Cons of Enlargement

It would be more confusing than helpful to enter into the wide and diversified arguments against NATO enlargement in detail; but before a comprehensive, complex evaluation of the aspects of NATO enlargement is made, the most important arguments are to be found in the intellectual spectrum of opinions of critics of enlargement and they will be summarized below (and critically evaluated at the same time).

The issue is the establishment of a European peace order with the inclusion of Russia. A system of collective security for Europe is to be sought. - Both goals are not realistic.

The strengthening of collective security, i.e. of the OSCE, is to have priority; NATO enlargement would weaken the further development of the OSCE and also endanger armament limitation and disarmament agreements.

The OSCE cannot enforce security. The disarmament agreements were based on a firm behaviour toward Moscow and not on backing off. Russia has in part openly violated the original limitations of the CFE (e.g., by the invasion of Chechnya in December of 1994) without triggering any reactions by the West worth mentioning.

The security of the Eastern Europeans is not increased by NATO enlargement, since Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are not

threatened, while exposed countries (as, e.g., the Baltic states) cannot be admitted due to the fundamental Russian opposition in this case. - The wish for enlargement does not come from the West, it comes from the Eastern Europeans. The longer Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are prevented from joining NATO, the more Moscow will be tempted to surmise a Western recognition of the Baltics as part of the Russian sphere of interest.

The enlargement to the East would mean the return to old patterns of confrontation and would, therefore, not bring stability and security for Central and Eastern Europe. - To renounce the enlargement, however, creates an open space of competing forces and would, therefore, bring increased instability.

NATO enlargement to the East would narrow Russia's "breathing space", establish a new dividing line in Europe and isolate Russia. - The geographically largest country in the world cannot be isolated, and - if Russia becomes an open democracy - there also cannot be a dividing line; if it does not, then the further East the dividing line is, the better.

Instead of NATO enlargement, first (or only) the EU should be enlarged, because also this brings a "win" in security but no (or at least less) confrontation with Russia. - The EU, as is well known, is no defense organization; it would offer only a little more in actual security, e.g., in the case of the Baltic states. In addition, Russia has by no means agreed to an EU enlargement under any circumstances - on the contrary, its representatives always repeat that this is only sustainable if its trade and economic interests in Eastern Europe (e.g. in the energy market sector) remain untouched. Should the EU increasingly develop also into an organization relevant in terms of security policy, it would only be a matter of time until Moscow would voice massive reservations against its enlargement to the East - just as is the case with NATO.

Enlargement would put NATO to a final test because of the diverging interests and evaluations of the situation, which could threaten the existence of NATO. - NATO cannot avoid a decision on its future role; without a willingness to change, the alliance would eventually cease to exist in any case.

A large number of arguments against NATO enlargement pertain to the (genuine or presumed) concern over the future of the alliance; e.g., that, the larger it would become, the less effective NATO would be, or that the defense guarantee would be diluted, if it would be (unrealistically) expanded to far distant countries. With respect to this, it can only be repeated that NATO (if it wants to fulfil its function in a changed environment) must continue to develop - and that is with or without enlargement. But many arguments against NATO expansion can also be used against the existence of NATO itself and create the impression as if it were intended to make

things as difficult as possible for NATO. With some cynicism one could attribute to some critics the following way of thinking: in the East-West confrontation Moscow has not been able to bring Western Europe to its knees; it should therefore get a second chance.

The argumentation based on the improbability of a Russian aggression to begin with, would have to be raised not only against NATO enlargement to the East but would also challenge the right of existence of the alliance itself, what is more: why maintain complex defense structures and continue to develop them and design a complex security architecture at all, if the potential aggressor does not exist?

Some points of criticism (against enlargement) raised in the West repeat Russian positions in part or in toto. In general, the counterarguments tend towards (at least) a delay of the enlargement, which is in any case in Russian interest. Many counterarguments are also based on the assumption that the peace policy opportunities for the establishment of new security structures should be taken advantage of, so that no "finalized facts" are created by NATO enlargement. A weakness of this argument is that it cannot offer any credible or realistic concepts in case of a failure of a new, idealistic "peace order".

### 10.3 The Pros of the Enlargement

NATO in its core function was and is a pure defense alliance; it had and has no aggressive objectives. The NATO territory was an area of inner stability and a protected area. NATO enlargement to the East would, by enlarging the area of the alliance, decrease the grey zone of the insecure and unstable space in between and would at the same time narrow the potential future hegemonic area of Russia in Europe and its geostrategic possibilities.

