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## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN BULGARIA**

### **1.3 Assessment of Security Sector Sxpert Formation**

#### **1.3.1 Introduction**

Traditionally, the security sector in former communist countries was as a ‘sacred cow’ – out of any transparency and critics. The only permissible criticism was on how to make the excellent army and security services better. The general outcome of this was dangerous for both, society and security sector professionals. The Bulgarian public had a wrong impression about the way the equipment for the army was provided and its price, the real capacity of the security services and its cost, the level of national sovereignty of the Bulgarian security sector in the Warsaw Pact and Socialist Camp format. In particular, the militaries and policemen have lost the sense of professionalism in modern context.

In contrast, there was a period immediately after the beginning of a democratic transformation, when the security sector was criticised even for its existence. The total nihilism was based on a mass rush to cancel all ties with the repressive Communist institutions. The most popular and commonly used argument to justify all activities towards the demolition of the communist hangover in the security sector was: ‘we change the system’. The professional prestige of the serviceman was minimised. The long-standing system of values was negatively re-evaluated and questioned.

Between these two periods positive and negative experience a sign of equality could be established due to the obvious lack of comprehensive and systematic analyses. There was, and still is not enough serious

expertise outside the security sectors, that could independently and impartially evaluate the status of the so called 'security sector reform'.<sup>2</sup>

In the case of Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries, foreign security and defence expertise were requested in several occasions.<sup>3</sup> The overall result of the work that had been done within some of the national security institutions was that a great gap existed on how the Bulgarian and foreign experts looked at problems of the security sector reform. In some cases, the outcomes and recommendations were not even understood, no consensus was found. Paradoxically, the media in most cases took the side of the Bulgarian experts in public debates. Which reforms were better for the national interests? It is also very illustrative that the voice of the media was significantly changed when NATO/European Union membership became more realistic!

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<sup>2</sup> Against the background of the specific Bulgarian division of political power and related to that division security organisation this paper will address the following content of the 'security sector': the Bulgarian Army (traditional name for the Armed Forces), Police Service, Gandarmerie (paramilitary force with police functions), Border Police Service (control of the ground and maritime borders), National Security Service (counterintelligence), National Guard Service (for guarding VIP and important civilian objects).

<sup>3</sup> The Bulgarian government requested an external study of the ongoing defence reform, which would assess the situation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, civil-military relations and the efficiency of NATO membership efforts, as well as suggest steps for modernisation of the Bulgarian military. The US Department of Defence responded to the request. The Department's assessment aimed at providing the Bulgarian government with an individually tailored blueprint that could be used to develop defence reform plans in accordance with Bulgaria's national security and defence interests. The study was led by MG Henry Kivenaar and the report was compiled over the period November 1998 to April 1999. In 1998 a team from the British Ministry of Defence conducted a study of the existing civil-military relations and democratic control over the Bulgarian military. The results of this study were incorporated in amendments of the National Defence and Armed Forces Law prepared and adopted the same year. Since this period the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence has hosted consultants from the United Kingdom (defence planning, programming and budgeting, English language training and testing and special adviser to the Chief of the GS), Germany (reform of the NCO corps training and career development), and France (reform of the logistic support system). In the Ministry of Interior Services foreign expertise was used in terms to better the fight against the international organised crime during the embargo against former Yugoslavia. In recent times a British consultancy from the *Crown Agents Co* was provided to modernise the structure and activities of the Customs Agency.

At this time, which is typical for the power transition countries, a new type of mentality came into play among the civil society, political, administrative, academic and media experts, as well as the security sector professionals. As a result, the situation in Bulgaria today is much better than it was five years ago. State security organisations consider independent experts not as friends but as necessary partners. By doing this, the state security organisations can justify to the public the way the administration spends the money of the taxpayer. In their opinion, the media and NGOs are interested in working with and within the security sector not only to criticise them, but also to participate in the reform and creation of the new security organisations. It is too early to make conclusions on the process of creation of effective independent expertise on security matters as well as a fundamental understanding among professionals that this expertise is not only necessary but also vital for the successful completion of this expertise.

The basic existing problem is the insufficient and ineffective education and training of civil experts on security affairs. Without appropriate expert formation, the term independent experts would miss its actual meaning and lose its compatibility. The lack of adequate training further minimises the effect of enlarged transparency on security services activities.

Without in depth knowledge on the issue of expertise, the ‘independent experts’ (including those in political parties and the state administration) will continue to be used by professionals (as a main source of information) for their purposes. For example, certain workers/associates assume that several years of work experience in the security sector will automatically turn them into experts. This happens and continues to happen.

### **1.3.2 How are the Different Experts Prepared for Their Tasks and Assignments and How Well?**

The evaluation of expert preparedness is problematic. If the evaluation was strictly based on the proper definition of the term ‘expert’ – being very skilful, having much training and knowledge in some special

fields'<sup>4</sup> – it would be very difficult to identify an independent or politically obliged person on expert level. For the aims of this paper, it is accepted that the independent security sector expert represents a person whose primary job is related to state security, who has an education and training that permit him to understand in broad context specialised facts and information and, on this basis to make responsible independent conclusions, evaluations and recommendations. Regarding the expertise, the expert systematically has access to enough, detailed and professional information, and is in contact with the official representatives of security sector organisation(s), as well as research and academic centres at home and abroad. In addition to the work definition, it has to be considered that the requirements of the many experts vary, depending on whether they belong to parliamentary staff, state administration, NGOs or the media. Therefore, each expert needs to be specifically trained in accordance to his/her job duties.

(a) *Parliament and Parliamentary Staffers*

The Constitution and role of the Parliament determine the requirements for the expertise. The National Assembly has the authority to pass resolutions on the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. Further, the Assembly can approve any deployment and use of Bulgarian armed forces outside the country's borders, and the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of the country or their crossing of that territory. It can pass resolutions on motions from the President or the Council of Ministers, introduce martial law or declare a state of emergency on all or part of the country's territory. In addition, the Assembly ratifies or rejects international initiatives of political and military nature, and envisages corrections to the national borders. The National Assembly ratifies international treaties, both bilateral and multilateral (e.g. the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe, the 'Open Sky' Treaty etc.), international conventions, as well as laws regulating particular issues of defence, internal order, security and the defence-industrial complex (The Law of Control over Foreign Trade

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<sup>4</sup> Webster's New World Dictionary (3rd edn).

Activities with Armaments and Goods and Technologies with Dual Purpose Application).

The work of the legislature, referred to as the National Assembly, is open to the public. Committee deliberations are open and the media have access to both committees and plenary sessions. The draft legislation is presented on the Assembly's Internet site and in the media. Important sessions, including every Friday's 'question time', are broadcast live on national radio and television. Since 1997, parliamentary committees have increasingly drafted legislation in partnership with independent professional experts and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

(i) Preparedness of the Members of the Parliament

Throughout its history, Bulgaria has used various types of electoral systems. However, after the proportional representation system was implemented during the transition period, it was considered the best among the many before. The proportional representation system enables all interests and groups in society to be represented in the Parliament. Policies established on this specific system enjoy overall approval and enhance the legitimacy of the political system.

As a result, a large number of particular interests are represented in the Parliament, but the number of MPs with professions that could be useful for the work of the parliamentary committees is limited. The various professions are listed as follows:

<i>Profession</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Engineer	50	20.83
Lawyer	43	17.92
Economist	35	14.58
Lecturer	31	12.92
Medicine doctor	27	11.25
Journalist	8	3.33
Historian	5	2.08
Not presented	4	1.67
Other (architect, political scientist, philologist)	37	15.42
<b>Total</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>100</b>

Illustrative in this data is the fact that retired militaries (including a former Chief of General Staff) and security service personnel, being members of the Parliament, have presented other professions.

After the first democratic elections in 1990, the Grand (i.e. constituent) National Assembly decided to create the first National Security Committee (9 August 1990). Today, this is the permanent body that supports the legislative and control functions of the Parliament. In the next 'ordinary' Assemblies the members of the Committee are 36<sup>th</sup> – 29 members; 37<sup>th</sup> – 31 members; 38<sup>th</sup> – 21, and 39<sup>th</sup> – 28.

The chairmanship of the Committee has almost always been held by non-professionals. Only once, in 1991, the chairman was a retired colonel (an academician from the G. S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College).

For the first time, the entire Parliament underwent a significant change with regard to the structure of the parliamentary permanent committees that deal with security sector issues. The change predominantly transformed the former National Security Committee into Foreign Policy, Defence and Security Committee. The purpose of this transformation was to combine closely related issues under the control of one body. Chairman of the Committee is a philologist and PR person who entered the committee from university circles. Among the members, only one has a particular foreign policy education and another person a professional intelligence career. There are seven members with significant practice in democratic parliaments (25%) and more than two in the security sector. None of the members has either an education or previous experience in national defence and armed forces control.

Simultaneously, and for the first time, an Internal Security and Public Order Committee was established, which would work on legislation and parliamentary oversight of police and other special services that mainly belong to the Ministry of Interior. The Committee has a total of 24 members.

Among the members of this committee, nine have significant parliamentary experience (two of them with an education directly related to national security issues), which results in more than 37 per cent. A former Chief of the General Staff, head of the National Intelligence Service and Minister of Interior, leads the committee.

The lack of well-prepared and experienced members of the Parliament is well illustrated by the draft laws and amendments that are related to the national security sector. First, the basic laws and normative acts were prepared by executives. Therefore, they do not appropriately reflect on the process of democratisation and the transition of the power sector by parliamentarians. As a consequence, the security organisations started to reorganise themselves.

The influence of the intra-institutional interest is much higher when the ministers and directors of Services draft the laws than if the parliamentarians and their staffers do this job.

Secondly, this practice did not help to overcome the division of labour within the security sector organisations that found its root in the years of totalitarian regimes. In those times, every single service was ‘a state within the state’, which slowed down the transformation of a central system into various democratic reform processes.

Thirdly, this practice lowered the overall interest of members of security related parliamentary committees to participate in specific training activities.

Especially, after the years 1996/1997 direct connections (not always with positive outcome) between parliamentarians and professionals from the security sector (in many cases fired or retired), replaced the required training for expert building.

Some general conclusions regarding the preparedness of the parliamentarians are the following:

- The fact that the two committees that are dealing with the parliamentary oversight of the security sector are organised on the presumption that the security is most of all ‘external’ (foreign policy and defence) and ‘internal’ (counterintelligence and police). This shows that the entire Parliament (more precisely the majority in the Parliament) thinks very schematically about national security and its connotations.
- The proportional representation of the electoral systems does not presuppose a Parliament with professional workers in the most important areas.
- The Bulgarian political parties still lack well educated and trained party-members that could be performing effectively in their parliamentary job.
- The most popular areas of specialisation are those of foreign policy and internal security.

- The Armed Forces have no lobby and no attractive image among the members of the Parliament.
- The fact that the experienced members of the two committees represent less than half of the total is a source of irregularity and lack of depth and perspective in their work. The lack of appropriately educated people reflect the most serious problem and cannot only be compensated by experience.

(ii) Preparedness of the Parliamentary Staffers

One of the main problems of the Parliamentary committees is a lack of tradition to support permanent and invited experts. There are two reasons: On the one hand, the party members do not like to share specialised information, as well as the party's own position regarding certain topics with external people. On the other hand, the Parliament's tolerance level for hiring other experts is very low.

There is a lack of professional parliamentary staffers on an individual as well as on a parliamentary party group basis. The reason for this insufficient basis mainly depends on a lack of tradition. Bulgarian parliamentarians, some exceptions excluded, are not professional politicians. They do not receive the necessary training and therefore lack necessary sources for a successful individual political career. All individual politicians should follow the path of their affiliated party. As a result, the 37<sup>th</sup> Parliament session included two National Security Committee experts, the following session just one.

