

## Chapter 3

# Security Sector Governance in Georgia (II): Achievements

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### Achievements and Positive Trends

Despite major challenges and obstacles, there have been positive developments and considerable steps into the right direction. We will focus on four relevant trends: an apparent tendency towards transparency enhancement, a positive and ongoing process in training and professionalisation of the Armed Forces, general promising signs for a slow but continuous system change, and efforts to adapt and coordinate international assistance. After all, “At least, the threats are transparent”<sup>1</sup>.

As a crucial positive starting point one might state that none of the mentioned challenges to SSR are seen as absolute or insoluble problems and in comparison to the still-vivid soviet past. An extremely important step has already been taken: the threats and challenges are transparent<sup>2</sup> and therefore have a chance to be addressed and tackled. The pressure to elaborate further a national security concept as well as to adopt a binding SSR concept is increasing and coming from all kinds of political actors: from NGOs, parliamentary staffers as well as various members of the MoD who demand a transparent and precise programme as well as binding and reliable directives and guidelines. “In general I

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<sup>1</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of the Defence and Security Committee of the Georgian Parliament.

<sup>2</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of the Defence and Security Committee of the Georgian Parliament.

would be optimistic about the reform process... If we conduct reforms effectively we would be able to join MAP”<sup>3</sup>.

The decision of the National Security Council to develop cooperation with NATO seems to give hope, if not more, for an acceleration of the process. The government is well aware that reforms are a crucial condition for entering the preparatory phase to join MAP<sup>4</sup>. It is clearly seen, that the quite powerful incentive of joining MAP cannot be reached without a quite swift and effective implementation of necessary standards<sup>5</sup>.

Therefore, we may state a starting point which is not as bad as might have been assumed: there is a general will to proceed with the reforms and a concrete knowledge on the traps which are to be found on the way.

### **First signs of improvement**

“The pyramid is getting holes”<sup>6</sup>.

According to some interviewees there are first signs of a general system improvement. They state a general societal transformation process, which is irreversible and also affects the security sector relevant structures. They are positive that the transition process towards a democratic society will proceed successfully<sup>7</sup>.

It has been stated, that the first “holes” have appeared in the “corruption-pyramid”, mainly as a result of the dismissal of highly corrupt personnel and their replacement by members of a “new generation”. Ministers as well as head of units within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security have been removed from office, ones who have been said to be deeply involved in criminal

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<sup>3</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of the Georgian Mission to NATO within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> NATO Membership Action Plan

<sup>5</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of the Georgian Mission to NATO within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>6</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>7</sup> Referring to an interview with a Member of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and to a member of a Georgian NGO.

activities<sup>8</sup>. The newly appointed officials in charge seem not to be involved in illegal processes and obviously try to stay out of the usual mafia-pyramid. The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is said to be dedicated to reforms. Those examples for transformation and a change of political generations are made public and seem to give a certain hope for an improvement of the situation<sup>9</sup>.

The downfall of Shevardnadze and his clan has also had positive effects. The Shevardnadze clan in itself was the most visible symbol of the corrupt and clientelist society. As long as the leader of the state was the most obvious representative of the detrimental structures, no change could be expected.

### **Achievements in transparency**

Considerable improvements are to be noted in view of transparency of security structures as well as of defence spending. Of particular importance are the concept of the reform of the Security and Law Enforcement Services of Georgia, the MoD White Paper, the new PPBS<sup>10</sup> budgeting system which is providing more transparency in defence spending, and, finally a close cooperation of the MoD with the NGOs and interested public.

### **The Concept of the Reform of the Security and Law Enforcement Services**

As already mentioned before<sup>11</sup>, the concept of the reform of the security and law enforcement services, elaborated by an Interagency Commission, has been made publicly available with a series of relevant expert's and institution's recommendations, including recommendations adopted by the Council of Europe on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, recommendations on the Police Ethics Code, furthermore concepts of the reform of investigation and of the reform of

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<sup>8</sup> Minister Targamadze, the founder of the MOI empire has been dismissed and replaced by his deputy, Koba Narchemashvili. See also: Darchiashvili, 2003, op. cit., pp. 76-78.

<sup>9</sup> Referring to interviews with a military journalist and a member of the Georgian Mission to NATO within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as members of Georgian NGOs.