The limitation of the Russian sphere of influence in Europe should be regarded as positive. If Russia really becomes a democracy (which in no case depends on NATO enlargement), it would want to live together peacefully with its neighbours, without wanting to dominate them. This scenario is by no means secured; on the contrary, development in Russia, especially since 1992, has demonstrated that it is continuously moving further away from Western models in politics and economics, instead of coming closer. Numerous Russian positions (among these some of official nature) indicate that Eastern and Central Eastern Europe are still claimed as a "sphere of influence" - even against the resistance of the countries there. Therefore, they should be removed from Russian "access" as long as this is (relatively) easily possible. In the times of the Cold War it was often regretted that one could, alas, not help the Poles, the Hungarians, the Czech, etc., (i.e., free them from Soviet dominance) since that would have caused a war - stability had preference over freedom. Now the opportunity is there, to guarantee both freedom and stability.

The geostrategic enclosing of Russia by NATO enlargement would not only affect Russia but would also obstruct its future military operational capabilities. Its economic weakness has inevitably caused drawbacks for the military possibilities of the country. Thus, by NATO enlargement Russia would lose the capability to wage a conventional war against Europe in the medium term. (It is not intended to make such an insinuation. If, however, such an insinuation is groundless because Russia has no aggressive intentions anyway, then NATO enlargement is actually unproblematic.)

Finally, in considering Russia's situation, one important factor should not be overlooked: in the area of the former satellite states of the Soviet Union a latent instability can be detected, and certainly dangerous areas of tension exist there, but the potential danger which surpasses everything else is Russia itself: its internal stability is fragile; the survival of the present political system with a president in ill health who cannot lead and in view of the prevailing economic crisis and a strong and self-confident opposition (which partly, pursues radical goals as, e.g., the reestablishment of the USSR) is in principle, questionable at any time the control over several categories of Russia's weapons of mass destruction does not seem completely ensured; substantial areas of the economy and the administration (also the executive authorities) are subverted by organized crime; the very popular calls in Russia for a "strong state" are faced by an actual decline of state power in many areas and, above all, in internal security; Russia has demonstrated again and again in the CIS that it is ready and able to use force for achieving its goals; and even though it is dependent to a high degree on the West or the international financial organizations dominated by it as was evident again in the crisis of the summer of 1998 which caused the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to commit loans of 22.6 billion dollars until 1999, it entertains at the same time demonstratively close relations with countries like Serbia, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, etc.. In addition, - stated benevolently - the Russian interest in disarmament and arms control could disappear: in the Duma (the lower house of parliament) dominated by communists and nationalists, opinion is widespread that disarmament is not in line with "national interests" and is "final surrender to the West". Thus the START II treaty, signed by the U.S.A. and Russia in the beginning of 1993, is still not ratified by the Russian parliament, and Moscow wants to further "modernize" the CFE treaty to its advantage. The parliament has in fact ratified the chemical weapons convention (signed by Russia in 1993), which prohibits the development, production, storage and usage of C-weapons, in the fall of 1997, but Moscow at the same time wants money from the West for its implementation. In addition, Moscow has again and again openly threatened with the breach of long existing disarmament treaties (illegal according to international law) because of NATO enlargement - however, without raising concern or even criticism in the - West.

Two essential aspects for a realistic evaluation are: the alternatives "security from Russia" (in particular for the Eastern Europeans) and "security with Russia"; these aspects cannot be ignored. In addition, the time factor must not be overlooked: if in "in-between" Europe hegemonic areas are established again, then the share of whoever becomes active first will be the larger (at the cost of who reacts - if at all). If Russia would try to extend its area of dominance as a reaction to the already initiated NATO enlargement, it would stand in front of an already narrowed field; however, if vice versa NATO enlargement takes place only as a late reaction to the visible extension of Russia's predominance area, then, the area for NATO action is limited from the start.

Even the first step of NATO enlargement would be an important contribution to stabilizing Europe, because the present situation in Central Eastern Europe is by no means unproblematic: from a historic point of view security risks have arisen from the weakness of states and from a security vacuum. Such a vacuum at present exists in Central Eastern Europe. The situation however cannot be influenced by vague promises of support, as the West provided. NATO membership of the post-communist countries would, however, have an immediate stabilizing effect and would also certainly guard against attempts by Russia to include these countries again into its own hegemonic area. NATO membership would also make the emergence of future open conflicts - and, above all, the involvement of the present NATO applicants - improbable.