The entire 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament session seemed to focus on an enhanced organisation and use of expert knowledge. The reason for this positive development is associated with the level of education that was brought into the committees by new members. Most of them were better educated (studied abroad) and were able to integrate the values of parliamentary staffers. The new majority further wishes to avoid the former permanent relay on mid-level experts from the security sector institutions. A possible positive factor is presented by the nature of the

Secretary General of the Parliament, who was a former aide (legislative issues of the Security Sector) to the first democratic president Dr. Zhelev. In conclusion, the use of experts in the current Parliament has never been bigger with regard to all the years of democracy and promises in increasing development in quality and spectrum. In addition to the existing National Centre for Public Opinion Studies a department for Parliamentary Research and Analysis was established. The first of them has been systematically performing (since 1990) a public opinion poll and studies on security, defence, armed forces and military conscript service issues. The other contributed effectively to the creation of a concept for 'integrated Ministry of Defence' (2002).

The entire observations on the capacity of the parliamentary staff are based on less than one year of experience.

(b) *Presidential Staff*

The President is the Supreme Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. He appoints and dismisses the higher command of the Armed Forces and bestows all higher military ranks, acting on a motion from the Council of Ministers. The President presides over the Consultative Council for the National Security, which status is established by law. The National Intelligence and the National Guard Service are under his authority as well.

On a motion by the Council of Ministers, he declares general or partial mobilisation in accordance with the law. Whenever the National Assembly is not in session and cannot be convened, he proclaims a state of war in case of armed attacks against Bulgaria, or whenever urgent action is required by virtue of an international commitment. He proclaims martial law or any other state of emergency. The National Assembly is convened forthwith to endorse the President's decision.

So, the President of the Republic exercises his control in two ways: as the Head of State, responsible for applying the Constitution, and as Supreme Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces who approves the

defence plan of the country. The presidential role and status contain some possible functional problems:

- The President has to approve the quality of documents which he is unable to assess because of a lack of appropriate staff. Therefore, the act of approval is pure formality.
- The President's limited access to information forces him to execute certain acts without being aware of any possible consequences (e.g. the declaration of general or partial mobilisation).
- The President's right and obligation to appoint and dismiss the higher command of the Armed Forces (and subsequently to bear responsibility for these acts) would only work positively if he had a sufficient or strong relationship with his advising experts. The current situation only enables him to follow already existing personal structures within the hierarchy level, but does not provide him with detailed information about his individual co-workers. The current situation binds the President to the formal order of movement within the system, which prevents him from a substantive personal objective opinion. Basically, he is exclusively exposed to the existing network within the system.

In this context, the role of the presidential staff is extremely important, because in many cases their work reflects precisely on the balance between the centres of political power. In relation to the previously discussed situation – recognising a lack of personal competency – the first democratic President, Dr Zhelev, decided to establish a military cabinet that consisted of four senior officers: a one-star general as the head, and three colonels, representing in total three branches of the Armed Forces. Some observers in Bulgaria believe that 'the military cabinet' was a good idea but it was compromised by the struggle between the presidential staff and the General Staff. The clash was for more influence over the decision-making process in the Armed Forces.

Parallel to the military supporting staff, the President has a national security adviser that is responsible for the political aspects of national security competency of the Head of the State.

The next President, Mr. Petar Stoyanov, decided to abolish the existing military cabinet, as well as defence adviser, and only make use of a defence secretary. Paradoxically, during his mandate, the national security secretary was former Chief of the General Staff and the defence secretary, which is the former chief of the cabinet of the current defence secretary. Later, the former minister of defence joined the team. He got laid off his position during the last year of his mandate.

President Parvanov kept the two advisory positions, but for the first time they were occupied by civilians: the defence secretary was a retired rear admiral and the national security secretary was a former member of the Parliament (chairman of the National Security Committee) and an academician.

Without giving rise to doubt about the competency of these officers and civilians, it has to be stated that the President, in accordance with his own preferences, selects professional expertise from his co-workers. It needs to be emphasised that two of the important national services – National Intelligence and National Guard – work under presidential direct supervision. Furthermore, there is important job aiming, budgeting and strategic planning as well as work coordination with other organisations, that are not under presidential direct influence. Not included are the Military Information Service (Ministry of Defence) and National Security Service (Ministry of Interior).

The President is also chairman of the Consultative Council for National Security. The Council forms a crucial security nucleus. The Council has a unique task of bringing together the President, the Prime Minister, all ministers being related to national security responsibilities, all parliamentary leaders and the Chief of General Staff. This Council is related to the role of the President as Chief Commander of the Armed Forces. The circle of participants can be extended upon need.

The Council's function is mainly analytical and consultative, but its decisions have immediate foreign and domestic policy implications. The results of the Council's work carry enormous weight with public opinion. The Council meets regularly to review the security situation as it pertains to Bulgaria. Extensive reports from the intelligence services are subjected to examination for policy implications. The role of this institution is most apparent in situations of crisis.<sup>5</sup> One of the Council's shortcomings is the insufficient number of specialists involved in its work. There are almost no experts that support the Council on a permanent basis.

(c) *Political Secretariats of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Justice, and other Leading Representatives of the Executive*

(i) Preparedness of the Council of Ministers' Staff

There is no specific expert organisation within the government (called official Council of Ministers) that is oriented towards security issues. The only government that contained a small department – called National Security and Public Order – inside the Council's basic structure was under the regime of Mr Videnov (Bulgarian Socialist Party). The department consisted of two officers of the AF and a legal expert of the Ministry of Interior, headed by a non-professional political appointee.

The Security Council supports the government. This Council was established in 1998 on the basis of the National Security Concept that was adopted the same year. It includes the Ministers of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, the Council also includes the Deputy Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, the Directors of the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Services.

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<sup>5</sup> During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the Council met in various formats every couple of days to review incoming information about the quickly evolving situation and the parameters of Bulgaria's response. Following the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001, the Council met on a number of occasions to assess the immediate repercussions of the acts for Bulgarian national security. The wider implications of the new terrorist threat led the President to convene the Council with the specific purpose of strategic analysis.

This Council is not an organ that determines governmental policy in the area of national security. It analyses incoming information on security risks and threats, delivers short- and long-term risk assessments, proposes concrete resolution plans in situations of crisis, and decides on the allocation and use of resources of the executive. The Council further produces reports and has a permanent civil servant staff, headed by a Secretary of the Security Council. When needed, the Council relies on expertise from the Ministries of Interior and Defence.

Unfortunately, there is a limited number of staff members. Due to lack of political will and understanding, the Council does not enlarge its membership number. However, such an improvement is urgent, because the Council begins to play a significant organisational and coordination role. The intra-institutional interests of the Security Services are to be directly reported to the Council of Ministers, but are not supposed to be reported or in any way publicised.

(ii) Preparedness of the Members of Political Cabinets

An administrative reform has been an integral part of the modernisation package. The Act of Public Administration and the Act on Civil Servants have led to the complete transformation of public administration, which positively impacted the work of law enforcement agencies. Key elements of the reform include a transparent and clearly structured system of administration, a clear delineation of expert and political levels in the system, the introduction of political cabinets, the introduction of common educational and professional criteria for each position in the single classificatory grid of public administration, the introduction of well-defined career paths and so forth.

‘Political cabinets’ in the security sector ministries consist of the minister, his deputies (usually three to four), the press secretary or the head of Press and Information Office, the Parliamentary secretary of the ministry, and the political cabinet secretary.

Deputy-ministers should be non-uniformed political appointees, who are experts (or should play the role of experts) in particular areas of the

respective ministry. They further possess a functional responsibility towards the ministry. For example, the areas in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are international military cooperation and defence planning; personnel policy, social adaptation and judicial issues; finance and budgeting; and logistic and procurement issues.

Following the principal diversification of the sphere of functioning of the MoD, the deputy-ministers have expertise in their own fields of work. The deputy for international military cooperation and defence planning is usually a professional diplomat or senior retired officer. The deputy for personnel policy, social adaptation and judicial issues received his/her education in the study of law and often advanced to the level of a lawyer. Financial issues are handled by economists. And the issues of procurement and logistics are entrusted to a person with business experience or senior retired officer with a logistic background.

In most cases, promoted experts occupy deputy-minister's positions. Only in very few instances, elected members of the Parliament occupy this type of position.

The press secretary is strictly a professional, but normally without any practice in defence and security related topics. Here, a fundamental problem comes into play. The press secretary receives information from uniformed structures, such as the General Staff of the Armed Forces or the National Services in the Ministry of Interior. This connection represents itself as the weakest link in the line of communication between the uniformed and civilian sectors in the power institutions. In addition, some of the ministers used to work directly with the press secretary. All other information regarding the ministry is addressed to the Press and Information Office where more professionals dedicate themselves to the different topics. Generally speaking, in Bulgaria the practice of press secretaries personally handling large amounts of information to specific institutional activities does not exist.

In this regard, a serious contribution to more effective communication between the political cabinets and members of the Parliament was expected to come from the parliamentary secretaries. Unfortunately, most appointed parliamentary secretaries in those positions did not

have expert status in parliamentary affairs. Some of them were lawyers, others journalists, and a few only political or friendly appointees. Their main goal consists in informing the minister about the position of different parliamentary groups and to share with some of them the opinion of the minister. As a result, their work is mostly oriented towards promotion of ministerial ambitions and not to contribute to more precise work of the parliamentary committees.

The political cabinet's secretary presents a position without any preconditions for occupation. In practice, the person is specifically selected and appointed by the minister, based on their individual relation and level of confidence. In several cases, the secretaries played a much more significant role in the decision-making process than was expected from their job description. However, this role has not always proven positive.

Some general observations over the period of one year, with regard to the work performance of the Political Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence and its members, give rise to the assumption that a serious organisational problem has been in existence since the beginning. The decision-making procedures are aggravated by the fact that the Deputy Ministers of Defence also deal with work in the administrative chain of governance. A big part of the information and the filing turnover in the Ministry has to pass through the administrative chain first, and is then sent to the Directors for the final execution. This results in an exceptional overloading, a lack of time for thorough analysis of the problem, and an inadequate suggestion for its solution. Further, this information process can cause delays in deputy ministers' offices due to keeping correspondence for excessive amounts of time and possibly missing deadlines. At the same time, the Deputy Ministers of Defence, as members of the political cabinet, cannot focus their attention on performance development and the control of policies in their areas of responsibility. Moreover, the members of the Political Cabinet have no obligations in accordance with the Administration Organic Law to conduct administrative work. Such obligations would further contradict duties of the Secretary General of MoD. The focus on this organisational situation is purposely made, because it is a prevailing problem among many of the East European countries. It also negatively impacts the

formation of political employees as experts on the political level of security and defence.

(iii) Preparedness of Judiciary Experts

As of 1997, the legislature, together with the executive, fell rapidly into the line of European Union practices, laws and directives. At the same time, the judiciary lagged behind. International institutions, both EU and world related – such as the World Bank – had been drawing attention to the fact of upgrading and modernising the judicial branch of the government. A lively internal debate has taken place since 1999 on the problems of the Bulgarian judiciary, including matters such as:

- the place of prosecution (whether it should remain in the judiciary or be moved over to the executive, which would require a change of the Constitution);
- whether Bulgaria has to continue to make use of the specially designed Military Prosecution Branch, which had the purpose of investigating any illegal activity among military personnel;
- how the system is funded;
- modern training programmes that intend to prepare members adequately for new requirements.

Attempts have been made to solve the problem with training since the year 2000. A school of magistrates registered as an NGO – funded with governmental sources – with the purpose of tackling issues of training of members of the judiciary.

Such forms of NGO-government cooperations have become characteristic for Bulgarian politics since the late 1990s and have spread to many disparate fields. The Government cooperates with NGOs on projects dealing with legal and communication relations between local

government and citizens, such as the NGO-led establishment of municipal and region-wide mediators, ombudsmen, ethnic and minority problems, environmental issues and, increasingly, issues of sustainable local development.<sup>6</sup>

(d) *Representatives of Civil Society such as Academic Workers, Journalists and Non-Governmental Experts Working in NGOs*

In societies such as those prevalent in the Balkans, where many different historical phenomena have created especially acute distrust between government and people, the gap between the two is usually filled with one of the following: either a resilient and kinship-based traditional society, or a civil society. Bulgaria has both, but in a less traditional mixture. External observers usually agree that Bulgaria possesses the most dynamic – indeed ‘vibrant’ – civil society in the region of Southeast Europe.

