Ausgabe 1, Ausgewählte Simulationsberechnungen zur Raketenabwehr
erschienen in der Publikation "Schriftenreihe des Amtes für Rüstung und Wehrtechnik"141 Seiten (412 KB) Schlagworte zu diesem Beitrag: Raketenabwehr, Simulation
The intent of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing MISSILE DEFENCE (MD) discussions by focusing on the technical aspects. The computer simulation model RAAB (an acronym for the German word RAketenABwehr) was developed by the Austrian Armed Forces and is the basis for the analyses. In comparison to two other simulation models, "GUI Missile Flyout” by G. FORDEN  and "Mod 5” by H. Ch. GILS , RAAB includes simple Proportional Navigation Guidance in its calculations of the Interceptor Missile’s trajectory. Furthermore, RAAB can compute an intercept simulation and a simple radar simulation simultaneously.
A basic verification of the model calculations performed in RAAB is provided via a comparison to the actual intercepts of the Chinese "Fengyun 1C” and the American "USA 193” satellites. Subsequently, a brief discussion of the planned "European Midcourse Radar” in the Czech Republic leads to deductions on its ability to detect or track theoretical Iranian missiles heading for Washington DC or Vienna and consequently the time frames for a possible intercept by a two stage GBI (Ground Based Interceptor) deployed in Poland.
The main part of the paper investigates various potential ICBM (InterContinental Ballistic Missile) intercept scenarios, based on three- and two-stage GBIs deployed either in Ft Greely, Vandenberg, or Poland. The theoretical offensive scenarios considered are Iran against Europe, Iran against USA, Russia against USA, Russia against Europe and some specific scenarios involving the Far East. One outcome of special interest to the European component of MD is the question of whether the planned US-Interceptors in Poland can catch a Russian ICBM targeting the US East Coast. According to RAAB’s simulation results it seems to be, based on the kinematics, a "boundary” case. Thus, it is not quite possible to intercept the Russian missiles from the intended site in Poland with its two stage GBIs.
Next, this paper elaborates on the possible debris impact from a successful Midcourse Intercept and alternatively a Boost Phase Intercept.
Another special calculation is performed, where on top of a two staged GBI the Kill Vehicle is substituted by a 400 kg "Advanced Hypersonic Weapon” projectile. It should be noted, that changing the payload in this way turns a defensive missile into an offensive system. The paper concludes with a short discussion on a possible Iranian-Israeli missile conflict. Some of these MD scenarios include the US radar in Negev.