The stabilization of Western Europe after the Second World War (by NATO, the Marshall Plan and European integration) is a model for successful policies. This is one more reason to view NATO enlargement in connection with the enlargement of the EU.

#### 10.4 NATO Enlargement and the EU

It would be important to aim, as far as this is possible, for a common identity of the three Western organizations NATO, EU and WEU, since the different memberships make the development of a European defense identity more difficult. Individual political considerations were earlier based on the argument that EU membership should be a prerequisite for NATO; in the more recent discussions the arguments that view NATO enlargement as a step before membership in the EU have gained ground. From the historic experience of a successful stabilization of Western Europe after the Second World War by NATO, the Marshall Plan and the EEC, it is evident that security policy and economic stabilization must go hand in hand.

NATO enlargement would first bring about a security policy stabilization which should be supported by an increasingly precise EU enlargement programme. With an earlier NATO enlargement, the time could

be won for the necessary reform of the EU which in turn is a prerequisite for EU enlargement.

The dilemma of the EU: deepening and/or enlargement. It would be an illusion to believe that the integration of the Eastern Europeans in the EU can be carried out simultaneously with the implementation of the monetary union in a few years. The EU is above all institutionally not prepared for a further enlargement (to 20 or even 30 members) and it is also, in terms of economic policies, not yet adjusted for the enlargement to the East (protection of agricultural markets, subsidies for steel, etc.). Either enlargement is achievable only at a late point in time - or finance-intensive EU sectors (agricultural policy, regional and infrastructure policies) would have to be changed substantially for a short term enlargement, for which no intentions are evident. But even if an essential change in policies with regard to the protected sectors (especially agriculture) and the distribution of subsidies to the less well-to-do countries within the EU would be achievable in the short term, the requirement of a structural reform still remains, which would guarantee capability for action even after an increase in the number of members.

More security and stability for Eastern Europe by EU integration is, of course, still a central goal which would have to be pursued vigorously; it is, however, not an objective that can be realized in the short term. The revival of Russia's great power ambitions and its attempts to extend its hegemonic area again are so far only contained because of the present economic weakness of Russia. This was made very clear by, e.g., Yeltsin advisor Andranik Migranian (addressing Bulgarian politicians): that it would be wrong to believe that Russia does not want to be an imperial power any more - it only does not have the means for it at present<sup>14</sup>.

### 10.5 First Enlargement of NATO, then of the EU

Far more unproblematic and simpler than the EU enlargement - as a medium to long term general political goal - is the enlargement of NATO. The fact of joining NATO must be ratified by all member countries but the military forces must (to a certain extent) be NATO compatible, and the political structures should reach Western standards (this is probably more easily achievable than Western economic standards); but all of that is feasible in a relatively short time if the political will to do so is there.

The following arguments are applicable:

NATO enlargement - both politically and practically- seems to be far more easily achievable than the economic integration of the former COMECON countries in the EU.

<sup>14</sup> According to *Die Presse*, Dec. 24, 1997, p. 5. 48

NATO enlargement provides the U.S.A. with an important role in Europe which is of decisive importance for the security need of the Central Eastern European applicants.

NATO enlargement is a guarantee that the U.S.A. will remain engaged in Europe also in the future.

A stabilization of the "Region Europe" can only be done via NATO.

The security "win" of the Central Eastern European post-communist countries will make these still more attractive for Western investment which will of course be of advantage to economic development (and suitability for the EU membership).

## **11. Considerations Before the First NATO Enlargement**

### 11.1 Strategic Perspectives on NATO Enlargement to the East

In evaluating strategic aspects for political decisions U.S. politics has always used political consultancy to a higher degree than is usual in some European countries. Especially with a question such as NATO enlargement, security policy studies and analyses provide valuable assistance; this is valid for the principle question (if or if not), as well as for the extent and the right point in time in connection with the defense concept and the military strategy of NATO. Central points of the evaluation are the possibility for security guarantees and the evaluation of risks. - An interesting decision aid for the U.S. government is based on a study by the RAND Corporation, in which three variations of the enlargement were investigated which also very well highlight the strategic dimension of NATO enlargement to the East.<sup>15</sup>

The first variation shows an "evolutionary" enlargement: the basic assumption was that the Central Eastern European countries have, above all, economic and political problems, for the solution of which the EU is best suited. By joining the EU, the security and economic integration is harmonized. The EU determines the pace.