(i) Preparedness of the Civil Academicians

The state and private universities of Bulgaria were among the first to identify a lack of basic knowledge and professional training on security matters.

The main reason for the late open debate on this issue is related to the fact that in Bulgaria military science is officially recognised as an independent area of science. Based on this fact, educational programmes were concentrated in institutional high schools that were subordinate to the ministries of defence, interior, transportation or construction. Each of those ministries contained military and parliamentary forces.

Because of that, the expertise among civil academicians on security matters was developed essentially only in the mid 1990s. Before, the

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<sup>6</sup> *Civil Society and Sustainable Development: Non-governmental Organisations and Development in the New Century*, Sofia, Centre for Social Practices & USAID, 2001, Ch. 2.

only civil educational capacity had been established at the University of National and World Economy, where a programme on economic aspects of national security was offered. The programme intended to educate people planning to work for the national defence production complex. Certain topics of international security were studied within the field of international relations.

Among the academic circles there were no centres for war and peace studies, crisis management in international relations, international negotiations etc. The first book on security was published in the 1990s by Professor Georgi Stefanov.

To fill the identified gap in training leadership on national security issues, a Centre for Personnel Training on National Security<sup>7</sup> was established within the framework of the Ministry of Defence. However, the establishment of the centre was based on the assumption that it would work for all security sector institutions as well as state administrations. The history of this small institution had a crucial influence on the overall capacity of the country at this time. Courses on national security were offered for about 25 officials with the rank of chief of department (for the uniformed – colonel/general) on an annual basis. The courses took place over a period of eleven months, with contact hours during one week per month. This course for the first time provided attendants with opinions from both internal and external aspects of national security, and foreign guest lecturers. The centre presented the first institution where civilian academicians and military experts worked together. In connection to the centre, a large circle of non-governmental and state experts was established. This team of experts created the fundamentals of national security documentation (the Military Doctrine in 1994, the National Security Concept in 1995, the Crisis Management Concept in 1997 etc.). Also, the first national and international conferences on security were organised by the centre. For the first time in 1994, international research fellows from NATO countries studied Bulgarian security problems in the country. The centre published the first Bulgarian security and defence magazine in English,

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<sup>7</sup> Initially the institution was established under the title Scientific Centre for National Security Studies in 1993.

German, and French, named Bulgarian Military Review. With the establishment of the National Security and Defence Department into 'G. S. Rakovski' Defence and Staff College, the centre was closed. Its original purpose of expert formation was still not fulfilled.

The second important ministerial training institution is the Police Academy. Since 1997, the work of the academy has undergone a level of transformation. The structure of the Police Faculty has been reorganised and changed with the introduction of three separate departments: the Department for the Theory of Investigative Work, Crime Prevention, and Legal Matters. The first department includes training in the areas of theory and practice of investigations, legal provisions of investigative work, and so forth. The second department focuses on two main areas: economic crime and organised crime. The third department is subdivided into three units: Administrative Law, Penal and Penal Procedure Law as well as Civil Law.

In addition, a special Centre for Specialisation and Advanced Training has been developed in recent years. This Centre carries out training courses for senior officers, provides specialised training in various fields and pursues international cooperation with foreign partners.

An entire new curriculum has been devised for the initial training of university-educated officers. The programme was constructed in assistance of experts from France and Germany. The year 1998 experienced the introduction of a new MA Programme on Countering Crime and Maintaining Public Order. An emphasis was placed on policing and EU law, strategic management, policing strategies and psychology of policing. The curriculum also included courses on International Public Law, EU Law in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, and International Penal Law.

A special course on 'European Police Integration' is being taught at the Police Academy. The course deals with human rights protection, European police cooperation, EUROPOL, and the police work ethic. Assistance for the transformation of the training programmes of the Academy has come from many sources, notably from the governments of France, Germany and the UNHCR.

(ii) Preparedness of the Journalists

Issues relating to freedom of speech and plurality of independent media were resolved for the most part as early as 1990–91, with residual problems remaining only regarding state-owned radio and television channels. In the year 1992<sup>8</sup>, independent radio and TV stations began their work. Two years later, 54 daily and 323 weekly independent newspapers started to publish. Since then, a dense network of independent press, TV and radio stations has maintained pluralism and critical debate, keeping the public both informed and involved in the decision-making process. Since 1997, an independent body composed of influential, politically unaffiliated individuals – elected on a quota principle by Parliament and the President – has regulated the state-owned TV and radio stations. This regulatory body was originally called the National Council on Radio and Television, and by the end of 2001 changed its name to the Council on Electronic Media.

In accordance with conclusions made by various types of public opinion studies during the last decade, people's attitudes towards national security issues depend predominantly on their education, access to actual information and age. Those three factors form the picture of public opinion that dominates people's personal commitment to their country's security. Seventy-five per cent of Bulgarians indicate that they would fight for their country in case of a national threat (September 1995 – at the middle of the transition period; a national representative survey conducted by the National Centre for Studies of Public Opinion<sup>9</sup>). The answer to the question 'what would make you fight in a war?' outlines a specific scale of values of post-totalitarian Bulgaria. The survey indicates that a threat against the homeland security would be the primary reason for people to fight. This opinion is shared by 80 per cent

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<sup>8</sup> Data selected by Evgeny Dajnov, director of Centre for Social Practices, a NGO based in Sofia.

<sup>9</sup> By studying public opinion, NCSPPO aims at establishing the necessary feedback between the population, government agencies and the politicians responsible for political decision-making. The NCSPPO team provides the Parliament, national agencies, political forces, mass media, NGOs and civil society with timely and reliable information on attitudes towards the progress of reforms and events of national importance.

of adult Bulgarians. The first six years of democratisation managed to emphasise the value of human rights and freedom, so that they were rated immediately after national security as possible causes of war. Values such as the preservation of world peace and keeping individual freedoms were abstract principles, not considered equally worthy to fight a war. One-fifth of the total interviewees held this view on both questions. The percentage of Bulgarians who would fight if their religious beliefs or the natural environment was threatened (9% each) was rather low.

The same survey shows that interviewees in large cities, those who are highly educated and middle-aged (30–50 years of age) are more likely to express readiness to participate personally in the defence of their country's security.

Here, this data is presented most of all to underline the importance of the actual, impartial and alternative information for the successful reform, democratisation and oversight of the security sector. The data, together with the basic education, reveals a transformation on the mentality and thinking processes of people related to security issues.

After 1998, defence and security issues became a daily concern to most people. This change definitely contrasted with the situation that had been in existence before. Issues such as the personnel and arms reduction (especially destruction of SS 23 missiles during the summer/autumn period of 2002), the debate over the political control of the Special Services, the preparation for the integration into the NATO, and the fight against organised crime and corruption became a focus in the daily agenda of most Bulgarians. This change predominantly resulted from the following: more transparency in the work of the state administration, and more professional reflection from the side of the media. The overall influence of the mass media on defence and security policy in the country significantly increased.

In reaction to the increased popularity of security issues, more media journalists started to pay close attention to this specific field, in order to meet public expectations. Gaining access to foreign data banks on all aspects of defence and security matters is easy and ordinary practice.

However, the media still struggles to deeply analyse security information and therefore often reports on a surface level. Observers believe that an enhancement of transparency and the strengthening of the NGOs' expertise will enhance the quality of media reports. They are most of all supported by the increased information provided by the ministries of defence, interior, foreign affairs, and some of the security services. A security community needs to consist of sustainable factors and conditions if it intends to provide transparency and clarity to the public. The media and journalists are such elements from the civil sector. They have the opportunity to create and maintain a spirit of cohesion and shared opinions in the future security community. The journalists show a remarkable aspiration for independent and informed expertise.

Among the large number of daily and weekly independent newspapers, as well as independent radio and TV stations, several have the capacity for national coverage and influence. Some of the names of daily newspapers are as follows: *Heavy Artillery*, *Trud*, *24-Chasa*, *Monitor*, *Standard*, *Sega*, *Dnevnik*, *Duma* and *Novinar*. The weekly issues that contain political information are *Kapital* and *168-Chasa*. None of the papers are politically affiliated and only two – *Duma* and *Democracia* – are strictly one-party oriented. Most papers permanently reflect on different aspects of the security situation and institutional activities. Therefore, the level of impartiality and professionalism is relatively high.

To provide higher publication qualities, seven of them (*Trud*, *24-Chasa*, *Monitor*, *Standard*, *Sega*, *Dnevnik*, *Novinar*) created specialised journalist posts on defence and security topics. Those professionals consider these specific fields as important for their careers and therefore show an increased interest in working in these fields. Regarding three daily newspapers (*24-Chasa*, *Standard* and *Novinar*), the leading journalists are former Armed Forces officers.

Concerning the electronic media, independent TV programmes with national coverage are of highest influence for the state. All of them, including the Bulgarian National TV (state owned), BTV, and Nova TV (both private channels) have journalists specialising in defence and security issues. Most of the releases discuss particular events and

elaborate on interviews given by key executives, members of Parliament, and senior militaries. Independent expertise is still a rarity on TV.

Among the radio stations, specialised staff is only available on the Bulgarian National Radio and the Sofia Office of Radio Free Europe. Additionally, the Bulgarian official news agency BTA has a professional in the field of defence and the security sector.

As previously mentioned, the number of journalists specialising in security policy issues is fairly small. Considering that 30 per cent of those journalists have military backgrounds, the additional training for others is not difficult. Interesting topics are methods of journalist investigation in the area of security and defence policy, procedures in defence planning and procurement, illegal arms trade and proliferation, global threat of nuclear and biological weapons and the spread of political terrorism.

### (iii) Preparedness of the NGOs' Experts

Bulgaria is home to a large number of NGOs, which have a significant financial influence. By the end of the year 2000, Bulgaria had an adult population of 6.4 million and 4500 registered NGOs, all of which had increased since 1989. A wide-ranging study conducted in 1999 indicates that 1,600 of these NGOs are active, and no less than 700 are in fact full-time organisations. Registered trade unions, sport clubs and various 'creative unions', which survived the transition away from communism, provide the sector with another 3000 organisations. The post-1989 NGO community attracts a total funding equal to 1.5 per cent of the total GDP. That represents the same amount as is spent on the national budget for the environment. It even exceeds the money spent on the national culture budget. Since 1998, one-tenth of all foreign investments entering Bulgaria have been attracted by the NGO sector.<sup>10</sup> Most NGOs are set up with help from Western countries or international foundations. The

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<sup>10</sup> *Civil Society and Sustainable Development: Non-Governmental Organisations and Development in the New Century* (Centre for Social Practices, Sofia, 2001).

major and influential NGOs continue to run primarily on EU and US-funded projects, addressing a wide range of issues, but focusing primarily on citizen and community empowerment in the decision-making and problem-solving process. Those facts have let researchers conclude that the Bulgarian NGO community is way more than just a political one. The community is dedicated to work and pursue – in all the different NGO fields – agendas of civil society and empowerment, as well as to overcome exclusion and discrimination. Furthermore, the experienced and influential non-governmental sector has been one of the major contributors to Bulgaria’s democratic determination. Since 1990, this sector has acted as a powerful guarantee against the abandonment of reform agendas, and it has been helping governments and parliaments move forward in the drive to modernisation.<sup>11</sup>

Established, influential NGOs exist in the fields of economic development, foreign policy and security too. Since 1998, a joint programme between the government and an organisation called the Non-governmental Resource Centre, has co-coordinated the retraining and resettlement of army officers made redundant under the army modernisation process. The same Centre has previously been involved in three regions of the country’s organisation of small and micro-lending schemes to enterprising individuals. The scheme was so successful that by the end of the 1990s the leading party of today (National Movement of Simeon the Second) appropriated the idea during the parliamentary campaign in the summer of 2001, and made it into government policy after the election. The same government set up an NGO Commission in the National Assembly. The Commission in return established a forum of 200 leading NGOs in order to tap into their expertise for government policy formation and legislative intentions.

