

# **Multinational Training and Force Integration**

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When a nation or a group of nations decide to launch and sustain a Crisis Response Operation (CRO) or a Peace Support Operation (PSO) they will need

- A Force Planning Process to ensure that the right forces are available in the right quality and quantity.
- A Command Structure, from where the Headquarters (HQ) for the mission can be drawn.
- A Force Structure from where to draw the forces.
- A Force Generation Mechanism to compose a force of the right units and elements.
- A Training Structure to ensure the proper training of the force.

This should not surprise anybody, for this is what we all have in our defence organizations for raising and training our national forces, although we may not distinguish so specifically among the various elements. My message is, however, that if you are going to generate, integrate, and train viable forces, the structures mentioned above are required for the process.

For a multinational force, there is one more prerequisite: Standardization. If the force elements are not interoperable, intellectually, procedurally, and to a certain degree technically, the force will fail.

My presentation on multinational training and force integration will therefore be built on the preconditions

mentioned above, and as NATO has developed and made use of all the structures, I will primarily use NATO as an example.

## **Force Planning**

In NATO, Force Planning is an integrated part of Defence Planning comprising also Armament Planning, Logistics Planning, C2 Planning, and Resource Planning. I mention this only to remind you that Force Planning - although decisive for the provision of forces and capacities - cannot be seen in splendid isolation.

In NATO, Force Planning runs in two-year cycles. The basis is the Ministerial Guidance setting the Alliance's level of ambition. Currently, that is the ability to conduct and sustain simultaneously three corps-size operations with the participation of equivalent sea and air components or - in a worst-case scenario - to concentrate the forces and capacities in a multiple-corps Article 5 Operation.

Based on the political guidance, the Strategic Commanders develop the force requirements to fulfil the political ambitions. The requirements are submitted to the NATO HQ where they are broken down into force goals for the member countries. Needless to say, that this is a difficult process because nations are not always in a position to deliver or may have other priorities.

The next year of the cycle is the review process, where NATO and nations take stock of the force contributions, and make necessary adjustments. Out-of cycle consultations are conducted if required.

The NATO Force Planning Process was extended to Partners in 1994 through the so-called Planning and Review Process (PARP). Since then it has been modified several times to help Partners modernizing their forces and fielding units that can be made available for training, exercises and operations in conjunction with NATO forces in CRO/PSOs.

There are still big challenges ahead for the Defence and Force Planners, in particular when it comes to the provision of force multipliers and in improving the strategic mobility and sustainability. You may recall the initiatives of the 1999 Washington Summit, the Defence Capability Initiative and of the 2002 Prague Summit, the Prague Capability Commitment.


Nevertheless, the NATO Force Planning process supplemented with the PARP deserves a large portion of the credit for NATO's ability of fielding balanced forces for CRO/PSOs and of the ability of including partners and other nations in the forces. It also helps the participating nations providing forces for operations under the leadership of other organisations, e.g. the EU.

## **Command Structure**

NATO's Command Structure is the prerequisite for acting militarily to tasks from the North Atlantic Council (NAC). With the multinational HQs permanently in place, NATO can provide strategic and operational assessments; establish force requirements; field multinational, joint and component HQs at short notice; and sustain them over a prolonged period of time.

The NATO Command Structure has been regularly updated and streamlined to meet the current challenges of the strategic concept and the level of ambition. It comprises three levels of command.

The first level consists of two strategic commands, Allied Command Operations (ACO) at Mons, Belgium responsible for planning and operations, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) at Norfolk, Virginia responsible for transforming NATO and its partners from the cold war static posture to the current requirements of deployability to any part of the world with forces capable of conducting operations from full scale war to humanitarian operations and disaster relief.



The second level comprises the Joint Forces Commands (JFC) at Brunssum in the Netherlands and Naples in Italy and a Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) near Lisbon in

Portugal. These headquarters can plan and conduct NATO's joint operations from their home location or from a deployable land or sea based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQ.

The third level comprises a Land Component HQ, a Maritime Component HQ and an Air Component HQ for each of the two Joint Forces Commands. The Component Commands can perform their CC role in a Combined Joint Task Force either from their home location or deployed to the area of operation.