The second, strategic-political variation is based on the promotion of stability in Central Eastern Europe: part of the candidates are admitted within a relatively short time (three to five years) according to criteria to be established exclusively by NATO. The U.S. engagement in Europe remains. Dealing with candidates not accepted (in particular, the Baltics) and the development of relations with Russia remain problematic.

In the third variation enlargement was described as a strategic answer to a possible end of the democratic experiments in Russia, whereby NATO can

*" RonaldD. Asmus/Richard L. Kugler/F. Stephen Larrabee: NATO-Expansion: The Next Steps. In: Survival, 1/1995.*

remain in a waiting position until Russia again represents a threat to Central Europe. This variation would indeed have the advantage of not worsening the relations with Russia but would have the disadvantage of great uncertainty over the development in Europe. Russia would determine the development and the West would de facto have to accept the new power situation. De facto, the second variation was realized.

## 11.2 The Alternative to NATO Enlargement - a Security Policy Grey Zone

The question of enlargement to the East does, however, not only concern the new order of the power structures in Europe but also raises important questions on the capability of NATO to function with regard to its core mission, joint defense. By the enlargement question also the question of structuring the defense cooperation between the U.S.A. and Western Europe was raised again, whereby the collective defense capability could be put in question in total. One consideration was that enlargement to the East would undermine and erode NATO - still capable of functioning - , which would then not be of advantage with regard to security policy, neither for the old nor for the new members. But on the other hand the continued limitation of collective defense and the obligation to assist to the present area of the treaty would probably also cause erosion since the area covered by the treaty does not seem to be subject to a threat for the foreseeable future. Enlargement to the East would put that into perspective, since threats would seem more likely (but why should one strive for that?), which would make the obligation to assist seem more realistic.

This somewhat complicated consideration reflects the real "crisis of meaning" of NATO. Put to the point, this means: the present NATO area does not seem to be threatened by any direct serious military attacks for the foreseeable future; this, however, according to experience, reduces the willingness to "keep together". For NATO in fact only the "reserve" function remains in the case of a return to the old East-West confrontation. But this will in the long term not keep it together and then it will face a potential future threat as a not "unified" alliance. Enlargement to the East could well bring more meaning to maintaining the defense capability since new members seem more endangered; this would ensure alertness to meet potential threats. Then, however, the question arises as to whether the - decreasing - resources would suffice for this expanded defense task. If not, then this means that the credibility of NATO defense (intact up to now) would be undermined.

The solution to this problem is astonishingly simple: a defense alliance must defend what seems endangered. What is endangered, according to their own evaluation, are the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. From the viewpoint of these countries (and probably from the overall point of view of interest of Central Europe) a NATO enlargement with full defense

capability is needed. But the question is whether in the enlargement a full obligation to assist (security guarantee) can be given to the new members or whether it would result in a "softer" form of membership with a not de jure but de facto qualified obligation to assist.

Without enlargement to the East the NATO environment in Central Eastern and Eastern Europe may remain unstable and become an area of competing spheres of influence. This is hardly in NATO's interest. The question of enlargement to the East cannot be postponed any longer without political strategic damage. From this reality the conclusion had to be drawn to design NATO reform so that it produced a convincing solution for the Central European countries.

The question now is whether the resolutions or declarations of intent made up to now correspond to this solution. The very limited first enlargement should on the one hand confirm the reality of enlargement by accepting three countries which will have already progressed far on the transformation path by 1999. On the other hand, this narrow limitation should signal that it is a first and not the only enlargement: the door remains open; enlargement is a process.

It is in any case an undisputed fact that three things were achieved: first, the limited enlargement, together with the NATO-Russia "Founding Act" as well as the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council, has kept the dialogue with Russia intact. Second, regarding those candidates which were not considered, the impression that they would never be accepted was not given. Third, the first enlargement does not create any new dividing lines in Europe which could be interpreted as a division into spheres of influence; this was especially expressed by the institutionalized relation of NATO with Ukraine.