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<sup>11</sup> It was the NGO sector that filled the now empty reformism niche by acting as ‘keepers of the democratic agenda’, as analyst Ivan Krastev noted in one international study of the NGO sector.

### 1.3.3 What Courses would be Needed?

Several comprehensive studies from the last five years focused on conclusions such as the one made by professor Peter M.E. Volten: 'The problem of reforming the security institutions is based on a lack of civilian competence, elite bickering, legacy of communist days and training a new generation of security experts and officers.'<sup>12</sup>

#### (a) *Assessment of Needs for Additional Courses*

The reality in Bulgaria fully confirms Professor Volten's conclusion. There are several significant 'white spots' within the national education and training system that are still short of the intellectual aspect of the security sector reform.

First, in both the civilian universities and security institutions' educational systems, several key topics related to the new type of security expert formation are still on a very rudimentary level of teaching, or even missing. Some examples are the following:

- *Peace and war studies*: a modern context that should help educate experts in the field of security in its international and national dimension. The training would target civil as well as uniformed professionals.
- *National security*: this course would provide a social, economical and political approach to security and elaborate on multidisciplinary and inter-institutional characters.
- *Democracy*: as an applicable theory and system of practices in executing civil oversight of the Armed Forces and other security institutions.

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<sup>12</sup> Peter Volten, Chapter I in *Towards Shared Security: 7-Nations Perspectives* (CESS, 2001).

- *Civil-military relations studies*: a methodology to analyse the concepts and practices of objective and subjective control over the security sector organisations.
- *Governmental studies*: in their strategic and political aspects.
- *Strategic leadership*: command and management for civilian and military senior executives.
- *Crisis management and conflict resolution*: in national security and international intervention context.
- *Human rights, humanitarian and international law*: regarding national and international security aspects.
- *National security decision-making processes*: concerning planning, programming, budgeting and management of the security sector resources.

An essential lack of basic education in the above-mentioned areas, as well as in several others, reflects on the capacity of both civilians and uniformed experts. As a result, additional training is needed in order to see them as comprehensive in modern understanding. However, the existing training restricts experts in a professional area without gaining a larger vision of the strategic and political dimensions and perspectives.

Secondly, the so-called ‘national security experts’, who occupy positions which enable them to oversee security organisations, were either elected or promoted from respective parliamentarian, executive, or management positions. Their training through practice is essential but very much depends on factors such as Bulgarian society as a political authority, public confidence, international prestige and even money. A negative impact, caused by a lack of appropriate training and comparative practical information about the experience of other countries, takes place

because people do not work/act creatively and therefore fail to contribute to a bettering of relations between society and security sector professionals.

Thirdly, members of the academic and non-governmental sector with expert status often find themselves on a very basic level with regard to security problems. For that reason, very few of them can actively participate in important debates. For example, the Kosovo crisis, the reduction of the army, the expulsion of some foreign businessmen, the destruction of SS 23 missiles etc. were unquestionably controlled by a dominance of security sector professionals. Society had no chance of any alternative ideas, evaluations and/or recommendations. An alternate expertise was demonstrated during the case of SS 23 missile destruction this year by a scientist who was affiliated with the Bulgarian Academy of Science.

Fourthly, the absence of regular training courses prevents important forums from coming into existence. As a result, civilian and uniformed people are deprived of an opportunity to meet with each other, to share ideas, information, mentality and culture. If those requirements could be met, a democratic security community could easily be established.

(b) *Identification of Needs to Enhance Formation and Training Courses in these Fields*

There is no doubt that the formation of security experts is a top priority for the successful implementation of reform plans, the successful preparation for integration into NATO and EU, and a further successful democratisation of the society. The main considerations are as follows:

- The global, national and regional security situation developed a tendency which, in comparison with a decade earlier, was much more complicated though not as destructive. Adequate reactions to this tendency require a substantive expertise in previously unknown areas of security. Examples are political and criminal terrorism, non-traditional military missions abroad and at home,

cross-border corruption, international organised crime networks, cyber-criminality etc.

- Dynamic processes within different security areas are high and are constantly being stepped up. This fact reflects on requirements for more and better experts in every tier of the security decision-making process, including its parliamentary and civil society context.
- There is an immediate need for a significantly higher number of well-trained experts who are capable of handling work in NATO and EU accession context. Again, this need is prevalent in practically all five areas mentioned in the NATO's Membership Action Plan. Considering that the best of them will occupy NATO and EU positions, a professional training becomes even more important.
- Following the defence and security services' reforms, their technical modernisation and integration into NATO and EU, the amount of resources delivered for security will be systematically increased.<sup>13</sup> This will inevitably require more experts and expertise to oversee and control the spending of public resources.
- Following further development of society as a modern liberal democracy and the application of European Union's judicial system and regulations – including the security sector – more precise work will be required in the legislation sectors of the executive and parliamentary branches. The quality of the laws and other regulations is crucial for the enhancement of the effectiveness and sustainability of the security sector. Similar expertise is also needed for the correctives: the presidential staff, the Constitutional and Administrative Courts, as well as the civil sector and media.

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<sup>13</sup> Despite the fact that Bulgaria has one of the highest figures of security expenditures among aspirant countries in the 2003 budget, there is extra money for both defence and interior sectors.

- The avalanche of security-related information that comes to both institutions and society needs to be analysed, translated into an understandable format and adequately presented to decision-makers and society. It is crucial for the evaluating/interpreting experts to profit from professional education and training programmes which are in accordance with friendly and alliance countries. As a result, the expert community will effectively contribute to the formation of a stable public and institutional environment.
- The ongoing reform of educational systems in both the civil and security sector demands higher requirements on the quality of teaching and research, and on the large scope of security problematic.

There is another important element regarding the situation around the expert formation in Bulgaria and countries that implement similar types of security sector reforms. Significant decreases in the number of civilian and uniformed personnel in the Armed Forces and security services (except the Police Service) serves as a potential source of independent experts. They can fill the missing expertise in state structures and non-governmental as well as academic institutions. The precondition for successful work among experts is appropriate training.

- (c) *Assessment of the Needs of Participants-to-be: Whom do We Want to Address with the Existing Courses and What Are Their Needs?*

In assessing potential target groups, the reality of the Bulgarian security sector needs to be considered. The sector seems to be homogenous, including both a system of organisations as well as procedures of political direction.

The number and content of target audiences is a product of national tradition and last decade's international cooperation in implementing different training programmes. Basically, they can be structured as follows:

- *Senior group*: members of ministries' political cabinets, senior military and security services leadership, members of Parliament, chiefs of local administration, and senior staff from state agencies.
- *Executive group*: heads of departments in ministries and state agencies, heads of departments in the Armed Forces and security services' (HQ), heads of the analytical centres from the security sector, chairman of inter-institutional planning groups, chiefs of crises reaction committees.
- *Supporting group*: advisory staff within ministries, senior planners from ministries, HQ, security services and state agencies, researchers and experts from situation centres and analytical units, crises reaction staff members, members of centres for excellence in security matters and civil-military relations, civil servants and uniformed personnel interested in individual expert formation.
- *Independent group*: academicians, researchers, journalists, representatives of local businesses, members of political parties, members of NGOs with national and local format, university aspirants and students.

The last decade's experience in security expert formation shows that the separation of potential members within different training and education programmes should be flexible. There are particular topics that senior group members prefer to discuss only among themselves. Any inclusion of external persons, especially from the non-governmental sector and the media, considerably confines the scope and depth of discussions. The groups preferably consist of people who are familiar with each other, even if they have only just been elected or promoted. For instance, at the beginning of the parliamentary, presidential, or governmental mandate.

Under different circumstances, mixed groups tend to be preferred. They provide each member with a unique opportunity to learn from the others. Furthermore, personal ideas can be exchanged, re-evaluated and possibly newly generated. This approach only fulfils its purpose if all members have an adequate initial level of preparedness. If this precondition is missing, than the debates are usually limited between better informed members and those who only assume they know everything but in reality lack the necessary skills to contribute actively to a substantive exchange of information. Mixed groups are also very effective when the topic of debate deals with current problems.

Finally, during the selection period the organiser should account for the existing education and the level of personal experience of potential course members. Certainly, neither the new members of Parliament nor the ministerial cabinets are those of ten or five years ago, not to mention NGO members. Factors such as education, personal experience, information, culture and mentality are different. For example, in 2001 a well-prepared seminar for parliamentarians on defence planning and budgeting failed since invited MPs had no interest in discussing an issue, because of their education and experience. Foreign partners who provide training opportunities often overlook this fact.

#### **1.3.4 What Possibilities for Expert Formation do Exist?**

The first efforts of expert preparation in the context of the new comprehensive understanding of security in Bulgaria were made in 1988. The reason for those first steps was the Vienna process of arms control and a non-proliferation policy. The three months programme was addressed only to selected militaries. The focus was set on international relations behind the ideological boundaries, mutual problems of security and a new approach towards arms control, early warning and international military cooperation for conflict prevention. Civil-military relations and any issues of democratic control were not touched upon.

##### **(a) *Programmes Offered by Foreign Institutions***

The presented institutions and their activities in Bulgaria are arranged in accordance with their involvement in Bulgarian security sector democratisation and reform. However, the way of listing is not so important. Over the last 2–3 years, the institutions have often exchanged experts and speakers, intending to provide the best experts for each of the topics discussed. However, the exchange was not always successful. There are also a lot of other foreign and international institutions that perform different methodology programmes on expert formation in Bulgaria. The following institutions have no incidental focus on the security sector.

(i) Centre for European Security Studies (CESS)

After the democratic transition, several Western institutions and research centres suggested short seminars and a series of seminars on democracy and the power sector. Among the first in Bulgaria were the East–West Institute and especially the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) at the University of Groningen, in the Netherlands. The seminars were primarily addressed to middle-ranked staff of the Ministry of Defence civilian and uniformed staff. Later, the CESS suggested a series of seminars for members of Parliament and key executive personnel. The CESS represents one of the few institutions that systematically participate in the security expert formation in Bulgaria. In addition to the training programmes, several Bulgarian scholars had the opportunity to publish research papers in English on security and civil-military relations issues with the support of CESS (see also Appendix 1.1).

(ii) George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies

The other institution that strongly influenced the introduction of civil-military problematic in Bulgaria was the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies. The programmes of the College of International and Security Studies and the Conference Centre of the Centre are well known. They are structured around specific target groups and cover almost all important issues of control regarding armed forces and democracy.

Since 1995, the Marshall Centre has provided Bulgarian experts, executives and parliamentarians with a series of seminars, workshops and conferences to support the democratisation process of the security sector and the modernisation of the security sector management. Until the year 2002, the focus was towards defence management (1995); defence planning and budgeting (1996, 1997 and 1998); civil-military planning and performance in crisis management (1999); and resource planning and management (2001). High training quality and an adequate selection of topics with regard to national needs are guaranteed by professors from the College of International and Security Studies, experts from the Defence Analysis Institute (Virginia), parliamentarians and experienced generals and senior officers from Germany, the USA, and other countries, as well as distinguished institutes and research centres (see also Appendix 1.2).

(iii) Hans Seidel Stiftung

Among the many influential institutions, the Hans Seidel Stiftung needs to be mentioned. This institution paid special attention to the intellectual support of the democratisation of security services in the Ministry of Interior. A series of conferences took place and a number of works were published in order to promote democratic thinking and reform know-how (see also Appendix 1.3).

(b) *Programmes Offered by National Educational and Research Institutions*<sup>14</sup>

(i) ‘G. S. Rakovski’ Defence and Staff College

The G. S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College is the oldest military education and training school, which in 2001 gained College status. It is recognised by the State Accreditation Agency following general civil rules. To develop a suitable environment for education and research in the G. S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College, the existing General Staff Faculty, in the year 2000, was transformed into a National Security and a Defence Faculty.<sup>15</sup> The Faculty implements a series of security, defence and war level courses (see Appendix 1.4).