All the HQs are by design multinational with representation from all relevant Alliance members and Partners. Through their existence and functioning in accordance with agreed NATO standards, the HQs in the Command Structure together with the International Military Staff in Brussels contribute tremendously to Alliance and Partner integration.

NATO's Command Structure is unique, which is sometimes seen as a challenge. Some want to copy it, which would mean duplication of efforts; others act jealously and want to diminish it. My advice is to make use of it. For 50 years it has proven its ability to integrate national contributions to efficient joint formations.

### **Force Structure**

The size of the NATO Force Structure is determined by the Force Goals for each alliance member. All together, NATO's pool of forces must ensure that NATO can honour the political level of ambition of fielding and

sustaining simultaneously three corps size operations with equivalent sea and air elements.

With a few exceptions, the Force Structure was from the outset primarily national. Allied experiences from the 2nd World War made it clear that multinationality is an extra source of friction in war, and this was reflected in NATO's general defence posture in Europe where the forces at the Iron Curtain was a long ribbon of national corps, in Central Europe for example German, American, Belgian, Dutch and British corps. Only the northernmost corps LANDJUT was multinational with German and Danish participation.

Multinational land forces existed primarily for flag-waving purposes as ACE Mobile Force (AMF), a multinational brigade-size formation. AMF was later augmented with a multinational Air Wing (AMF Air). Both Forces have been deployed in support of Alliance operations: AMF Air in Turkey during the first Gulf War in 1991, AMF Land in Albania during the Kosovo Crisis.

Likewise, NATO had a number of multinational standing naval forces, STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED (Surface Action Groups) and STANAVFORCHAN (Mine Counter Measure Group) to mention the most important. Standing naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean in November 2001 in NATO's first Article 5 Operation, Active Endeavour to counter sea borne terrorism.

The highest degree of multinationality during the cold war was achieved in the air forces as the result of

NATO's Integrated Air Defence System, and that advantage has been maintained in the present structure.

Following the end of the Cold war, the urge for multinational forces, in particular land forces grew for a number of reasons. It prevents re-nationalisation. It demonstrates solidarity and international determination. It shares responsibilities and risks. It facilitates inter-alliance integration. And it makes it possible to field more forces and sustain the forces over a longer period.



The spearhead for the new wave of multinationality was the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under UK lead, which was introduced in 1992 in accordance with NATO's 1991 Strategy. It was multinational to the limit with up to ten dedicated divisions of which two were multinational themselves. And the corps troops came from all over the Alliance. The ARRC would never have worked with all the dedicated forces, and it was never the intention. But the exercise cooperation with the big pool of forces was an important step towards multinational training. And operationally, the ARRC HQ with assigned forces spearheaded NATO's CRO/PSO operations with IFOR in Bosnia in 1995 and Joint Guardian, subsequently KFOR in Kosovo in 1999.

In NATO's current land force structure the ARRC under British lead is one of nine multinational Corps HQs available for fulfilling NATO's ambition.

All Corps HQs are under national lead, either a single nation or more nations, i.e. the German – Netherlands Corps under German/Dutch lead and the Multinational Corps North East under Danish/German/Polish lead.



### Land CCs and Deployable Corps HQs

Command Structure	Force Structure Corps HQs
Land CC Heidelberg 	ARRC in Rheindalen Germany
	RD German - Netherlands Corps Munster, GE
	<i>Multinational Corps NE in Szczecin, Poland</i>
	<i>II Polish Corps in Krakow, Poland</i>
Land CC Madrid 	EUROCORPS in Strasbourg, France
	RD Italian Corps in Milan, Italy
	RD Spanish Corps in Valencia, Spain
	RD Turkish Corps in Istanbul, Turkey
	<i>Greek C Corps in Thessaloniki, Greece</i>







High Readiness      Lower Readiness

Through their training affiliation with the force elements (divisions, brigades and corps troops including special capacities and force multipliers) the Corps HQs contribute to the multinational training of all parts of the force structure. The certification process of the Corps HQs is almost complete providing NATO with a robust basket from where to pick the land component HQs for CRO/PSOs.