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 65.

<sup>11</sup> See pp. 70.

procuracy, a concept of the police reform, a concept on the reform of the ministry of state security etc. The web-publication of the concept as well as other relevant material<sup>12</sup> might be seen as a first step towards a public dialogue and public involvement in the reform process.

## **The MoD White Paper**

As mentioned in the preceding Chapter, the White Paper is seen as a first step towards more transparency and public involvement in security related issues. At the same time it has been criticized for not going far enough, i.e. for not containing a more precise reform concept<sup>13</sup>. Nevertheless it cannot be excluded from the section on achievements. Most of the interviewees mentioned it proudly as a first and remarkable step into the right direction, especially as a sign that the government understood the importance of transparency in view of defence and security related issues<sup>14</sup>. Looking on the Paper from the perspective of somebody who has a soviet past and experience, it is a huge step towards transparency, public involvement and participation in the reform process. And seeing it in relation to the historic background, where transparency and public involvement were simply not imaginable, one may also understand the motivation the paper triggered within the strategic community. Not only MOD officials and parliamentary staffers, but also members of NGOs, working within the field of security policy and civil-military relations, welcomed this paper with a considerable hope that the real reform process finally and irreversibly has started.

## **Increasing transparency in defence spending**

Similarly, there is a quite optimistic assessment of the introduction of the new PPBS budgeting system. It is supposed to provide enhanced transparency in defence spending. It has also been stated that meanwhile the process of introducing the system has been blocked. Despite this

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<sup>12</sup> See: <http://www.supremecourt.ge/english/About.htm> →Public Information --> Reform Commission of the Law Enforcement and Security Agencies → Concept of the reform of the Security and Law Enforcement Services of Georgia.

<sup>13</sup> Referring to an interview with a Member of the Defence and Security Committee of the Georgian Parliament.

<sup>14</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD).

drawback, the system need not be described as entirely failed. Taking the circumstances into account it does not make sense to expect that such a process is going smoothly without any hindrances. It is a complicated system and time is required to comprehend and implement it. Thus, even if it will take some time, one may state that a first and important step is done and that at least with some pressure of the international community, the process of introducing the new system will be on the right tracks.

### **Cooperation with NGOs and interested public**

Tense relations with Russia on the one side but also the engagement of the West in security related assistance programmes on the other - especially the American Training and Equipment (T&E) programme<sup>15</sup> - caused a considerable public interest in defence and security related issues. This can be seen in quite extensive media coverage on defence issues. Some papers even dedicate up to one fourth of their coverage to defence related information<sup>16</sup>.

Understanding the importance of a public attention and interest towards the reform issues, the MoD follows an open policy towards interest and active involvement of NGOs and the general public<sup>17</sup>. Admitting, that MoD issues are still not transparent enough, at least some departments try to be as open as possible. They keep a good and close relationship to NGOs, appreciate their interest and keep them updated on new developments<sup>18</sup>.

### **Training and motivation for the Armed Forces**

The reform process of the Armed Forces is said to be proceeding well while considering NATO standards as well as general western advice as basic guidelines. Western advisors are not only appreciated as trusted

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<sup>15</sup> The over 60 million worth of assistance is provided to train and equip about 2 000 Georgian soldiers within the overall framework of American anti-terrorism campaign.

<sup>16</sup> Referring to an interview with a military journalist.

<sup>17</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD).

<sup>18</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD).

and respected experts but also seen as main source for motivation and hope in success of any reforms<sup>19</sup>.

The obvious engagement and interest by the West, which found a new peak in the American Training and Equipment Programme (T&E programme) considerably increased the motivation to continue with the reform process and is generally seen as sound basis for a professional army-building process.

The over USD 60 million worth of assistance is provided to train and equip about 2000 Georgian soldiers within the overall framework of the American anti-terrorism campaign. Members of the Armed Forces as well as of other security forces are undergoing the intensive training programme, which is supposed to result in a basis for a well trained, reliable and disciplined army<sup>20</sup>. Media echo as well as expert views on this programme show the importance of such a project, not only in view of training and professionalisation of the Armed Forces, but much more in view of the motivation which has been triggered by this new sign of international engagement and support<sup>21</sup>.