- Senior course on *Strategic Leadership and Management of the National Defence and Armed Forces*:

The idea of the course is the sharing of responsibilities for the defence aspect of the national security, which should be based on common recognition of the importance of the specific political-economic expertise of civilian leadership, and the unique military expertise of the officers’ corps. This raises the non-discussible need of educated political strategists and military politicians. The joint education on strategic art is the key factor for both sides to achieve a new culture of thinking and acting. Furthermore, it coincidentally serves the national interests and is compatible with the modern Euro-Atlantic style in defence policy. The strategic level of military education faces a challenge by creating a liaison between the defence sector and political decision-makers.

The goal of the educational programme is to introduce members into the complex of conditions and factors that form the strategic environment of the national security and defence. Among them,

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<sup>14</sup> The copyright belongs to the mentioned institutions. Translation is non-official.

<sup>15</sup> The General Staff Faculty was established in 1993 when the country authorities decided to cancel the practice of all senior military leadership being educated in Moscow’s Voroshilov Academy. Originally, the Faculty was designed for a small number of officers (up to 12) who plan to be promoted to generals and admirals.

senior military staff lead the armed forces to give them knowledge about modern methods and approaches in analysis and estimation, and to prepare them to solve basic issues that concern the strategic leadership of the armed forces. They were looked up to as a higher stage of military qualification on national security, defence and military policy, and military strategy.

The scope of the course is designed to refer members to search for answers to the great questions of peace, war, armed forces and the strategy for their development and utilisation:

Which are the main tendencies in security and military areas that influence national security and defence policy?

How should defence policy be structured and developed in conditions of a democratic political system, openness of the military activities and a civilian political leadership?

What are and how should the key characteristics of the Bulgarian military strategic culture be developed? What should be the balance between the national and international elements in the strategy?

What are the characteristics of the future military conflict in the region and how do they reflect on force planning? How should the strategy be developed during the next decades? What operational capacity should the Armed Forces possess? How is the modern military strategy related to diplomacy in conflict prevention and crises management?

Which internal factors and conditions influence the strategic processes in security and defence? How can strategic and force planning balancing be accomplished with limited economical and demographic resources?

How to relate the defence policy with the growing civil society and the free media?

What are the characteristics of the contemporary military professionalism? How to implement the Western concept of modern strategic leadership? What should their new social status be?

The course is designed for civilian and military personnel from all the state institutions, including foreigners (under contract with the Ministry of Defence). The attending military personnel ranks from commander, high-level staff officer, general, to flag officer. Civilians should at least be in a head of department position. The course extends over one academic year.

- For those who are not interested or who do not have the required graduate education to study campaign and operations planning (military art), there is a shorter (six months) version of the course. Most of the civilians from the Ministry of Defence, state and local administrations attend this course.
- Advanced distributed learning course on *National Security and Defence*

This is a postgraduate specialised course designed for those who occupy senior positions in the security sector and the state administration. In the future, the course will be limited only to working places in ADL laboratories. The first experimental course will start in September 2002 with six participants. The Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands donated the newly equipped ADL lab.

- *Programme for orientation and expert support to parliamentary oversight of security sector*

The programme was initiated by the National Security and Defence Faculty and suggested to the Parliament through the Minister of Defence in begging for the mandate of the entire (39<sup>th</sup>) Parliament. It is aimed in the first place to provide focused initial training of those MPs who do not have relative education or political practice to perform effective parliamentary oversight of the security system. Simultaneously a group of experts was organised to meet eventual parliamentary requests for professional expertise on specific issues.

- *Programme for orientation of the Political Cabinet of the Minister of Defence*

The newly appointed Minister of Defence requested the programme for the first time in 2001. It was designed in the National Security and Defence Faculty and performed by selected experts and professors. The programme lasted two weeks, two and half-hours daily. The audience included the Minister, all deputies, the secretary of the Political Cabinet, the speaker of the Ministry, all the Minister's advisers and the parliamentary secretary.

(ii) Police Academy

The modernisation of expert formation for the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and its National Services is related to the MoI 'European Integration Programme of the Ministry of Interior for the period of 1998–2000' and the 'National strategy for combating criminality'. In their context, one of the main aims is 'Enhancement and strengthening administrative capacity of the Ministry of Interior in accordance with the European norms and standards'.

The enhancement and strengthening of the administrative capacity of the National Services of the MoI are related to deep changes in the way of education and training of security services personnel followed by institutional and legislative reforms. Based on that, the Faculty of

‘Police’ in the Academy of Ministry of Interior developed (in 1998) a five year programme aimed at the ‘Modernisation of the organisation of the Faculty to meet the new requirements for education and training’, the ‘High quality of accreditation criteria on specialties of education and training police experts’ and the ‘Adaptation curricula to European police force education and training standards’.

The reason for the first aim is the increased number of students and recognition of a specialised education for the newly established National Services Border Police, the Gendarmerie and the combat against organised crime. Another need was identified in the field of special courses for the qualification and requalification of the senior leadership of the Ministry of Interior.

The average annual number of students that make up the faculty is as follows: bachelor degree – 400; extra-mural – 350; master degree – 20; courses for qualification and requalification – more than 1200.

The staff of the Faculty specifically underlined that the number of special seminars with foreign instructors has been significantly enlarged since 1999. French specialists have presented courses on the methodology of police force training. The Hans Seidel Foundation from Germany has sponsored a series of conferences on police reform, including the exchange of education and training expertise with the Bavarian Police.

The second aim reflects on the quality of education of police experts. The basic educational specialty for the police experts is ‘Counteraction to criminality and guarding public order’ (see Appendix 1.5).

(iii) New Bulgarian University

The New Bulgarian University was the first private university to suggest a master degree programme on national and international security. It was developed at the Political Science Department in the year 2000. The programme is designed for students who have a bachelor's degree in any of the following fields: philosophy, sociology, journalistic, political science, economics, international relations, and protection of national security. The authors consist of a team of lecturers, mainly from the Police Academy. As a result, the programme is based on general security knowledge, but with a focus on internal aspects of security. Examples are: public order and the role of police, protection of national security and the role of counterintelligence, the fight against organised crime, the role of the Ministry of Interior Services, and crisis management. The international, legal, psychological aspects of security are relatively well presented. The qualification training is more oriented towards police and counterintelligence functions than towards other aspects of security. In spite of a large list of institutions in which graduates could possibly find a future occupation, the programme is mostly designed for all Ministry of Interior Services and security officers in private businesses.

Similar in content is the programme performed at the Public Administration Department. Here, focus is given more to issues related to the administration and governance of security sector institutions. In fact, the programme was initiated in the context of the new Act of Public Administration and the Act on Civil Servants. These laws have led to the complete transformation of public administration including the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior. For that reason, the programme is a well-designed module on civil-military relations (see also Appendix 1.6).

The Department of Economics also provides a course (30 academic hours) on *Security and Economics*. The course is taught by a professor from the University of National and World Economy.

(iv) University for National and World Economy

This state university offers two programmes related to security expert formation. The *International and National Security* programme is designed for bachelor and master degree education in International Relations. This programme is one of the oldest in the civilian sector to contribute to security expert formation. Most Bulgarian diplomats and foreign policy experts graduated here. The security aspect of the programme underwent a total change after the end of the Cold War.

The other programme, called *National Security and Defence Economics*, has contributed to security expert formation for a long time (primarily in aspects of defence). This programme aims to prepare finance and resource management experts for the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, the national defence industrial complex, and state financial as well as all other institutions dealing with financial or defence related resources. The programme is designed for bachelor and master degree level, and different postgraduate studies (see also Appendix 1.7).

A similar programme, called *Security and Economics*, is carried out at the New Bulgarian University.

(v) Varna Free University

This private university offers two programmes for civilian experts belonging to the state, regional and local administrations, as well as services that provide public order and security. A focus is further given to the institutional system for executing penalties, business companies and bank security (see also Appendix 1.8).

### **1.3.5 What possibilities for Expert Formation, which you would consider necessary, are not available and who would ideally offer them?**

Generally, expert formation in the area of security includes the following activities:

- basic security education;
- specific training (postgraduate) and retraining in concrete security fields;
- training in applying expert's methodology and methods;
- comprehensive practice;
- theoretical and field research;
- collection and use of adequate data;
- development of modern operational and communicative skills.

In conclusion of Chapter 3, a systematically functioning system of expert formation for the security sector has not been arranged yet. The main reason for this problem is related to the fact that state officials still do not consider individual security organisations as being part of a security sector. From the bottom to the top layer of the hierarchy, all expert and policy institutions are separated, which prevents the establishment of a coherent security sector concept.

Expert formation further requires a strategy and long-term focus, which represents another fundamental problem because the issue reflects on the civil sector, armed forces, police, judicial system and special services. The creation of such a long-term sustainable policy should be the work of top-level national security decision-makers – members of the Government, the President and the Parliament – with the strong involvement of capable academic and civil sector institutions.

As a result, there are several important missing elements in Bulgaria's prevailing concept of expert formation. First, there is still no developed approach towards security sector professional, and security sector expert formation. The education and training of professionals is well organised on every functional level, but lacks the main purpose of educating them as security experts. Professionals have sophisticated knowledge in their field, but lack a high amount of interdisciplinary knowledge, current information and major practice. To overcome this problem, one needs to understand that training without basic education results in a limited positive effect, and that education without specialisation as well as actualisation does not turn a person into an expert either.

Secondly, in accordance with the traditional public belief, security experts are only those that belong, or have been members of the security sector organisations. There is not a single chance that a person only with a good education (possibly received abroad), or research achievements will be recognised as a security expert. Further, political parties, big private businesses, consulting companies and even academic bodies prefer to hire former security professionals instead of investing in a long-term education and training of experts.

Thirdly, the country still lacks enough expertise to educate security experts in accordance with the modern understanding of this term. All the security sector educational institutions are still in comprehensive reforms and the civil colleges are on an initial level of collecting expertise. Even the publicly accessible literature on security issues is still extremely limited.

Fourthly, the expertise provided by foreign partners, with a few exceptions, discusses the same topics and training forms as a decade ago. The role of Bulgarian beneficiaries is mainly expected to follow the best practices presented by foreign speakers. Most guest speakers are not well aware of the Bulgarian political system, the national chain of command and the decision-making machinery in security affairs. Not to

mention important issues such as national traditions and specific cultural particulars.<sup>16</sup>

Fifthly, security sector institutions have no interest in sponsoring independent security studies. Only after 1998 did the Ministry of Defence sponsor the first non-governmental research projects on defence related issues (White Paper on Defence and the Armed Forces). In 2002, the Parliament initiated a Readiness Indicator study that was realised by several NGOs. Also, the Centre for Parliamentary Studies (sponsored by the Parliament Institution) performed a support study for the concept of the integrated Ministry of Defence. The Bulgarian Academy of Science conducted, and is still doing so, research to contribute to the security sector reform. Foreign institutions sponsor most of the other research activities. This factor is a major contribution to internal developments. Unfortunately, in many cases, the practice follows ideas of foreign institutions and not specifically Bulgarian principles.

The national efforts compensate for these offsets. However, they will not be enough. The core of this part of the security sector reform, as was mentioned earlier, stands for a fundamental change in the Bulgarian strategic security culture. Without foreign support, many more national efforts would have to be made and there would still be no guarantee for the result to turn out to be what was originally expected. Regarding those support institutions, foundations and programmes which have experience in supporting such efforts, the following could be invited:

- *Comprehensive programmes:* Stability Pact for SEE, EU programmes (PHARE, TACIS), NATO Training and Education Enhanced Programme, national programmes that support democratisation in SEE, and others.
- *Security experts training programmes:* G.C. Marshall Centre, GCSP, NATO Defence College, The Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, King's College

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<sup>16</sup> The way of preparing and the execution of destruction procedures of SS 23 missiles in Bulgaria and in the Slovak and Czech republics were totally different and this is a good example how important the above-mentioned issues are for the environment of expert formation.

(London), CASD (Rome), Centre of Civil-Military Relations (Monterey, USA), IHEDN (Paris), Institute for Defence Analyses (Virginia, USA), and others.