Like the land structure, the maritime force structure consists of a number of Task Force HQs under national lead to which the force elements can be attached as required. Currently Italy, Spain, United Kingdom and United States have provided HQs and appropriate command ships. France is expected to be next on the list. In addition there are two standing naval groups under each of the two Maritime CCs, Standing Naval Maritime Group 1 (Surface Action) and Standing Naval Mine



## Counter Measure Group 1 under Northwood, and SNMG 2 and SNMCMG 2 under Naples.



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Maritime CCs and Deployable Maritime HQs					
Command Structure		Force Structure			
Maritime CC Northwood					
Maritime CC Naples					
		HQ Commander Italian Maritime Forces on board INS GARIBALDI			
		HQ Commander Spanish Maritime Forces on board SNS CASTILLA			
		HQ Commander United Kingdom Forces on board HMS ARK ROYAL			
		HQ Striking Force Atlantic on board USS Mount Whitney			

The centralized employment of air power makes the air force structure differ from that of the army and the navy. Under each of the Air CCs you find two stationary and one deployable Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC). In many CRO/PSO, air operations can be controlled from the home location, but should it be necessary to deploy a CJTF HQ with all its components, the Deployable CAOCs are available.

In addition to the CAOCs, France and Germany provide Joint Force Air Control Centres under national lead.



### Air CCs and Deployable Air HQs

Command Structure	Force Structure
Air CC Ramstein • CAOC Finderup, Denmark • CAOC Uedem, Germany • Deployable CAOC Uedem, Germany 	
Air CC Izmir • CAOC Poggio Renatico, Italy • CAOC Larissa, Greece • Deployable CAOC Poggio Renatico 	
	Joint Force ACC- France
	Joint Force ACC- United Kingdom


## NATO Response Force

The latest development in the provision of forces is the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was agreed at the Prague Summit in 2002. It stood up in the autumn of 2003, reached Initial Operational Capability 2004, and it is expected to reach Full Operational Capability in October this year.

NRF is a multinational, joint, high readiness expeditionary force for use in all types of operation from opposed entry to humanitarian relief. It can operate alone or spearhead larger operations in accordance with the concept of “first in – first out”.

It will operate under the command of Allied Command Operations and under control of a Joint Forces Command/Joint HQ. Fully developed NRF will comprise

a land component built around a brigade size force; a maritime component comprising a naval task force with a carrier group, an amphibious group and a surface action group; and an air component capable of launching 200 sorties a day.




Over the years, the NRF will be used as the engine for the introduction of various force multipliers as mentioned on the organization diagram:

- **CBRN:** Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological, and Nuclear. A CBRN Battalion is already in place.
- **PGM:** Precision Guided Munitions, e.g. cruise missiles.
- **SEAD:** Suppression of Enemy Air Defence.
- **AGS:** Alliance Ground Surveillance.
- **TMD:** Theatre Missile Defence

- CIS: Command Information Systems/Network Centric Warfare
- CS/CSS: Combat Support/Combat Service Support.


The NRF integrates force planning, the command structure, the force structure, force generation and training in one combined concept. Based on a Joint Statement of Requirement from the Allied Command Operations, a Force Generation Conference is held 1½ years prior to the commence of the readiness period. This leaves one year of national preparation time of the force elements and ½ year for multinational training at the component and joint levels.



The standby period is ½ year, which means that the process in principle has to be repeated twice a year to ensure that there is an NRF in place permanently.

The NFR is the top of NATO's readiness pyramid. Over the years most of the High Readiness Forces and the Forces of Lower Readiness will rotate through the NFR for which they will be equipped with modern equipment; receive state-of-the-art training; and participate in challenging exercises and/or operations. Consequently, the NFR is not only a response force. It is the dynamo for transforming NATO's forces both operationally and technologically.

The picture below illustrates the NFR Rotation Cycle.



JFC Brunssum was responsible for the first rotation with NRF 1 and 2.

JFC Naples was responsible for rotation 2 with NRF 3 and 4. The Italian Corps and the German/ Netherlands Corps provided Land CCs. The Maritime CC came from

the UK, and the Air CC was drawn from the Command Structure (CC Air, Izmir).

JHQ Lisbon is responsible for rotation 3 with NFR 5 and 6 with land CCs from the Spanish Corps and the ARRC, maritime CC from Italy and air CCs from France and UK. JFC Brunssum is responsible for rotation 4. For NRF 7, the CC is provided by the EUROCORPS, the Maritime CC by Spain and the Air Component by the Command Structure (CC Air Ramstein).