## **Coordinating international assistance**

Western assistance is clearly seen as fundamental for any success in SSR and it has been understood, that a crucial matter of concern is the proper use of foreign aid. Initial steps have been taken to arrange programmes which help to coordinate different support projects and try to guarantee their most effective use. An example of those positive coordination-efforts has been launched by the Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee, which arranged meetings with the military attachés of those countries, supporting Georgia in its reforms in order to start a comprehensive coordination of useful assistance programmes, which also take into account the current infrastructure, as well as capacities and challenges caused by corruption. The feedback on those meetings has been quite positive<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> Referring i.e. to an interview with a Member of the Georgian Defence Academy and to several members of Georgian NGOs.

<sup>20</sup> Referring to an interview with a military journalist and to a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>21</sup> Referring to an interview with a military journalist and to a member of the Georgian Mission to NATO within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>22</sup> Referring to an interview with a parliamentary staff member.

A Swiss pilot project has also been mentioned, which takes into account corrupt structures by purchasing necessary equipment in Georgia and handing it over directly to the departments in need without involving any money transfer<sup>23</sup>. Those pilot projects may help to avoid mismanagement in view of international assistance and help to built up sustainable donors' involvement in the process. Seeing those efforts as valuable steps within the reform process it should of course be mentioned that an effective coordination finally only can take place when clear priorities are set by the government.

## **Prospects for the Future and Factors for Success and Failure**

“Reforms will be definitely implemented. It only takes time”<sup>24</sup>.

We asked the interviewees on prospects for the future and factors for success and failure in view of a democratic governance of the security sector. The following picture is a selection of the most important factors, which determine the future reform process.

Generally there have not been any far-reaching doubts in a final success of a democratic reform of the security sector, even if it is admitted, that it probably would take quite a long time to implement the democratic changes. However there are a lot of uncertainties in view of concrete prospects of the next years and quite a lot of different variables and factors, determining anticipated developments:

### **The role of international assistance**

International support in SSR is clearly seen as most fundamental factor in view of a successful implementation of the reforms in future. The following quotations of our experts' statements mirror their concerns in this direction:

The prospects of security sector reform depend on the involvement of international aid. Our own forces and energy are

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<sup>23</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA).

<sup>24</sup> Quotation from an interview with a Member of the Georgian Defence Academy.

not strong enough. We need Western assistance on educational and strategic level. If the assistance will remain, the SSR has a chance to progress. In case Western support would stop, no chances would be left for any progress<sup>25</sup>.

“During the past years we saw what Georgia can do by itself: We saw that we can do nothing! We need the Americans and their Training and Assistance Programmes”<sup>26</sup>.

“I hope the Americans do not let Georgia down. They are stakeholders now”<sup>27</sup>.

There is no doubt that the Georgian perspective clearly sees international support and assistance as basic factor and absolute necessary precondition for the success of Security Sector Reform. Georgians seem to be convinced, that, if the West would let them down and stop supporting them a total failure not only in view of a reform of the security sector but also of democratization in general is to be expected. Furthermore it has been repeatedly stressed how important a general support and cooperation concerning democracy-building and a basic development of the whole country would be. Hopes are especially linked to Turkey, Germany, US, France, Switzerland, as well as to UN, EU and NATO. Assistance is especially appreciated and needed with regard to training, education and qualification of militaries as well as civilians. Those assistance programmes are seen as basis for any future prospects of SSR in Georgia<sup>28</sup>. In view of a time-wise perspective most experts are convinced, that international and especially American interest in Georgian SSR clearly helps to speed-up the process<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>26</sup> Quotation from an interview with a Member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>27</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>28</sup> Referring to interviews with a member of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), with several members of Georgian NGOs, with a parliamentary staff member and with a member of the Georgian Mission to NATO within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>29</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.



## The role of national motivation

“We need readiness and motivation from our side”<sup>30</sup>.

“We have to sit down like the Estonians and say ‘We have Zero’ and start building everything from the scratch”<sup>31</sup>.

“For 200 years we had no state, no army...Now it is most important to get a strategy. That is very difficult, because we have to start from Zero-position. But we will try...”<sup>32</sup>.