- *Professional training*: Defence (war, joint staff) colleges and police academies that have nationally sponsored international programmes, NATO, PfP and TEEP programme, as well as others.
- *Multinational research*: EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris), Centre for European Security Studies (Groningen), G.C. Marshall Centre, NATO Defence College, ELIAMEP (Greece), UNDIR, ERGOMAS, and others.
- *Specialised programmes*: focused on general and political aspects of the democratisation of the security sector, and its control. Further programmes include: Open Society Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Democracy Network Programme, and others. Programmes focused on expert development include: Hans Seidel Stiftung (police), G.C. Marshall Centre (defence, terrorism, corruption), and others.
- *Information*: ISN, MERLN, CIAO, PIMS, Transition on line, and others.

### 1.3.6 What to Do?

In spite of the progress made in the last ten years, security sector reform continues to be one of the top priorities in the Bulgarian political agenda. After years of difficult and frequently painful decisions, the country's general political transition to democracy was successfully completed. Along with basic issues such as the introduction of democratic political and market economy rules, considerable efforts were dedicated to implement the principle of democratic civil control and democratically legitimated relations between the society and its security professionals.

Bulgarian security sector organisations already operate under new judicial and procedural regulations leading to strict political control and public oversight. Nevertheless, they still remain an important factor in the domestic democratic process. This is not because they represent any kind of threat to society, but because they consume a significant part of the limited state budget, and have an indisputable social role. The reorganisation of the security Services and the Armed Forces from the typical totalitarian status of 'a state within the state' to the size, structure and functions, acceptable from an internal and international point of view, is a process of extremely high political and strategic importance. Security sector reform in Bulgaria is a factor for strengthening civil society, ensuring sustainable socio-economic development and effective integration into the European Union and NATO. It needs special public (including international) attention, monitoring by the mass media, and comprehensive cooperation for development and implementation of effective standards, norms and procedures, which would guarantee both the effectiveness of the security sector and rigorous democratic control.

Security expert formation is a significant problem for the success of the power sector reform (not only) in Bulgaria. It reflects key issues such as security culture as an element of politics, contemporary professionalism in all of its dimensions, establishment of sustainable civil society and, most essentially, *effective communications (liaison) between society, politicians and security sector' professionals.*

A successful solution to this problem will impact the new national security culture integrating its main dimensions:

- the way Bulgarians think about national security (comprehensive security concept and the roles and missions of the security sector organisations, relations with other instruments of national power, required capabilities, expected combat and secret operations);
- the way Bulgarian state institutions act (decision-making, prioritisation, choices, civil-military relations) and the manner in which the civil society is involved in this process.;
- the way Bulgarian governors and the public think about the security of others –partners, allies and potential adversaries.

In this context, the primary mission of security sector expert formation is to prepare civilian and uniformed leaders that are skilful to formulate ends (objectives), coordinate (balance of interests), communicate (motivate), and provide resources (motivate defence as a priority). They should also be insistently and systematically ready to apply strategies to promote and support the national security interests by following traditional liberal democratic behaviour.

To reach this aim they must achieve excellence in the art of security vision, planning and performance skills that did not exist before. The sharing of responsibilities for national security should be based on a common recognition of the importance of the specific political-economic expertise of the civilian leadership and the uniqueness of the professional corps. Joint education and training presents a key factor in developing new security experts.

The programme maximum in security sector expert formation should be based on actual achievements and EU/NATO practice as a system of orientation marks. To fill identified gaps, activities in the following areas are expected:

- conceptualising the security sector with a general design for security sector reform;
- education of civilian and uniformed professionals;
- training of civilian and uniformed experts;
- comprehensive and systematic security studies;

- development of a system for the collection and deliverance of security-related information;
- creation of legal, administrative and social status of security experts;
- establishment of a security community.

*The conceptualisation of the security sector and the general design for security sector reform needs to be realised as a first step.* A concept of the security sector will be the organising factor for the political, professional and public debate on the future security architecture and security policy regime. It will help to overcome the narrow institutional way of thinking and will contribute to the establishment of a common language on security-related issues. The eventual successful conceptualisation will be an important tool for designing a framework of the security sector reform. Keeping in mind that many steps of reform have already been applied, the current idea is now to develop the security sector as a fully European system that complies with national interests, and is capable of meeting future security challenges. This step is large and complicated. An initial conference with the purpose of gaining the attention of top-level officials from the presidential, governmental and parliamentarian branches, as well as influential non-governmental actors, can facilitate a design of long-term strategy. The conference could be organised by DCAF with the support of the Stability Pact for SEE, NATO and EU institutions, as well as countries that have accomplished good practices in security sector reform over the last decade. The development of reform plans is a much more difficult and complicated story, but upcoming negotiations with NATO and EU can be used as a stimulating factor (similar process with regard to defence reform and customs reorganisation). Another important element that comes along with the planning process concerns the guaranteed involvement of independent experts. A permanent consultancy in key institutions has proven as good practice and therefore needs to be continued (there are foreign consultants in the Ministry of Defence, General Staff, Ministry of Interior, Customs Agency and others).

*Education of civilian and uniformed professionals is another permanent priority goal.* Currently, the Bulgarian educational system – both civil and security sector intern – finds itself at an unequal stage of reform. A positive interpretation can be the fact that for the first time all security sector colleges are overviewed by a state civil agency for accreditation. This constellation provides an opportunity for national standards to be developed and applied, in order to enhance military and police education adequately in accordance with real world needs. Furthermore, the needs of society and politicians from the security sector should be satisfied. As a first result, a new field of education was introduced, called security and defence. This consists of two subdivisions, security and military affairs. An immediate interest of some civil and all specialised colleges leads to the proposal for an accreditation of new master programmes in the new educational areas. New master programmes were expected to successfully compensate for the lack of education in the fields of security and defence civil staff.

The author's personal experience shows the following difficulties and deficiencies in which support is needed:

- There are several new educational disciplines that are not covered by in-depth and comprehensive national expertise. Those include: national and international security, civil-military relations, and management in defence and security services sectors. In many other more or less traditional topics significant improvements are needed as well. Regarding this aspect, international scholarship training for target audiences is necessary. The summer institute formula is appreciated.
- All previously mentioned study disciplines require a detailed description of the curricula. This includes an allocation among bachelor, master, aspirant courses of particular topics, and a preparation of student books as well as packages with fundamental/actual reading materials. It could be helpful to this strategy to create experienced visiting professors who have the role of lecturers or consultants. Here it is important that they are invited by the institutions and not only the colleges. This allows them to perform conceptualising and organisational roles.

- The improvement of educational process should be accompanied by intensive scholarly and expert research. As a result, the capacity of the lectures will be strengthened, a critical thinking mentality will be developed, and the authority of professional experts will be stabilised. Joint international comparative studies with capable and preliminary educated people could decisively contribute to the process of expert formation.
- A programme for the standardisation and validation of security and defence related basic educational curricula is appropriate. It will stimulate the innovation process, enhance the international mobility of education (students, professors and instructors), and provide a basis for the general interoperability of security activities. This type of programme could be initiated with the support of institutions such as GCSP, NATO Defence College (the Conference of the Commandants), G.C. Marshall Centre, the Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, civil universities and colleges (for example King's College), defence academic institutions with international programmes, and others.

*Training of civilian and uniformed experts should transform the educated professionals into security and defence experts.* Training should be most of all oriented towards acquiring specific methodologies and techniques in particular areas, including strategic, political, and international security and defence policy. The target groups are both civilians and uniformed experts. They should be able to communicate on a common language with regard to professional matters. Short intensive seminars, which last up to one week, could provide more time for questions and discussions. Such seminars could prove useful as additional forms of training. The list of topics should be commonly identified. In certain cases, locals may not know what information they might need in order to become experts in particular areas, whereas foreign partners occasionally stick too much to their country's understanding of how expert formation should be developed. It should also be stressed that a programme with a number of activities in one area would be more useful in the first run, before starting to cover many

problems and to attract the attention of a permanent list of participants. Another important factor to keep in mind is the problem of quick personnel changes during times of reform and downsizing. Furthermore, some seminars should be institutionally based but the majority need to be compulsory, with a large institutional and civil participation, including political parties and different NGOs. Very few institutions have limited experience in such comprehensive and systematic approaches. An example could be the George C. Marshall Conference Centre.

*The comprehensive and systematic security studies ask for international support to be transferred into national sustainable practice.* The country's experts and scholars have a still limited capacity to do such research. The lack of modern methods/means to study security can be identified with regard to Kosovo and other regional conflicts, as well as to the national fight against criminality and corruption. Besides the areas of economics and general democratisation, there are only few comparative studies in the field of security – mainly on NATO and EU integration issues – conducted by Bulgarian experts. A significant number of institutions contribute to the aspect of expert formation. What is missing is preliminary training on methodology issues. Without common methodology, clear and meaningful communication will never be possible. This could even dangerously impact political decisions.

*Development of a system for the collection and delivery of security-related information is an obligatory precondition for success in the expert formation process.* In comparison with neighbouring countries, Bulgaria is a leader in using modern information technologies, but still lags far behind Western standards. There are at least two key aspects concerning this context: first, the value of expert advice depends mainly on highly operational information and secondly, the necessity to place information at expert's disposal provokes and guarantees an enlargement of transparency in the security sector. Public access to security-related information was enlarged permanently in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, it is still mainly the same inside the security sector organisations. Often, new equipment is used for administrative purposes, with the exception of last year's practice in some of the organisations within the Ministry of

Interior. However, active support is received by partners such as ISN, PIMS, MERLN and CIAO and it could be developed even further.

*The creation of legal, administrative and social status of the security experts is an important element of the security sector reform. The successful realisation will provide the necessary stability and personal interest that are preconditions for expert formation. Foreign consultants could play a positive role by trying to reach this aim. Several foundations, including the Hans Seidel Stiftung, the Open Society Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Democracy Network Programme and others, could support initiatives in this direction.*

*Establishment of a national security community could be a natural result of the above package of initiatives. Generally speaking, Bulgarian society, the political establishment and the security sector professionals are not ready to go deeply into sector modernisation. They are not prepared or do not want to accept such great responsibility. NATO and EU membership perspectives strongly and positively influence this process. In any case, the finalisation will depend on the maturity of the Bulgarian society.*

## **APPENDIX 1.1 CENTRE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STUDIES**

(Groningen, The Netherlands)

Entire programmes and projects in Bulgaria<sup>17</sup>

*Democratic Control Programme: Parliament and Parliamentary Staff Education Programme for Southeast Europe (DEMCON-SEE)*

This is a three-year programme designed specially for Albania, B&H, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Several workshops have been realised during the first half of the programme:

- Enhancing Policy and Financial Accountability (Romania)
- Setting Up Mechanisms for Democratic Control (Serbia and Montenegro)
- Parliaments and security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- Promoting Effective Legislative Oversight of the Security Sector (Bulgaria)

Bulgarian partner to the CESS for the programme is the Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia.

*Extending Security Cooperation and Defence Arrangements in Southeast Europe Project*

This project is a kind of extension of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) that was finalised in 2001 with the in-house publication of Harmony Papers *Towards Shared Security: 7-Nations Perspectives*. The new project is organised around two study groups, each of 16 members (two from the each of eight participating countries autonomous republics: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro). The final event in the

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<sup>17</sup> The information is based on publications in *Security Matters*, a Newsletter from the CESS.

programme is an international conference, scheduled for Bucharest at the end of November 2002.

*Transparency-Building Project in Southeast Europe (TBP-SEE)*

This project is a pioneering inquiry to gauge the extent to which transparency is practised in the security sectors of eight countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. The results from the studies are expected to be presented in the Transparency Audit paper. An investigation of *Transparency and Accountability of Police Forces and Security Services* is being conducted more or less in parallel, but independently. The country coverage includes Bulgaria, France, Italy, Poland, Sweden, UK and USA. A consolidated review is the planned outcome.