The multinational training of NFR 7 is in full swing. Exercise STEADFAST JAGUAR will be a significant hurdle on the way to the Full Operational Capability. The exercise takes place on the Cape Verde Islands, and it will enter its final stage within the next few days.


## **Current Operations**

Currently NATO is running four major operations and exercises under the authority of the Strategic Commander Operations from his Supreme HQ, SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.

JFC Brunssum is in charge of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan). NATO took over the mission on August 11, 2003. ISAF consists of more than 8,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen, with contributions from 36 nations.

As already mentioned JFC Brunssum is also responsible for conducting Exercise STEADFAST JAGUAR in Cape Verde as part of achieving Full Operational Capability of NFR 7.


JHQ Lisbon is responsible for the training and deployment of NRF 5 and 6. In October 2005 the JHQ deployed with the Deployable Joint Task Force HQ to control elements of the NRF 5 in the disaster relief operation following the earthquake in Pakistan. The force comprised a field hospital and medical teams; engineers; a disaster relief team; and heavy lift helicopters.



JFC Naples is in charge of the 16.000 men KFOR in Kosovo with the participation of 37 nations as well as NATO's first and so far only Article 5 operation, Active Endeavour activated in October 2001 to counter seawards spread of terrorism in the Eastern Mediterranean and expanded to comprise the Strait of Gibraltar in 2003.

The European Union has no command structure. It relies on NATO or national joint HQs. EU's Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina is controlled through

the NATO chain of command. DSACEUR, who is a German or British four star reports as the strategic commander to EU and exercises his authority through the EU Staff Group collocated with SHAPE while making use of all SHAPE staff functions. Co-located with JFC Naples there is an EU Command Element, and in theatre, the EUFOR HQ is co-located with the NATO HQ in Camp Butmir.



For good reasons the EU Force Planning mechanisms are not so well advanced as those of NATO. The work to fulfil the 2010 Military Requirements of the Headline Goals is in progress. The Requirement's Catalogue of 2005 will be followed by a bidding round with the view of producing a Force Catalogue. This will subsequently be followed by Progress Catalogues. I appreciate the complicated work of tailoring a 60.000 men strong joint force, and I hope that the EU Military Committee and the



EU Military Staff is making full use of NATO's expertise in the project.

In May 2004, EU decided also to achieve a Battalion Battle Group capacity. The aim is the capability of deploying and sustaining one Battle Group in 2005 (Initial Operational Capability) and two Battle Groups in 2007 (Full Operational Capability). Most EU nations – individually or in teams - have committed battalions and niche capacities to the concept.

### **Coalition of the Willing**

An operation sponsored by a coalition of the willing may sometimes be necessary if agreement cannot be achieved in the proper multinational organisations. Both Golf Wars and the operation against terrorism in Afghanistan were fought by coalitions, and while NATO is now controlling ISAF in Afghanistan, the operation in Iraq is still under Coalition control.

Operationally, the coalition of the willing is – at least in theory - complicated, as it lacks common force planning, command and force structures, standardization and force generation processes. In practise, however, the members of the coalition may already be interoperable, if they belong to the same organisation, e.g. NATO.

A coalition of the willing will, however, require a strong lead nation capable of providing the HQ, the C2 structure and the force multipliers.

## **Force Generation**

I have already touched on force generation in my presentation of the NATO Response Force, and with NRF fully operational many of the problems of fielding CRO/PSO forces at short notice will be solved. Nevertheless the traditional and well-proven mechanism will be maintained to preserve the flexibility of coping with new and unexpected challenges and to sustain current missions.

The first step in the Force Generation is the Strategic Commander's Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) developed on the basis of the mission. It comprises a full list of the units, capacities and C2 arrangements needed for the accomplishment of the task. Based on the CJSOR, nations - members as well as partners - offer their contributions for consideration at a Force Generation Conference hosted by the Strategic Commander. The conference will often reveal duplication, e.g. of infantry units, and areas that have not been covered, e.g. force multipliers that are in short supply in many nations, and the less "sexy" elements as transportation and supply. In such cases nations are requested to reconsider, and they may later be summoned to a Force Balancing Conference to conclude the process.