In the medium to long term NATO enlargement to the East is also not to be seen as an obstruction to Russian interests, if Russia remains on the path to democracy. The future dangers for Russia itself as well as for the major part of the CIS and/or its close ties to Russia will not come from Europe but from East and South Asia. Russia will one day be dependent on cooperation with Europe in order to protect its interests in the Far East. The stability of Central Europe, to be effected through NATO enlargement to the East, is a good prerequisite for the above mentioned cooperation.

## **12. A Second Enlargement Round and Russia**

If NATO shall be the basis of a future cooperative all-European security architecture then orderly relations with Russia in the sense of a security partnership are required. It seems that that has been decided in the West.

The development of a permanent meaningful relation with Russia in the sense of a security partnership poses the question whether NATO enlargement - as officially announced - shall be a continuous process in which new members can be integrated consecutively, or only a onetime action. An open process of NATO enlargement could cause a permanent irritation to Russia; this, according to the present status of NATO's enlargement and reform policies, is obviously not intended. Therefore, as a substitute for the acceptance of new members in a second or third round, there could be a further extension of the PfP, in the foreseeable future.

What was intended as a substitute for membership in the first phase of the development of the PfP and which has in fact developed as a preparation for membership of at least individual countries, could perhaps be repeated in the second round. The "enhanced PfP" would blur the dividing line between members and non-members, provided that some NATO partners fully make use of the opportunities offered by the programme by intensifying military cooperation to the extent possible.

The prerequisites for a transformation of NATO into a new kind of security alliance, more into an organization for collective security, are much better than it may seem to some critics. NATO has understood itself from the beginning as more than just a military alliance. The members, or at least most of them, are determined to protect the freedom, the common heritage and the culture of their nations; these are based on the principles of democracy, personal freedom and the rule of law. The "keeping together" of the Western nations in NATO was also a "keeping together" for maintaining political culture, freedom of "Weltanschauung" and the free-market economy of the West.

Therefore, the larger NATO is, the more countries will have the protection of its common defense and the smaller the risks of war will be on the continent. A reformed and expanded NATO provides the opportunity for an eventual development of a comprehensive or even - if the inclusion of Russia is successful - a Euro-Asian security architecture.

### **13. Geostrategic and Geopolitical Aspects of NATO Enlargement**

The question of the feasibility of the final extent of NATO enlargement and the time frame for it must be evaluated under global aspects. In this, the U.S.A. has a decisive role because it is the global power and because it bears the main military burden of NATO. After the turning point of 1989, the U.S.A. seemed surprised by the wish of the Eastern Europeans for NATO membership and avoided this question for a long time out of consideration for Russia. To many Eastern Europeans, this U.S. position seemed distant ••from reality, since it was based on a too optimistic expectation with regard

to developments in Russia and since it supported the imperialistic thinking there. From a U.S. point of view, of course, the security wishes of the small Central Eastern European states were second priority as compared to the "security interests" and "reforms" of Russia, which were not to be endangered by pressure from the outside. When NATO enlargement to the East was then initiated, Central Eastern European top politicians were often disturbed by the slowness of the process and its dependence on Russia. The leftist Polish Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz at that time thought it 'totally unacceptable that Russia's permission is asked as to whether NATO is allowed to expand'<sup>6</sup>, and the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, asked NATO 'not to let its position be dictated by Moscow'<sup>n</sup>. The opinion was sometimes heard that NATO itself had bargained for controversy with Russia because it had practically asked Russia's permission for enlargement to the East instead of just carrying it out.

### 13.1 The U.S.A. and Russia - Between Cooperation and Confrontation

From an American point of view, one could, however, argue that everything had to be avoided which was negative for the process of transformation of Russia into a "normal" country. If this process were successful, the Eastern Europeans need not be concerned about their security; if not, the need for action would arise at the given time, instead of being based early on pessimistic variations. The background of this evaluation consisted in the fact that the U.S.A. saw its main strategic challenge in Europe only as long as the Soviet Union was strong; but now interest turned to the economic and security policy challenges in East Asia (China, Japan, Korea) and South Asia which had already emerged (before the background of the nuclear arms tests of India and Pakistan in May of 1998).

If the U.S.A. allows Russia a large sphere of influence in Europe this could lead to a disruption of the Euro-Atlantic relations, a disruption which would also not be negligible for the U.S.A. If, however, NATO enlargement, or its extent, determines or limits the future spheres of influence, this of course would be decisive for the future role of Russia as a great power.