**APPENDIX 1.2      GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN  
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES**  
The Conference Centre: Activities in Bulgaria,  
2001–02

A      *Bulgaria Defence Resource Planning Seminar for Experts  
(22–26 October 2001)*

The seminar was designed for experts from the Ministry of Defence, armed forces, Ministry of Finance, and other institutions involved in defence resources planning and management. The lecturers were from Defence Analysis Institute, Virginia. The following key topics were discussed during the five-day event:

- General model of defence planning, programming and budgeting
- Bulgarian defence planning goals
- Planning for national security
- Planning guidance formulation
- Defence goals and priorities formulation
- Defence programme formulation
- Defence programme development
- Defence programmes review
- Defence planning time frame and outcomes
- Synthesis of recommendations

B      *Bulgaria National Security Planning Seminar for  
Parliamentarians and Supporting Staff (29-30 October 2001)*

This two-day seminar addressed members of these parliamentary committees that primarily perform oversight of all security sector. The aim was to bring them together with senior expert staff from defence planning and management bodies for discussion of the following issues:

- Situation in security and defence planning at political and executive level
- Key issues for development of effective defence planning and management system
- Possible improvements in planning and performance system for bettering the parliamentary oversight
- Further development of the parliamentary committees' capacity for effective involvement in resource planning process

An important aim of the seminar was also to facilitate direct connections between MPs and their staff and defence resource planning experts. The lecturers were from the Defence Analysis Institute, Virginia and experienced members of the German Parliament.

C *Bulgarian–Romanian Parliamentarian Seminar (19–22 January 2002)*

The seminar was performed in Germany. More information could be obtained from the Conference Centre.

D *International (Regional) Conference on Institutionalising the Prevention of Corruption in Security Forces (11–14 March 2002)*

This conference was initiated in a continuing effort to support institutionalisation of the fight against corruption through modernisation of state institutions simultaneously with the strengthening of civil society. Based on two previous conferences that identified the threat to regional security posed by organised crime and corruption, and inventoried many of the current efforts aimed at combating these challenges, the Marshall

Centre provided assistance to countries from the region of SEE to design and implement solutions. The objectives of the conference were described as follows:

- Evaluate the effectiveness of current institutional structures that work towards preventing corruption
- Establish the components of successful anti-corruption structures including
- Setting standards/codes of ethics
- Character-building and training
- Prevention/identification
- Interagency cooperation
- Recommend areas for improvement in existing structures
- Facilitate future cooperative activities between international organisations/NGOs and security organisations towards preventing corruption

50 senior officials were invited as participants, representing internal anti-corruption structures within the armed security forces from 11 countries in Southeast Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. International organisation representatives and representatives of NGOs with the status of 'special observers' were also invited. The following key topics were discussed:

- Transforming leadership and defining norms/standards
- Building character and identity in an organisation
- Reducing vulnerabilities: accountability-enhancing structures and internal control mechanisms
- Internal investigation and prosecution structures within the security forces
- Increasing external cooperation with other government structures

- Enhancing NGO cooperation/public-private cooperation and transparency

The conference was organised in cooperation with the Centre for the Study of Democracy – a Sofia-based NGO.

E *Conference on Ethics/Code of Conduct in Bulgarian Security Forces (23–26 September 2002)*

The conference was designed for a large number of parliamentarians, executives, experts from the security sector, academicians and NGO representatives. The topics were in the context of ongoing security sector reform and the total fight against corruption and criminality in the country. The lecturers were experts from IDA and experienced people from the Department of Defence, Joint Staff and others. The basic objectives of the conference were as follows:

- Develop a clear understanding of internationally accepted ethical and moral norms
- Examine key factors involved in building military (security) forces in keeping with these norms based on a foundation of character, identity and leadership
- Bring about the realisation that such a force is the ultimate antidote to the disease of corruption
- Focus on the corrosive damage of corruption both internally and externally
- Initiate the first phases of planning and strategy to build national integrity centring on the most effective approaches and attitudes necessary to succeed

The following topics for discussion were planned:

- System of legal and ethic norms for the national security system

- Challenges to the security sector professional during organisations' reforms
- New parameters and requirements to the character, identity and leadership in security sector organisations
- Forms of corruption in security sector organisations
- Corrosive impact of corruption
- Further development of national integrity
- Structural, legal and organisational aspect of security sector reform
- Approaches towards confidence, credibility, consensus and cohesion building

### APPENDIX 1.3 HANNS SEIDEL STIFTUNG<sup>18</sup>

The Hanns Seidel Stiftung activities in the security sector of Bulgaria after year 1999 were focused on the Ministry of Interior (MoI) National Services. The projects generally consisted of expert research on specific issues designed in cooperation with Police Academy and the Institute for Political and Legal Studies (NGO), conference with participation of civilian and uniformed experts and scholars and publication in Bulgarian language.

#### **1999**            *Modern Institutionalisation of the Security Services*

Reorganisation of the services in accordance with the Ministry of Interior Law. Status of financial police officers. System of measures for protection of the national security. Division of political power and security services in Bulgaria. European Human Rights Convention and the security issue in Bulgaria. Human rights and security services. Refugee status procedures. Public relations and national security. Transparency in MoI activities. Mass media interest in counterintelligence activities.

#### *Prisoners' Regulation*

Prisoners in Bulgaria. Prison as a last measure against criminality. System of places for dispensing freedom in Bulgaria. Alternative to dispensing freedom. Civil control over prison's administration. Working activities for dispensing freedom. Public opinion formation for support of the prison's reform. International control for overpopulation of prisons.

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<sup>18</sup> The information is about projects realised after 1999.

## *Ministry of Interior at Threshold of the New Millennium*

Issues related to national security: Status and perspectives of the National Security Services. Harmonisation of MiO's Act with the European norms. MiO's Act as a legal basis for the fight against criminality. Information society: reality and perspectives. Counterintelligence. Information and information activities in National Security Service (counterintelligence). Confidence to special services. Organised crime. New century challenges and Bulgarian internal security. Refugees. Prevention in counterintelligence. Psychological war and counterintelligence. Bulgarian Police mission. EU cooperation in internal affairs. Civil control over police investigations. Administrative-legal aspects of the use of special equipment. Cooperation between police and the civil sector. Financial investigations. Measures against money laundering. Developments of the local police offices. Police control over the foreigners. Use of arms by the police.

**2000**

### *Police and 21st-Century Challenges*

The European Human Rights Convention and the Ministry of Interior' activities. Police education and training in accordance with EU requirements. Police permission. The Schengen standards and police collaboration. MoI reform: legal aspects. Police in solving refugee problems following EU standards. Education and training challenges in the MoI.

### *State Administration Reform and the Police*

The European Human Rights Convention in Bulgaria. Reforms in the Penalty Code. Local administration and police. Public order during elections. Administrative

reform and education in MoI. The human rights issue and the administrative reform. Intra-police coordination.

*Reform of the Penalty Code*

Tendencies in criminality. Specifics of dispensing freedom to ethnic groups. Civil control and monitoring commissions in places for dispensing freedom. Attorney's control in places for dispensing freedom. Prison's local public relations. Human rights and international standards for dispensing freedom. Prevention of criminality. Problems in reprieving procedures. The future of the prison's system.

**2001**

*The European Standards in Executing Penalties and Bulgarian Practice*

Situation in the national system of norms for executing penalties and its modernisation. Legal aspects of the reform. Legal status of dispensing freedom. International standards in executing penalties of dispensing freedom. Necessary changes in legal regulations. Rules of behaviour in prisons. Specific procedures in other than prison facilities for executing penalties. Dispensing freedom to women, underage people and foreigners.

**APPENDIX 1.4 NATIONAL SECURITY AND  
DEFENCE FACULTY<sup>19</sup>**  
at G.S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College

A *Defence and War Level Course: Strategic Leadership and Management of the National Defence and Armed Forces*

This course has been in operation since 1994. Before 2000 the focus of the course was military art at a strategic and operational level. No more than 20 per cent of the study time was addressed to issues of national and international security, defence economics etc.

In 2001 the curricula was totally renovated in order to provide knowledge on the following main topics: study and analysis of external and internal factors and conditions of the national security and synthesis of security strategy; strategic leadership in defence; defence planning and management; force development and risk assessment; campaign and operations planning.

The ideal result is for members to receive knowledge and skills to perform the roles of strategic leaders, strategic practitioners and strategic conceptualists in the way that maintains all positive aspects of traditional Bulgarian strategic culture and simultaneously implements a modern European way of thinking about security, defence and armed forces. The effect of this should be an optimal strategic thinking and acting on a national level and a high degree of interoperability in the Euro-Atlantic and international context.

In 2002 the course was transferred to a master degree programme whose accreditation from the state Accreditation and Evaluation Agency was planned for 16 September 2002. Even before accreditation the programme was in operation for the 2002/03

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<sup>19</sup> The other faculty is focused on the operational level of military art and has no programmes addressed to expert formation.

academic year. 25 per cent of the students are from the civilian sector of the state administration. Foreign students also attend the course.

*Binding disciplines:*

- National and international security
- Management of defence and armed forces, including strategic leadership, civil-military relations, personnel policy etc.
- Military strategy (national and coalition format)
- Operational art (national and NATO CJTF concept)

*Electives:*

- Information technology and C4I system
- Planning, programming and budgeting in defence sector
- Public administration in defence sector
- Political science (security and defence context)
- International humanitarian law (in peace support operations and other international missions)
- Military history (post-Cold War period)
- Bulgarian public psychology (in security, defence and war aspect)
- Doctrine of Land Forces
- Doctrine of Air Force
- Doctrine of Navy

The course is led through personal engagement with the leading teachers and the department in charge with all phases of the preparation, conduct and period after the lectures of each training module and the active personal collaboration of each member.

The individual works of the members together with uninterrupted faculty expert support, use of electronic sources of information, and preparation of essays and theses, are among the basic methods for learning.

Probably the most important innovation is the development of abilities to think critically (critical thinking was forbidden during the years of the Warsaw Pact at every level of military competence). During the course an interdisciplinary approach is applied, within the framework of which the participants study official documents and conceptions as well as alternative approaches and decisions on strategic issues of defence and security.

The study process is organised in training modules with a duration of 15 teaching hours minimum. The basic forms of training are a version of the modified Oxford Tutorial System and consist of lecture-discussions, lectures, syndicate workshops and different training activities, as familiarising tours, conferences and symposia. English and/or French, computer and communication skills are studied also. A special programme for developing personal leadership, psychological and physiological quality is included. The course is open to senior ranks from the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council member countries.

There is a special programme for visiting places and familiarisation tours to strategic command facilities, governmental and local administration authorities, defence industrial units, mass media institutions. There are also visits to military academies of other countries.

The course members participate in the Annual Strategic Research Project of the Faculty. It reflects actual priorities of defence policy as well as military theoretical issues at a strategic level. Papers are presented to the Annual Scientific Conference, after which the theses are developed as graduation papers.

B *Defence Level Course: Strategic Leadership and Management of the National Defence and Armed Forces*

This is a postgraduate course for those civilian and uniformed personnel from the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, state and local administration that are in a leadership (decision-making) positions but who will command troops. Duration of the course is six months. Approximately 50 per cent of participants are civilians. The curriculum is similar to the previous course but operational art is not included.

*Study disciplines:*

- National and international security
- Management of defence and armed forces
- Military strategy
- Information technology
- Planning, programming and budgeting in defence sector
- Public administration in defence sector
- International humanitarian law
- Military history
- Bulgarian public psychology

C *Advance Distributed Learning Course on National Security and Defence*

This course is designed for high-level participants (head of department and higher) who cannot leave the office either for one year or for six months. The course combines ADL technology with in-contact lectures and discussions. It is organised in ten in-contact modules with a duration of five study days each. Between these modules education, consultations and examinations are through Internet-based technology. The experimental first course began 9 September 2002. The modules were organised in four thematic groups.