The Combined Joint Task Force HQ is drawn from the Command Structure, while Component Headquarters can be drawn from the third level in the Command Structure or the top-level of the Force Structure. In case of prolonged operations the organic HQs drawn from the Structures may be superseded by a more permanent built-up HQ's, where the personnel are rotated individually in

accordance with an agreed quota among the participating nations.

The forces are drawn from alliance members, partners and other nations. The ability to generate national forces is therefore a prerequisite for success. The previous lectures have already been devoted to force generation, so I shall limit myself to a couple of more general remarks.

Much of the multinationality is achieved already at the national level through bi-lateral cooperation. Let me mention just a couple of examples. For UNPROFOR in Bosnia – Herzegovina, the Nordic countries offered at combined battalion with the training responsibility alternating between Denmark and Sweden. In the IFOR/SFOR and KFOR the Danish Contingents have included platoons and companies from the Baltic States. Similar arrangements can be found in many other countries. This puts the burden of multinational training on the lead nation, but it usually also leads to good results, as the training can be focussed. And it carries the advantage that many of the force elements offered in the force generation process are already multinational.

The national force generation often leads to a discussion of conscripts versus professionals. In my view this discussion is futile. What is relevant is a sufficient training level of the soldiers and units. This can be achieved with conscripts if you allow the necessary time for training and exercise. Or you can fail with professionals if they are deployed directly from their basic training. In my opinion no private soldier should go on a CRO/PSO operation with less than one year of dedicated national training, and he should be lead by

NCOs and officers with considerably longer military background.


Another dimension of the discussion of conscripts versus professionals is sustainment. It is usually easy to generate the first contingent, but when it comes to rotation number five, ten or more, it gets more problematic. There are various opinions on how often you can deploy a soldier. Some suggests a roster of three. They are likely to face recruiting problems. Some suggests a roster of eight to nine. They are probably too generous with taxpayers' money. Somewhere in between pending rotation duration and national tradition you will find the right figure. Nations with pure professional forces, however, face bigger sustainment problems than those recruiting from their conscript force.

Personally, I think that the right solution is a mix. In Denmark we have maintained conscription, which provides us with a pool of fit young people among whom we can recruit a number of volunteers for additional training and a tour in one of the CRO/PSOs. But they are lead by experienced and mostly professional NCOs and officers. And the more specialized units are all manned with professionals. This system places Denmark high on the list of force providers in relation to our population size. Let my just add that the battalion Denmark will offer to the NATO Response Force will be 100 % professional because of the readiness requirement and the first-in capacity. But for the next rotation of a mission we may well deploy a mixed battalion because we have had the time to train short- term volunteers.

## NATO Training Structure

During the cold war era, NATO-lead multinational training was essentially limited to the Command Structure and the reactions forces like the AMF, Standing Naval Forces and subsequently the ARRC. Multinational education took place at the NATO Defence College in Rome with longer courses for senior personnel and more specific courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau and a few other schools for specialists.

Training of the Force Structure was primarily a national responsibility, which of course also involved substantial elements of multinational cooperation initiated by the General Defence Plan.



Today, NATO's training structure has been strengthened and reorganized to meet the new challenges. Allied

Command Transformation has assumed responsibility for the majority of the multinational training structures, while Allied Command Operations maintains responsibility for multinational exercises. But one thing has not changed. The training and exercise structure is still tied together by NATO's procedural, administrative, and technical standardization as developed and maintained by the NATO Standardization Agency.

The NATO Defence College under the authority of the Military Committee and the NATO School under ACT are still in the forefront of multinational education of individuals, which is so important because this is where you promote the intellectual interoperability that is the prerequisite for multinational cooperation. These two institutions are not alone with the burden. Our national Staff and Defence Colleges are lifting their fair share.


Next under ATC you find the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway and the Joint Forces Training Centre in Poland. They have the facilities of training Joint and Component Headquarters both for contingencies as required by NATO Response Force, and for the new or ongoing missions like ISAF, KFOR and Active Endeavour. The two Centres can also link up to train simultaneously both the joint HQ and the CCs.