International assistance is certainly a crucial aspect in view of Georgian security sector reform but an even more important point is the role of national motivation and self-confidence within the reform process. Like in Estonia or Latvia also in Georgia the state and governance structures have to be built from *ab initio*. Those states naturally face great additional challenges in reforming their Armed Forces and security structures than long established states. The interviewees quite often alluded to the magic number “Zero” when referring to this fact. The awareness of having no own historical experiences on which they could built up an own success-story appears as a quite strong psychological burden. “Zero” experience and knowledge is clearly seen as a “Zero” basis for the “reform”. Quotation-marks are used here because it has been stressed that “reform” is not quite the right word. There was more or less nothing to reform in Georgia. The first roots of the Georgian Armed Forces appeared spontaneously, without any strategy or concept, within chaos at the beginning of a civil war. Therefore the interviewees’ statements refer to a complete new construction of the security sector rather than to its “reform”.

This magic figure “Zero” is a quite relevant factor in Georgian SSR and nothing can counter it but national motivation and self-confidence. However, statements on confidence in Georgia’s own will

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<sup>30</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>31</sup> Quotation from an interview with a Member of the Defence and Security Committee of the Georgian Parliament.

<sup>32</sup> Quotation from an interview with a Member of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD).

and energy to successfully proceed on the democratic path have been quite rare.

While the interviewees hardly mentioned any conviction to be able to rely on the own national will and energy, “International Assistance” or “Western support” are dominating expressions which have been repeated like magic incantations when talking on a prospective success of Georgian Security Sector Reform.

### **The role of political goodwill**

Speaking on national motivation in a country where the nation’s fate is almost exclusively determined by governmental actors, we cannot forget the political good will of the government as crucial factor, determining the future of Georgian SSR: “The prospects depend on how far the politicians are willing to move the reforms”<sup>33</sup>.

Basically no one seems to doubt that capacities and knowledge for the conceptualization is available. However, in the end everything depends on the political will to give concrete directives and elaborate a consistent strategy, which could be used as binding guideline for all those involved in security sector reform. Such an official obligation and commitment would have to be launched and seriously promoted by the government. As long as there is no binding and officially adopted security concept available, no effective improvement of the situation can be expected<sup>34</sup>. The role of the new government will be the deciding one in this regards.

### **The importance of political stability**

Needless to say, without political stability there will be no democratisation in the country during the upcoming years. Everything depends on the ability and willingness of the new government to proceed with the democratization process and the implementation of the reforms. The presidential elections in January 2004 as well as the months under the new government provide a test of the stability of Georgian

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<sup>33</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>34</sup> Referring to interviews with a Member of the Defence and Security Committee of the Georgian Parliament and with several members of Georgian NGOs.

democracy”<sup>35</sup>. The international community is obviously ready to support Georgia in securing the stability in the country: Several million Euros have been for example pledged by OSCE participating states for the “Georgia Elections Assistance Programme”<sup>36</sup>.

### **General democratization and change of mentality**

“If the democratic change in Georgia will be successful, the governance of the security sector will also have a chance to change in a positive and democratic way”<sup>37</sup>.

The general importance of democratization and democracy-building as a basis for a democratic governance of the security sector has been stressed quite often. And, furthermore, for a general democratization a change of mentality is seen as crucial pre-condition. As stated before, soviet legacies still have strong influence and impact on all kind of societal and political life and prevent democratic changes<sup>38</sup>. The future of the general transformation process will determine the future of a democratization of the security sector and the other way around<sup>39</sup>.

### **Priorities and Recommendations for SSR and International Involvement in the Reform Process**

The interviewees were finally asked on priorities and recommendations in view of the implementation of SSR in Georgia. The recommendations will be divided along the lines of national and international implications. The first aspect considers actions and steps to be taken on a national level. The second aspect considers implications for international assistance and support.

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<sup>35</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>36</sup> See: OSCE States pledge almost four million euros for assisting Georgia in 2004 elections. Article to be found online at: [http://www.osce.org/news/show\\_news.php?ut=2&id=3792](http://www.osce.org/news/show_news.php?ut=2&id=3792)

<sup>37</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>38</sup> Referring to an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

<sup>39</sup> Referring to an interview with a military journalist and to a Member of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD).