*Thematic group 'Environment':*

- Third Millennium vision; issues of global security
- European security architecture: situations, tendencies, problems and perspectives
- Southeast Europe: border or bridge between civilisations

*Thematic group 'Methodology':*

- National security system and policy
- National crisis management system and policy
- National defence and defence policy

*Thematic group ‘Instruments’:*

- Strategic leadership and management in security sector
- Technological aspects of national security

*Thematic group ‘Practice’:*

- Civil-military relations, civilian leadership and democratic control in security sector
- National security strategy formulation

D *Programme for Orientation and Expert Support of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector*

The programme is designed to contribute to strengthening democracy in the country through effective parliamentary leadership and oversight of security and defence policy formulation and implementation. For this purpose experts will provide knowledge, information and practical skills, necessary to the MPs and their supporting staff. The programme will also create informal environment issues of inter-parties’ and inter-institutions’ interest to be impartially discussed. An additional aim is a circle of experts from the professional and non-governmental sectors to be identified and consolidated.

Methodology of the programme performance consists of: seminar thematic modules with duration of a half-day each month; discussion lectures with key national and foreign experts and parliamentary practitioners; workshops for the supporting staff designed in accordance with the parliamentary agenda; occasional expert’ reports under request; systematic information support through bulletins and web-based information. Proposed topics for the period of the first year of the new Parliament (2001–02) are designed following the Parliament agenda.

*Lectures and discussions:*

- Defence planning process
- NATO enlargement and Bulgaria
- Democratic control of national security sector: resources in the Budget 2002
- Democratic control of national security sector: procurement procedures
- Democratic control of national security sector: legislation
- International security situation and perspectives
- Security sector reforms in Central and Eastern Europe
- Bulgarian and international efforts in risk reduction: arms production and trade control
- Democratic control of national security sector: personnel policy and career perspectives
- Democratic control of national security sector: transparency and civil society involvement.

*Workshops for Parliamentarian Experts:*

- Force Structure Review 01: presentation and discussion
- Annual National Programme for Membership Action Plan performance
- Good practices in parliamentarian control over defence budget
- ‘Off the shelf’ policy in defence procurement
- Law of Defence and Armed Forces: discussion on proposed amendments
- Defence reform: criteria for success and failure
- Bulgarian defence industry and the national security – round table

- Public communications between the security sector, Parliament and the civil society – round table
- Methodology of National Security strategy formulation

E *Programme for Orientation of the Political Cabinet of the Minister of Defence*

The programme is organised in ten topics with a duration of 2.5 hours, presented as a briefing and question and answer period:

1. National Security and Defence. National security: concept, terminology, security goals, priorities, factors and actors, risks and threats, challenges. Defence: political category, classical and contemporary dimensions of defence, components of national defence, national defence power and defence capacity, defence resources, preparation for defence
2. Defence doctrine. Use of the Armed Forces. Content, aims and functions of Defence Doctrine. Use of the Armed Forces in accordance with the Defence Doctrine
3. Force planning and development. Organisation of the AF. Force planning process. Alternative models. Review of defence planning practice since 1992
4. National military chain of command. Organisation, functioning, legislative basis and procedures. Problems during transition period. NATO compatible system
5. NATO and Euro-Atlantic security issues. What is NATO and how does NATO work? Political and military structures. Programmes for partner countries. Internal transformation. Enlargement. Transatlantic relations. Relations with Russia

6. Regional security. Geopolitics of the Balkans. Conflict areas and issues. Military factor in the regional situation. Regional military cooperation
7. Civil-military relations and democratic control. Civil-military relations (CMR) problematic. Characteristics of entire practice. Defence reform as a specific situation in the CMR. Perspectives for further democratisation of defence sector
8. Defence and force planning. Concept for planning. Planning, programming and budgeting process mechanism and instruments
9. Human resource management and career policy. Concept and model. Legislative basis. Organisation and management. Problems and alternatives
10. Strategic leadership and management. Prerequisites for successful leadership. Revolution in military affairs in Bulgaria. Instruments of political leadership and management

## **APPENDIX 1.5 POLICE ACADEMY: MASTER DEGREE PROGRAMME ON SPECIALITY ‘NATIONAL SECURITY PROTECTION**

The programme is designed for correspondence education of personnel with bachelor or masters degree in other specialities than ‘National Security Protection’. Duration of the programme is 30 months. The course consists of the following study disciplines.

### *Binding disciplines:*

- Constitutional law
- International public law
- Penal code
- Penalty-procedures law
- Theory of counterintelligence
- Strategic assessment and management in counterintelligence organisations
- Psychology in counterintelligence organisations’ management
- Counterintelligence for economic security

*Criminalistica:*

- Theory of intelligence
- Psychology of intelligence
- Intelligence counter measures
- Management in intelligence organisations
- Policy and public authority
- EU law
- Economic aspects of European integration
- Balkan people ethnic psychology and security
- Information security

*Electives:*

- Technical equipment in intelligence and counterintelligence
- Counterintelligence in armed forces
- Counterintelligence in war time
- Philosophy
- Sociology
- International relations
- Administrative law and process
- Marketing
- Environmental law
- Ethics

## **APPENDIX 1.6 THE NEW BULGARIAN UNIVERSITY (SOFIA): PROGRAMMES OF THE MASTER DEGREE FACULTY**

### **A**     *Administration in Security and Defence Organisations*

This programme is realised by the Centre for Public Administration. The graduates could occupy positions as civilian experts in the administration of all the security sector organisations.

#### *Binding disciplines:*

- European security system
- Analysis of public decisions in security and defence organisations
- Investment management
- Finance and budgeting in security and defence
- International crisis management
- Budget accounting in security and defence organisations
- Business relations in security and defence organisations
- Logistics in security and defence organisations

*Electives:*

- Financial control and business-planning in security and defence organisations
- Acquisition in security and defence organisations
- Administration of state and war-time resource reserves
- International cooperation in security and defence
- State arms double use goods trade control
- Administrative control and certification of arms production
- Archives in security and defence organisations
- Economic stability and national security
- Civil Protection Agency: organisation and management
- Research and development studies in security and defence organisations
- Environmental defence and armed forces
- State confidential information protection
- Defence industry
- Administration in special services (intelligence, counterintelligence, antiterrorist, fight against organised crime)

**B** *National and International Security*

This master degree programme is presented by the Department of Political Science. The graduates could occupy civilian positions in security and defence organisations and foreign policy administration.

*Preparation courses:*

- History of international relations
- Theory and doctrines in international relations
- International conflict and national security
- Introduction to European integration

*Binding disciplines:*

- Foundations of security policy
- Theory of intelligence
- Theory of counterintelligence
- Criminology
- Corporative and business intelligence
- Police intelligence
- Specialised courses on foreign languages

*Electives:*

- International and corporate law
- Common European security and defence policy
- Information aspects of security
- Economics and security
- Personal relations in intelligence and counterintelligence
- International finance security
- Psychology of security
- Civil-military relations
- Legal basis of security
- History of intelligence
- International security organisations

- International military and police cooperation
- Public communications and security
- European legislation for security
- International humanitarian law
- Human rights and security
- Management of counterintelligence activities
- Global approach in the fight against narcotics

## APPENDIX 1.7 UNIVERSITY FOR NATIONAL AND WORLD ECONOMY

### A *Department of International Relations: Curricula on International and National Security*

The Programme is designed for both in-contact and correspondence education. Basic thematic modules:

#### *Origins and sources of security*

- Objects and subjects of security
- Historical development of the concept of security
- Political basis of security
- Balance between national and international in the context of security
- Concurrence and conflicts
- Interdependence and dependence in security aspect

#### *Subjective prerequisites for security problems*

- Culture and risk perceptions
- Stereotypes and misperceptions

#### *Understanding national security*

- Political nature of security
- Security concepts
- Subjects and levels of national security

- National security and democracy

### *Interests and security*

- National ideal, interests and goals
- Civil society and national security formulation

### *National security policy*

- Legislation and organisation
- Concept and doctrine
- Resources
- National security system

### *Instruments of security policy*

- Traditional instruments
- Security dilemma
- Military doctrine
- Intelligence
- Non-traditional instruments, technologies, communication and information

### *International and national security*

- Stability and security in the international relations
- Sovereignty, independence and engagement
- Military threats, conflicts and wars
- International security systems
- Mutual, collective, cooperative and regional security
- Security concept
- International security organisations

### *Mutual problems and security dimensions*

- Global interests and global security
- Security problems: arms proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism etc. Solving security problems: prevention, crisis management, peace support, human rights, etc.
- Regional problems of security

### *National security and foreign policy*

- Alternative strategies
- Integrating national security into international. Intelligence information as a resource

### *Internal dimensions of national security*

- Public order
- Social security
- Demographic aspect of security
- Ecology
- National cultural traditions
- New threats: religious fundamentalism, separatism, terrorism, organised crime, corruption

### *Bulgarian security policy*

- National security concept
- National security system: organisation and functioning

### *Information security*

### *Economic security*

- Stability and regulations of world economy
- Economic dimensions of national security and instruments of national security policy

### *Corporate security*

- Issues of confidentiality
- Business confidentiality and security
- Organised crime and corporate security

### *European security*

- Concept and approaches
- Security organisations
- Cooperative and common policies

### *Bulgarian national security and foreign policy*

- Geopolitical factors
- Security environment
- National foreign policy priorities
- Approach towards alliances
- Membership in NATO and EU

## **B** *Department of National and Regional Security: Curricula on National Security and Defence Economics*

The programme is designed for a masters degree on Defence and Security Economics in contact and correspondence education. The course is the first basic one and is aimed at introducing the concept, theory, terminology and other fundamental knowledge related to defence economics problematic. The Curricula is organised in information blocks.

### *First information block*

1. Defence economics, methodology of study
2. National economy system in support of national defence
3. Economy of the public expenditures for defence
4. Public sector in mixed economy and the national defence
5. Resources for defence

*Seminars:* Introduction and macroeconomic issues in defence economics

*Second information block*

6. International trade and defence
7. International finances and defence
8. Defence expenditures and economic development
9. Economic aspect of security and national defence
10. International finance institutions, debts and defence
11. Investments in national defence and economic development

*Seminars:* International economic aspects of national defence economics

*Third information block*

12. Defence industrial base
13. Budgeting
14. Defence and rehabilitating funds
15. Social policy in defence sector

*Seminars:* Microeconomic issues of national defence economics

*Fourth information block*

16. Introduction to defence financial management
17. Defence budgeting concepts review
18. Foundations of budget planning

19. Defence financial management system
  20. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
  21. Accounting systems in defence sector
  22. Practising PPBS
- Seminars:* Financial management of defence expenditures

## **APPENDIX 1.8 VARNA FREE UNIVERSITY**

### **A Graduate Programme on National Security Protection**

The programme is designed to provide a bachelor degree in national security protection in eight semesters in contact and nine through correspondence.

#### *Binding disciplines:*

- General theory of state
- General theory of law
- Constitutional law
- Administrative law and process
- International public law
- Penalty code and process
- Labour law
- Police code of conduct
- Criminology
- Intelligence and protection of the Constitution
- Intelligence and economic security
- Psychology of intelligence
- Theory of counterintelligence
- Counterintelligence
- Theory of intelligence
- Information support of the national security protection
- Intelligence service management
- International and national security
- Environmental security
- Others

#### *Electives:*

- Bulgarian law history
- Economics
- Philosophy
- Marketing
- Legislation in the insurance business
- EU legislation
- Others

**B** *Graduate Programme on Counteraction to Criminality and Protection of the Public Order*

The programme is designed to provide a bachelor degree in Counteraction to criminality and protection of the public order in eight semesters in contact and ten through correspondence. Graduates could occupy positions in the prosecutor's system, in the institutions for preventive anti-criminal activities at national, regional and local level as well as specialists in guard business in state and private companies, banks and financial institutions.

*Binding disciplines:*

- General theory of law
- Constitutional law
- Criminology
- Administrative law and process
- Penalty code and process
- Police code of conduct
- Public order protection
- Theory of police investigations
- Investigations in financial sector
- Practice in criminal investigations
- Management of Police Service
- Psychology of police activities
- Organised crime
- Theory of state
- Pedagogic in penalty service
- Penitentiary law
- Information systems and technologies

*Electives:*

- Law of taxes
- Law of insurance
- Intelligence support to economic security
- Sociology
- Re-socialisation pedagogic
- International public law
- International penalty code
- Intelligence support for protection of the Constitution

- EU legislation
- Under aged criminality
- Judicial medicine