The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal draws on "lessons learned" during missions and training to suggest improvements both in procedures, equipment, and training. NATO Undersea Research Centre in Italy and an increasing number of Centres of Excellence affiliated with ACT also contribute.

Allied Command Operations is responsible for exercising the CJTF HQs drawn from the Command Structure, the

Component HQs drawn from the Command Structure and/or the Force Structure. This will be done through Command Post Exercises and Computer Assisted Exercises through the assets of ACT.

ACT's training responsibilities, however, also reach out to partners in the NATO/PfP Training Network. It comprises NATO's Education Facilities, NATO's Training Facilities, and various PfP Training Centres in NATO and Partner Countries incl. here in Austria, the various Centres of Excellence as they develop, the PfP Consortium of Colleges and the NATO Training Group.



In this network member and partner nations can meet to coordinate and harmonize curricula to avoid duplication of efforts and allowing for better flow of information.

## **Force Integration**

Even if you make use of all the procedures and structures described above, you could still fail to generate the right forces if you forget the ground rules of Force Integration.

Multinationality can be a force multiplier. It shows resolve and solidarity. It makes it possible to field more forces and it can increase the quality of the forces by creating the right mix of forces and capacities. But multinationality can also result in military disorganization, which will occur if the various elements of the force cannot work together.

In the early days of PfP, multinationality “a outranche” became a political dogma. The ideal seemed to be platoons composed of squads from different nations or – even better – different continents. In some situations when the exercise aim was just to bring soldiers together for a barbeque in the field or to deploy them in a benign peace keeping operation it might even work leaving a false experience.

Political dreams of deep multinationality must not be allowed to challenge military efficiency. Whether you like it or not, multinationality subtracts from military efficiency because it adds an extra dimension of friction to the operation. But, as mentioned above there are many situations where multinationality is advantageous or even necessary. In such cases we need to find ways to cooperate effectively.

There are no fixed rules on how deep you can mix units from different nations. It depends on the mission type,



the training level of the units, the procedures and the technology. Let me give you a few rules of the thumb:

- In stationary PSOs you could of course accept a deeper degree of multinationality than in case of combat operation. But always use a worst-case scenario of the mission to judge whether multinationality would work. Could I, for example, with my squadron of tanks from one country, with air support via a Forward Air Controller from a second country support an observation post manned by a platoon from a third country? If that is a possible scenario and you cannot honestly answer yes to the question, you will need to find another way of mixing the forces. If on the other side the worst-case scenario is to eat rations because to supply convoy is delayed, deep integration of forces is not a problem.
- As already indicated, the multinational training level is an important factor in determining integration. Maybe the forces have already trained together, in which case you have an relevant background for your judgment. In other cases you may have to require additional training prior to the mission. And sometimes you may come to the conclusion that even months of training will not do the job.
- The elements of the unit must use common or at least interoperable procedures.
- The technological differences among the elements of the units must not be too big. A technology gap will drag down the technologically advanced elements without being of much help to the less sophisticated units.

## **Interoperability**

The ideal is that the elements of the units in the force are interoperable to the degree, where integration does not constitute a problem. But how can interoperability be obtained?

The first requirement for interoperability is a common language. If we cannot communicate, we cannot cooperate. We may eventually see technological solutions to that problem, but until then language training should be considered an important part of military training.

Besides language there are other elements within the area of intellectual interoperability, e.g. attitude to religion, human rights, international conventions, military working culture, etc. They need to be taken into consideration when you integrate your force. NATO schools, not the least the NATO Defence College and the NATO School in Oberammergau pursue the aim of promoting intellectual interoperability, and so does the whole PfP Training Structure with the Consortium of Colleges in the forefront. And the daily or frequent international contact in the multinational HQ's of the Command Structure and the Force Structure and in the PfP training structure certainly also helps overcoming this challenge.

The preconditions for Procedural Interoperability are common standards. NATO Standardization Agency has worked on this problem from the early days of the Alliance, and it has issued a substantial number of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied Publications dealing with operational, tactical,

administrative and logistic matters. Moreover, extensive work is being done to integrate NATO Standards in national manuals and publications, and NATO procedures are being used in the PfP-training structure. Having spent part of my military career with the development of national doctrine, I admit readily that NATO procedures are not necessarily the best in all fields. But they are acceptable and workable. That is why we need to stick to them to the benefit of NATO operations and indeed of operations under control of EU or a coalition of the willing, as most participating nations will already be used to NATO-procedures.