## **Implications: The National Dimension**

A first rank priority is the adoption and promotion of a national security concept as well as a concrete and precise concept for the security sector reform in Georgia. The reform plan has to include not only NATO requirements for joining MAP or list recommendations of foreign advisors; it also has to take into account the basic question: “What actually does SSR mean for Georgia?” and “What are the implications for a binding implementation of such a reform?” Those considerations should include the following questions: “What are the main obstacles to Georgia’s democratization? What are the primary challenges to its security? Are the current military, police, border guard and intelligence structures capable of responding effectively to those challenges? Why not? What are the priority areas for a reform? What are the domestic and institutional barriers to a reform? There are of course other questions”<sup>40</sup>. The concept should be precise in view of structures, institutions and responsibilities and give concrete directives for implementation to persons accountable and in charge.

The conceptualization of SSR should build up on a national consensus. Therefore a range of political actors as well as the general public have to be involved in this process. Requirements as well as developments must be made transparent. Transparency has to be promoted in view of all SSR-related aspects. Successful cases should be publicised in order to motivate actors as well as the general public.

Not only the Armed Forces, but also other security forces, most of all police forces, have to be reduced to size appropriate and affordable and be restructured in a professional way. Increased salaries and social securities should be provided in order to prevent corruption and illegal activities of the personnel. Furthermore civilian, especially parliamentary control over the armed and other security forces has to be firmly established. The implementation of Disarmament-, Demobilisation, Reintegration- and Retraining- programmes is of crucial importance.

Restructuring processes in the government must focus on the separation of responsibilities and improved decision-making processes.

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<sup>40</sup> Assessment and recommendations by Marina Caparini, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva.

Some experts also suggested an improvement of legislation and a reform of the court system. The need to develop a proper crisis management system was also stressed out in the interviews.

### **Implications: The international dimension**

The International Community has to go beyond its one-sided approach, which concentrates on supporting the reform of Armed Forces. It has to bolster its assistance in view of a reform of internal security forces, particularly the police forces. This is especially important since the Police forces are at the very heart of a society and interact with public and societal life on a daily basis. As law enforcement body, they form the direct arm of the government and therefore strengthen or weaken directly governmental legitimization.

Democratization has no chance without a reformed police, since democracy has to be based on the rule of law. Equally important is training and reform of the border guards. An effective border management system will help preventing conflicts with neighbouring countries. A reformed and more effective border management system will also help preventing smuggling and trafficking and is therefore not only of importance for Georgia, but for the whole region.

Training and educational programmes have to be launched and existing ones further supported. Additional training is necessary for a wide range of military, political and other societal actors. Programmes should be focused on Armed Forces, Internal Security Forces, including Police and Border Guards, but also on civilians in defence structure, including civilians within the ministries, parliamentarians, and civil society in general. Therefore the Military Academy as well as other institutions needs to start long-term training programmes for civilians in defence affairs. Civic education-programmes should be conceptualized in view of general democracy-building but also in view of democratic civilian involvement in security issues.

Support should be provided in view of parliamentary involvement and oversight of the security sector. International assistance has to help strengthening knowledge and expertise among parliamentarians and staffers with the help of specialized training programmes.

Civil society building is in need. A further withdrawal of the society from public concerns has to be prevented. International assistance has to invest in civic education and civil society building. It is crucial to help making democracy as well as democratic oversight over the security sector understandable. The role of donors in this respect is crucial: they must send clear messages, that political leadership as well as civil society are all participants in efforts to improve security. Furthermore donors should seek local organizations with ties in the Georgian community, in order to bring SSR into the own local agendas<sup>41</sup>.

International assistance is generally and basically in need of cooperation and coordination. Various programmes and efforts have to be coordinated and re-evaluated in view of efficiency. Despite “conditionality” is quite often considered as politically incorrect, international assistance should be at least conditional on i.e. respect for the rule of law and human rights<sup>42</sup>. A certain political will and at least a basic processing of the reforms, not only in view of Armed Forces and MoD, but in view of all security forces and their related agencies, should serve as measure for the assessment of prospective support programmes.

Democracy building has to be supported in general. A system of democratic and understandable values has to be established in order to support a change of mentality. Root causes of bad governance of the security sector have to be considered in the assistance programmes. Therefore enhanced support of anti-corruption programmes are a need.