The various arguments against (the allegedly "hastened") NATO enlargement due to consideration for Russia are based on the fact that there should not be any big geopolitical changes that would be to Russia's disadvantage. Of course, vice versa, it is a fact that the maintaining, or regaining, of the role of a (global) great power for Russia is made more difficult by NATO enlargement and would limit its possibilities of exercising it effectively.

<sup>6</sup> Interview, in: *Die Presse*, April 4, 1997, p. 6.

<sup>n</sup> Interview, in: *Die Presse*, March 24, 1997, p. 3.

The cooperation of the great powers U.S.A. and Russia is based on common interests. Today, American interests exist not only with regard to a strategic partnership for armament limitation and control as well as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the respective know-how. Russia is and remains, if only due to its massive nuclear potential, a first priority for U.S. foreign policy; therefore, U.S. interest in cooperation with Russia - even without much progress in the Russian reform process - will remain active. This interest in cooperation is, of course, not one-sided because also Russia should in fact have an interest in good cooperation with the U.S.A.

At the same time in Russia's opinion the "honeymoon" with the U.S.A. which started immediately after the end of the Cold War is over, and foreign and security policy reporting in all the Russian press is permeated by a - partly rude - basic anti-American sentiment. Moscow's foreign policy has been already for a long time openly to counteract U.S. influence in regions in which it is interested or believes that it should to be represented. This is done partly by activating old "friends" from Soviet times (Syria, Iraq, Cuba, Vietnam). The foreign policy doctrine of Russia postulates a "multipolar" world with at least the U.S.A., the EU, China and, of course, Russia itself; sometimes India and Japan are added. By this, Moscow also wants to underline its independent position. The U.S.A., according to Russia's view, is striving for a dominant position and, therefore, a "uni-polar" world order from which opposition to the other "poles" results; Washington would, however (as Russia demonstrates its conviction at the same time) not achieve its goal due to strong resistance in the world. The self-confidence of Russia - inspite of the acute economic weakness (Russia produces only about 10% of the economic performance of the U.S.A.) - goes so far as to believe that no problem of relevance in world politics can be solved without its participation. Therefore, Russia is also challenged in its self-understanding by NATO enlargement to the East.

### 13.2 Modification of the CFE Treaty

According to the CFE Treaty of 1990, the upper limits for the stationing of forces were adjusted, according to the "bloc principle" of the old constellation of power, NATO - Warsaw Pact. Russia, especially since 1993, requests substantial changes to its advantage by referring to the massive changes that happened in Europe since then - the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. In the center of this were the "flanks" in the North West and in the South. On June 6, 1996 the "flanks problem" was for the time being solved in the first CFE Treaty control conference in Vienna, mainly by a decrease in the two "flanks regions", so that the original CFE limits (1,300 tanks, 1,380 armored vehicles and 1,640 pieces of artillery) are now applicable to a smaller area; in addition, Russia was given the right to - partly take over the CFE armament quotas of the other CIS states. In spite of

these concessions, Russian resistance against NATO enlargement to the East has not weakened. Moscow still wants to achieve further changes to its advantage - above all, the departure from the "bloc principle"; this will - at least partly - probably be granted since in the West the feeling prevails that Russia has to be "compensated" for NATO enlargement to the East.

A "special zone of stability" was to be created with the NATO applicants Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, possibly Slovakia, as well as Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian region of Kaliningrad. In its western area, that is in the area of the future NATO members, the future upper limits should only be exceeded for purposes of manoeuvres and in case of natural catastrophes (and in fact only for a short time). Apart from that there were to be permanent upper limits for conventional weapons. In the area of Ukraine, Belarus and Kaliningrad, there should not be any stationing of Russian arms or equipment above the upper limits. Although this onesided proposition apparently favours NATO, it is still a fact that Russia can move its huge reserves across the Ural to the West more easily than the U.S.A. its reserves across the Atlantic. Viewed like this, the proposition in fact serves the purpose to demonstrate that NATO enlargement constitutes no conventional threat for Russia.

### 13.3 The Right Time and the Geographic Scope

Also if one agrees with those who think that the renunciation of NATO enlargement would be an enormous concession to a Russia inclined to expansion and that Russia would have been thereby supported in its role as an (Eastern European) order power, it still needs to be kept in mind that Russia is indeed not reduced to a European role but that, based on its size, it is and will remain a Euro-Asian power.