Logistics has traditionally been a national responsibility in NATO, and this worked fine in the stationary situation of the cold war. But with a number of CROs spread over two continents it is not the cheapest solution, and many attempts have been made to develop common logistics. Some success has been achieved with Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILUs), especially within the field of transportation. The BELUGA transport unit supporting the troops of Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Austria in SFOR in Bosnia is one of a few examples.

But logistics is much more sensitive to standardization than operations. It determines how soldiers live, eat, and recreate. And it deals with medical care, religion and death. Of course it is possible to integrate areas as transportation and bulk supply of fuel. But if you want to achieve progress in other fields it will put an extra burden on the force integrators because you may have to create – if you will excuse the expression – ethnically clean force elements with compatible healthcare, worshipping, eating habits, accommodation requirements, holidays etc. This

would lead to an unacceptable division of the force, which would run counter to our wish for integration. So the cumbersome National Support Elements will stay with us for a long time.

Nevertheless, we should continue working on streamlining our logistics. Especially, I am in favour of leaving some of the more trivial functions to contractors like accommodation, food supply, fuel supply etc. This could free soldiers from many unskilled labour jobs and make them available for the mission.

### **The right mix**

Force integration is not only the proper inclusion of the national contributions. It is also the composition of the force with the right units, the right proportion among combat or line troops and the units for combat support, combat service support, command & control, and logistics. If the force is joint, you also need to determine the right mix among the services. This is a trade that the Force Generators at Allied Command Operations in Mons have perfected over many years, and for which they have developed sophisticated computer programs. I would not hesitate nominating it the Centre of Excellence in Force Generation, and whether it is EU or a coalition of the willing that are generating a force, full use of the capabilities in Mons would be recommendable.

Finally, a few words on the integration of the military force with the civilian elements of a CRO/PSO.

There is nothing soldiers would rather do than provide direct help to the local population in their area of operation. Be it the provision of food and shelter; the

construction of schools and medical centres; or the transport of school children and elderly people. Or be it the construction of bridges and roads or the restoration of the supply of electricity or water.

In some situations it is necessary that the soldiers take on some of these tasks. When Milosevic at the beginning of NATO's air campaign in April 1999 forced thousands of Albanians to leave Kosovo, the soldiers of NATO's extraction force and the pre-deployed elements of Operation Joint Guardian (later to become KFOR) almost over night were changed into humanitarian help workers. They provided transportation, they erected tent villages and they feed the refugees. They did it well, and they did it because the demand by far exceeded what the NGOs in the area could cope with. We saw a similar humanitarian deployment of elements of NFR to help the victims of the earthquake in Pakistan.

But use of soldiers as humanitarian help workers should not be the order of the day. The military force should be tailored to its security mission and it should under normal circumstances stick it. The task of providing humanitarian aid and to rebuild the nations should be left to those organizations created to do that, be it NGOs or various contractors.

We military people are not always impressed with the efficiency of the NGOs. That is one of the reasons that we sometimes prefer to act ourselves. And I can assure you that you can find quite substantial political support for changing the military into brigades of humanitarian assistance. If that happens, however, we will loose our military sharpness and our ability to provide what

nobody else can deliver: A secure environment. And without a secure environment, any operation will fail.

Therefore, force integration in its broadest sense should also comprise the provision of the total Crisis Management Structure for the restoration of the area or nation concerned: The humanitarian aid and health care, the reconstruction of government structures, the re-establishment of the police and the armed forces, the rebuilding of the infrastructure, the reopening of production and commerce etc. But, I emphasize again: The most important task is the provision of a secure environment. Without this, everything else is useless. The military force should not allow itself to be distracted from the main task, but of course provide what help it can within its organic means and capabilities.

## **Conclusion**

Multinational training and force integration can take place among all nations who wish to do so and are prepared to invest the necessary efforts.

You do not need to do like NATO, but it would be wise to make use of structures and procedures similar to those developed in NATO/PfP. They are

- Force Planning Process
- Command Structure
- Force Structure
- Force Generation Mechanism
- Training Structure.