Financial aid and support with technical equipment has to take corruption into account, i.e. assistance has to be adapted: direct hand over of equipment rather than money transfer to non-transparent accounts.

Assistance in stabilizing the security environment and settling frozen conflicts in the Caucasus region would help providing a solid basis for reforms. Long term international back-up against aggressive territorial infringements would help to free resources and invest them in democratic reforms of SSR rather than in efforts to enlarge combat readiness.

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<sup>41</sup> See Johanna Mendelson Forman: “Promoting Civil Society in Good Governance: Lessons for the Security Sector”. DCAF Working Paper Series No. 29, page 15.

<sup>42</sup> Born 2002, op. cit., p. 66.

Training and seminars on professional state-management are in need, as well as assistance in creation of a state-management culture.

### **Conclusion: Reforming the Reform**

The Security Sector Reform in Georgia is in need of a reform. The current reform is leading to nowhere<sup>43</sup>.

One of the main conclusions from the preceding sections might be that the security sector reform in Georgia is in need of a reform. Considering the main points of what was said before, one might conclude, that such a reform should have an external as well as an internal dimension. One also might call it an international and a national dimension.

### **The international dimension**

The international assistance has to shift its focus. On the one hand it is taken for granted that SSR must be seen in a general frame of democratization and democracy-building and cannot be promoted as a separate issue (as well as the other way around democratization itself is not possible without an effective reform of the security sector). Nevertheless this insight seems not to be reflected in international assistance programmes. International support is still focusing on a reform of the Armed Forces, which is certainly an important part for the country's and region's security. However another crucial factor is the countries democratization. Just as important elements in view of democratization are internal security forces and law enforcement bodies as direct links between government and society. Without a reform of Georgian law enforcement bodies, especially police forces, general democratization will not be able to succeed.

A basic and most important conclusion is that international assistance has to be directed to reinforce its support of a reform of the police and internal security forces. Given the crucial importance of police forces within a society - and especially a society in transition -

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<sup>43</sup> Quotation from an interview with a member of a Georgian NGO.

donors have to become aware of the implications and gather efforts and energy to help transforming the internal security actors.

Furthermore an intensified cooperation and a coordination of SSR-relevant programmes would be in need – always keeping in mind, that SSR cannot be seen as isolated undertaking. Therefore not only mere security sector related, but also general assistance in democracy-building would have to be taken into consideration when coordinating relevant assistance.

Such coordination would also help to develop a joint assistance policy, which would eventually be able to link support to a minimum of concrete results. We do not mean that support should stop in case reform would not be implemented fast and successful enough. But pre-conditions in view of assistance programmes must more clearly be promoted as incentives to further proceed with the implementation.

Coordination would also help evaluating success and failure of support programmes. It might help determining the further direction of assistance, especially in view of the given background, i.e. the correlative structures.

## **The national dimension**

International assistance cannot help reforming the security sector without national motivation. Domestic will is crucial for the reforms. So far Georgia has made a good start, as shown, for example, in the Defence White Paper - despite its flaws – and in the Police Reform Concept. Both are considerable ventures in transparency. Furthermore Georgia is an active PfP partner and open to international advice, assistance and models, i.e. to be seen in the adoption of western legislation and the PPBS budgeting system. Nevertheless, receiving advice and assistance is not enough. A country and most of all its government should know where it wants and needs to go. It is not sufficient to wait until Georgia is told by NATO how and what to reform. It is of great importance to undertake itself the step to identify the specific national interests and requirements and then build a political consensus on a respective reform plan<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>44</sup> Assessment by Marina Caparini, Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland.



Political goodwill alone is maybe the first and foremost important aspect to trigger a positive process, but it also would not be able to succeed without a broad national consensus, getting backing from all kinds of political actors as well as the general public. And here again one should stress the importance of transparency on the one hand and civil-society-building on the other. National security including the reform of the security sector must become a transparent issue, discussed and promoted publicly. The role of civic education on those issues as well as on general democracy related aspects is of crucial importance.

Whatever the reasons for the failure to take the necessary steps towards a concrete reform plan are – domestic constraints, persistence of old-guard nomenklatura in key positions, clientelism and corruption etc. – the step has finally to be taken - and this by the country itself.