The drawing up of spheres of influence in Europe, as it is possible in times of peace and in a phase of a fundamental or non-confrontational new order, should, for all-European reasons not be done in such a way that future conflicts are basically preprogrammed. Further it requires choosing the right point in time. The right point in time for "taming" Russia, i.e. ensuring (as, e.g., the guarantee for independence for Ukraine, security guarantees for the Baltic people, etc.) that Russia cannot build a hegemonic region in Eastern Europe again, would probably have been immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, i.e. 1991/1992, and it was missed. It can be that the most advantageous point in time is already over, but it does not seem too late to take the right measures to prevent the rearrangement of hegemonic areas to the disadvantage of the West. With the decision on the first NATO enlargement round the first "right" measure has already been taken.

It is also necessary, however, to consider the geographic framework which could narrow the future of interests of the great power Russia too much. From the historic orientation of Russia and its geographic thinking,

certain priorities for direct exertion of influence and a difference between direct predominance and intermediate exertion of influence, up to the creation of non-threatened regions, can be assumed. In this, one can, in principle, start from the basis that the interest in Poland, as the door of mutual access of the East to the centers of Western Europe as well as of the West to the Russian central region must be substantially higher than the interest in the territories of Slovakia and Hungary located south and west of the Carpathians respectively.

The "big lump" that Russia had to "swallow" in the first NATO enlargement is therefore Poland. Poland in NATO and at the same time an independent Ukraine push Moscow, in its view, to the side of European importance. With regard to the continuation of NATO enlargement, the geographic location of the "Central European Core" ( that is, apart from Hungary and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Slovenia) is very favourable in order to stay permanently removed from the sphere of influence of Russia. The first ranking orientation of interests is the possible access to Western Europe via the Poland connection, the second orientation of interests is the access to the Mediterranean Sea via the Balkans connection, and only after that, the Central European Core region, which only provides access to the Alps and Northern Italy. Thus NATO membership of these countries would not preprogramme future conflicts with Russia.

A special situation, however, exists with regard to Slovakia. It fulfils - as long as Austria does not decide to join NATO - the function of separating the NATO area Europe North and South, practically lengthens the old neutral corridor Switzerland-Austria by the former NATO areas Europe Central and South. Viewed like this, Russia is without doubt interested that both Slovakia and Austria remain outside of NATO. This is, however, not of crucial importance.

More important for Russia would be Romania joining NATO. This would on the one hand create definite changes in the spheres of influence in South Eastern Europe and on the other hand also with regard to the Black Sea. With Romania, a second NATO state would be a neighbour on the Black Sea; this would lead to a total change of the operative possibilities in this region. In addition, if Romania is already a member Bulgaria joining NATO, would be an unproblematic issue and could be expected soon thereafter.

A still heavier aggravation for Russia would be if the Baltic states joined NATO. These countries are not only of extraordinary importance for Russian foreign trade; the Baltics are, even if Russia cannot directly rule these countries, regarded at least as a useful "Glacis" by Russia. The old Russian drive to rule the coasts of the Baltic Sea can only be realized via these countries. In this connection, of course, the question arises whether

NATO membership of Sweden or Finland would be meaningful or what Russia's view of this would be. With regard to the strategic situation, the Russian Baltic fleet and the North Sea fleet as well as the enormous nuclear potential of the Kola peninsula, membership of these two countries would be of greater importance for Russia than the membership of the Central European countries. For Finland, the vicinity to strategically important regions of Russia and the long land border demand caution. Sweden is in fact geographically further away but because of its considerably higher military potential, it is, from a Russian point of view, possibly a challenge. It is difficult to evaluate whether Russia would accept membership of these two or of one of these two countries without significant effects on its foreign and security policy. It is just as difficult to judge whether NATO membership of these two countries would provide a stronger backing for the Baltic people or, if the latter would be subject to stronger pressure by Russia, or, if Russian concepts would be developed against them which would otherwise not be necessary from a Russian point of view.

NATO enlargement has definitely challenged Russia to discuss its future position or its self-understanding as a political and military power earlier than would otherwise have been the case. Since the resources of the country - with the exceptions of territory and nuclear arms potential - do not suffice in any respect for a current role as great power, Russia must now seek the confirmation of this role in international politics. This consists to a large extent of countermeasures against Western, especially American, intentions.

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